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Chapter 1
Preface
Understanding the behavior of financial markets in the future, the interconnectedness of
different markets, the impact of different investor groups on financial markets and related
topics are exciting and important objects of research in finance.
Therefore, this thesis dedicates its first two chapters to research that contributes to our
understanding about the information content in options markets for future moments of
single equity and stock index returns.
In Chapter 2, the paper “The Information Content of Option Demand” (with Ker-
stin Kehrle1) combines the concept of market sidedness developed by Sarkar and Schwartz
(2009) with excess option demand (changes in open interest) to construct a measure of op-
tions market sidedness that captures the sign and the magnitude of directional information
in public option data.
The motivation for the measure is as follows; directionally informed investors have an
incentive to trade in those contracts that provide them with high leverage. This im-
plies that the increase in the open interest of high leverage options (out-of-the money
options) should be larger than the change in the open interest of low leverage options (in-
the-money options). Additionally, when informed investors have positive information we
expect a higher demand for call options than for put options and vice versa in the negative
information case. Therefore in order to capture situations characterized by a high degree
of positive information we relate changes in the open interest of out-of-the-money (OTM)
call options (the most attractive options for investors with positive information) to the
1Swiss National Bank
1
Preface
change in open interest of in-the-money (ITM) put option contracts. So our positive infor-
mation measure is the 30-day rolling correlation between the change in the open interest
of OTM call options and the change in open interest of ITM put options. We construct
an analogous options market sidedness (OMS) measure for detecting when investors have
negative information.
Intuitively, a low value of our measure implies that increases in demand for contracts
that are particularly sensitive to information trading are not associated with increases
in demand for contracts that are relatively insensitive to information trading. In the
terminology of Sarkar and Schwartz (2009) the market is one-sided and is characterized
by asymmetric information. On the other hand a high value of our measure indicates that
demand for information trading sensitive contracts is also associated with increases in
demand for contracts that are information insensitive, the market is two-sided and option
demand is more likely driven by heterogeneous beliefs.
To examine whether options market sidedness captures informed trading, we use a
dataset of all exchange traded securities at the intersection of OptionMetrics Ivy DB, the
CRSP daily return files from January 1996 until December 2009 with more than 5 million
observations.
We find that options market sidedness predicts the sign and the magnitude of future
returns of the underlying even after controlling for a wide range of factors (including
alternative measures of informed trading).
Trading strategies based on options market one-sidedness are highly profitable. Using
options market sidedness to select option contracts yields average returns of 22% for OTM
calls and 26% for OTM puts over roughly four weeks. To make sure that our results are
robust to option bid-ask spreads and the implicit leverage of options we construct long-
short equity portfolios based on options market one-sidedness. Our strategies generate
monthly risk-adjusted returns of 2.21%.
Further, we study options market sidedness prior and post to M&A announcements to
examine whether our measure indicates the presence of significant asymmetric information
that is resolved on the announcement date. Consistent with this, we find that our measure
2
decreases prior to the announcement and increases post announcement.
Given that options market sidedness identifies informed trading it is likely that mar-
ket makers respond to the presence of informed investors. We find that options market
one-sidedness is associated with future higher option bid-ask spreads. Additionally, we
find that a more one-sided options market predicts violations of put-call parity. These
results are consistent with market makers gradually incorporating the information in the
demand of informed traders and more generally with the perspective furthered by Gar-
leanu, Pedersen and Poteshman (2009) that demand pressure in options markets should
impact prices and price efficiency.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we develop a measure of options
market sidedness that identifies the sign and the strength of directional information in
publicly available options data. Using changes in open interest to compute our measure
of options market sidedness we focus on the part of option demand that is in excess of
the demand associated with other trading motives. Second, we show that option demand
contains directional information about the underlying. As such we complement Pan and
Poteshman (2006) who document using private data that there is directional information
in signed option volume but find no evidence for directional information in the public
part of their data. Third, we provide evidence that directionally informed option demand
impacts options market liquidity and price efficiency.
In Chapter 3 of this dissertation my paper “Volatility Information in Index Option
Demand” takes the idea of “Options Market Sidedness” to the level of index options and
focuses on volatility information in option demand and investor uncertainty. Volatility
informed trading in index options has not yet been systematically addressed even though
equity index options represent a substantial fraction of the derivatives market. Addition-
ally, the paper studies whether volatility demand in options markets is useful as a measure
of investors’ uncertainty about the macroeconomy. Intuitively, volatility information re-
lated option demand might be high at instances of high aggregate information asymmetry,
such as FOMC decisions on adjustments of the target rate or releases of data on unem-
ployment, GDP, consumption or other important macroeconomic aggregates. Hence, the
degree of volatility informed option demand might also project investors’ uncertainty about
3
Preface
macroeconomic news.
To determine whether equity index option demand contains volatility information, I
use the concept of option market sidedness as furthered in Kehrle and Puhan (2014) to
construct a measure of volatility informed index option demand (OMSσ). The measure has
the following intuition; since a common trading strategy to exploit volatility information
is the straddle trade volatility informed trading results in a joint excess demand (changes
in open interest) for at-the-money (ATM) call and put options with the same maturities
(e.g. Ni, Pan and Poteshman 2008). Hence to measure volatility informed trading I relate
the changes in open interest of ATM call options to the changes in open interest of ATM
put options with the same maturity.
More specifically, OMSσ is a correlation between open interest changes of ATM call
and put options pairs that would be part of a straddle strategy in a 30-day backward
looking rolling window. The intuition for the measure is that higher values of the measure
indicate a stronger comovement of the excess demand in call and put options that would
be part of the same straddle trade, which signals in increased volatility informed demand.
On the other hand lower values of the measure indicate less trading on information about
future volatility.
To investigate whether index option demand contains information about future market
volatility and investor uncertainty about the macroeconomy, I use daily CRSP data of the
S&P500 stock index (SPX) and data on all option contracts on the index as provided by
OptionMetrics Ivy DB from November 2000 until December 2010.
I find that informed excess demand in straddle option pairs has predictive power for
future volatility beyond current and lagged volatility and even after controlling for changes
in market risk premia, option implied volatilities and other variables. Furthermore, fo-
cusing on macroeconomic news announcements as exogenous events of high aggregate
uncertainty, I find that the changes in open interest for straddle option pairs are larger
and the predictive power of OMSσ for index volatilities is significantly stronger before
macronews announcements and decrease after the announcement.
Trading on volatility informed option demand yields annualized Sharpe Ratios for strad-
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dle strategies that in some cases almost double the Sharpe Ratios for a long investment in
the equity index. Sharpe Ratios (and returns) of the strategies increase with the strength
of the volatility informed trading, in particular during periods of high volatility.
The paper also speaks to the relation between informed volatility demand in options
and uncertainty about macroeconomic news. I find that a higher demand for straddle
option pairs before macroeconomic news announcements predicts larger uncertainty about
macroeconomic fundamentals. This implies that OMSσ is a potentially interesting new
measure of investor uncertainty about macroeconomic news. However, OMSσ is not
informative about the future levels or changes of the macroeconomic fundamentals by
themselves (e.g., does not predict GDP or GDP growth).
Finally, the third chapter of my thesis contributes to another important strand of the
finance literature, that is studies about corporate financing and investment decisions. The
investment timing of firms and the determinants of corporate decisions about the optimal
source of funding are central questions in finance that are so multifaceted that they provide
incessantly new research questions.
In “Financing Asset Sales and Business Cycles” (jointly with Marc Arnold2 and
Dirk Hackbarth3), we explore the decision of firms to use asset sales instead of equity
issuance in order to invest (financing asset sales). The traditional view in the literature
associates non-core asset sales with firms that are financially distressed and use the pro-
ceeds of the asset sales to repay debt (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 1992, Weiss and Wruck 1998)
or, alternatively, with financial constraints that create the need for firms to use internal
sources of funding in order to invest (e.g. Lang, Poulsen and Stulz 1995, Hovakimian and
Titman 2006, Bates 2005).
We start our analysis, by highlighting empirical facts from a sample of U.S. manufac-
turing firms in Compustat that cannot jointly be explained with the existing motivations
for asset sales. In order to explore the determinants of financing asset sales, we focus in
the data on the correlation of asset sales and investment and factors that increase this
correlation. We document that the correlation between asset sales and investment is sig-
2University of St. Gallen
3Boston University
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nificantly higher (i) for firms with higher leverage, (ii) in bad business cycle states, (iii)
for firms with attractive growth opportunities in bad business cycle states and (iv) our
results also indicate that unconstrained firms are more likely to use financing asset sales.
Motivated by these stylized facts on financing asset sales, our paper proposes a theory
that relates financing asset sales to the wealth transfer problem between equityholders
and bondholders and jointly explains the evidence in the data. Firms in our model are
financed with equity and risky debt; each firm has a certain amount of assets in place and
a growth option. Since the firms are partly financed with risky debt, the decrease in asset
volatility of a firm at investment creates the well-known wealth transfer problem between
equityholders and bondholders. We argue, based on our model, that selling assets upon
investment increases the leverage, which renders debt more risky. The resulting wealth
transfer from bondholders to equityholders mitigates the wealth transfer from the equity
holders to the bondholders at investment. Since the wealth transfer problem is larger the
higher the leverage of the firm is, it is particularly severe in bad states of the business
cycle where firm leverage increases. Our model predicts that firms with a higher leverage,
firms in a bad business cycle state and firms with attractive growth opportunities in bad
states tend to use more financing asset sales. These predictions match jointly the evidence
in the data and support our hypothesis that the wealth transfer problem is a potential
channel to explain the stylized facts on financing asset sales that we have identified in the
data.
We estimate a structural model and use the simulated sample in order to investigate the
model-implied correlation between asset sales and investment. The regressions from the
simulated sample broadly support the predictions of the model and qualitatively match
the evidence on the correlation between asset sales and investment in the Compustat data.
The conclusion of the paper is that financing asset sales are a significant source of
investment funding and provide an opportunity for equity holders to mitigate the wealth
transfer problem, in particular in bad states of the business cycle.
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Chapter 2
The Information Content of Option Demand
joint with Kerstin Kehrle
2.1 Introduction
A body of work in finance has documented the effects of asymmetric information on the
functioning of financial markets (e.g., Kyle 1982, Grossman and Stiglitz 1980, Easley and
O’Hara 1987). To financial economists and practitioners it is important to accurately
determine to what extent there is informed demand in a market at a given point in
time. Among other things options provide investors with leverage and therefore we expect
informed trading in option markets (see Black 1975, Easley, O’Hara and Srinivas 1998).
However, identifying informed demand is challenging since it has to be separated from
other trading motives such as hedging and liquidity. To further complicate issues any
return predictability associated with a measure of informed trading needs to be separated
from other sources of return predictability that are not due to directional information,
such as risk premia, volatility information or mispricing.
To deal with these challenges in a direct and easy to implement way, this paper combines
the concept of market sidedness developed by Sarkar and Schwartz (2009) with excess op-
tion demand (changes in open interest) to construct a measure of options market sidedness
that captures the sign and the magnitude of directional information in widely available
unsigned option data.1
1The open interest of a call or put option refers to the total number of outstanding options of a specific
contract type. Since the number of outstanding option contracts is endogenous, an increase in the open
interest indicates, endogenously, an excess demand for options. The existing literature has primarily used
7
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The motivation for the measure is as follows: Directionally informed investors have an
incentive to trade in those contracts that provide them with high leverage. This implies
that the increase in the open interest of high leverage options (out-of-the money options)
should be larger than the change in the open interest of low leverage options (in-the-
money options).2 Additionally, when informed investors have positive information we
expect a higher demand for call options than for put options and vice versa in the negative
information case.3 Therefore in order to capture situations characterized by a high degree
of positive information we relate changes in the open interest of out-of-the-money (OTM)
call options (the most attractive options for investors with positive information) to the
change in open interest of in-the-money (ITM) put option contracts. Specifically our
positive information measure is the 30-day rolling correlation between the change in the
open interest of OTM call options and the change in open interest of ITM put options.4
We construct an analogous options market sidedness (OMS) measure for detecting when
investors have negative information.
Intuitively, a low value of our measure implies that increases in demand for contracts
that are particularly sensitive to information trading are not associated with increases
volume, option prices, bid-ask spreads or implied moments to study informed trading in option markets.
However, there are many motives for trade and therefore changes in open interest have advantages over
trading volume as a measure of informed demand. For example, liquidity needs and hedging demand
results in volume, but may well leave the open interest unchanged (see Section 3.4 for a more detailed
description).
2There is usually a certain “natural” level of option contract creation and closing, for instance due to
synthetic option creation for technical trading strategies that involve as a replication or closing instrument
ITM options and the short side of OTM options (see e.g., Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson and Poteshman 2007).
3An alternative would be to go short in the opposite contract type. However, this would expose the
informed trader to much higher risk, which makes this trading alternative less attractive. In support of
this argument, previous work, such as Garleanu, Pedersen and Poteshman (2009), Pan and Poteshman
(2006), Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson and Poteshman (2007), Muravyev (2013), Easley, O’Hara and Srinivas
(1998), Choy and Wei (2012) or Chesney, Crameri and Mancini (2011), highlights the creation of new
long positions in out-of-the-money options as main channel of information related option trading. This
is supported by occasional evidence such as in Poteshman (2006) who identifies how informed investors
used long out-of-the-money put options of airline companies prior to the 2001 terrorist attacks. Another
example is the case of the German Commerzbank where in April 2011 in the week before a recapitalization
announcement some investors took large positions in new out-of-the-money puts and realized large profits
due to the post announcement stock price decline. Despite the high probability that informed traders
create new long positions we can naturally not exclude that informed traders also use different strategies.
Incorporating these trades would make our results only stronger but would come at the cost of a much
more complicated methodology to measure options market sidedness.
4More formally we compute the positive information measure as OMS+ = corr(∆OICOTM ,∆OI
P
ITM ),
where ∆OICOTM denote the changes in open interest of OTM call options and ∆OI
P
ITM the changes in
open interest of ITM put options, respectively.
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in demand for contracts that are relatively insensitive to information trading. In the
terminology of Sarkar and Schwartz (2009) the market is one-sided and is characterized
by asymmetric information. On the other hand a high value of our measure indicates that
demand for information trading sensitive contracts is also associated with increases in
demand for contracts that are information insensitive, the market is two-sided and option
demand is more likely driven by heterogeneous beliefs.
To examine whether options market sidedness captures informed trading, we use a
dataset of all exchange traded securities at the intersection of OptionMetrics Ivy DB, the
CRSP daily return files from January 1996 until December 2009 with more than 5 million
observations.
We find that options market sidedness predicts the sign and the magnitude of future
returns of the underlying even after controlling for a wide range of factors, including
alternative measures of informed trading. A one standard deviation decrease in the OMS+
(OMS−) measure predicts an increase (decrease) of future returns of more than 6 basis
points on a daily basis and more than 16% annually.
Trading strategies based on options market one-sidedness are highly profitable. Using
options market sidedness to select option contracts yields average returns of 27% for OTM
calls and 32% for OTM puts over roughly four weeks. To make sure that our results are
robust to option bid-ask spreads and the implicit leverage of options we construct long-
short equity portfolios based on options market one-sidedness. Our strategies generate
monthly risk-adjusted returns of up to 2.22%.
Further, we study options market sidedness prior and post to M&A announcements to
examine whether our measure indicates the presence of significant asymmetric information
that is resolved on the announcement date. Consistent with this, we find that our measure
decreases prior to the announcement and increases post announcement.
In a robustness exercise, we verify that options market one-sidedness is not related to
contemporaneous and future stock liquidity and trading volume. This alleviates concerns
that our results are driven by changes in liquidity of the underlying or increases in hedging
demand driven by greater stock market volume.
9
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Given that options market sidedness identifies informed trading it is likely that mar-
ket makers respond to the presence of informed investors. We find that options market
one-sidedness is associated with future higher option bid-ask spreads. Additionally, we
find that a more one-sided options market predicts violations of put-call parity. These
results are consistent with market makers gradually incorporating the information in the
demand of informed traders and more generally with the perspective furthered by Gar-
leanu, Pedersen and Poteshman (2009) that demand pressure in options markets should
impact prices and price efficiency.
A possible alternative explanation of our results is that investors are not informed about
the returns of the underlying, but about the volatility (see e.g., Back 1993, Ni, Pan and
Poteshman 2008, Puhan 2014). Hence, it is important to distinguish whether the excess
demand is coming from directional or volatility traders. To this end we develop a measure
of volatility informed trading and find that including our measure of volatility informed
demand does not qualitatively affect our previous results.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, this paper introduces the concept of
market sidedness to the options market literature and examines its predictability and in-
formation content. Second, the measure of options market sidedness that we develop has a
number of desirable features: i) OMS captures the part of option demand that is in excess
of the demand associated with other trading motives. This solves the empirical challenge
of separating informed demand from other motives of trade in the options markets; ii) the
information content is volatility neutral, which is to say that the predictability associated
with the measure is not due to volatility information;5 iii) the measure is easy to calculate
and uses only widely available and low frequency data, which means it is applicable to a
large set of markets and for long time periods. It also does not require a structural model
that signs trades as buyer or seller initiated. Third, by using our measure of market sided-
ness we document the presence of informed demand in option markets that is not driven
by other trading motives or other potential sources of return predictability. In particular,
our work complements Pan and Poteshman (2006) who document that put-to-call volume
5For example, implied volatilities or asymmetries in implied moments have been shown to predict
returns (see e.g., Cremers and Weinbaum 2010, Xing, Zhang and Zhao 2010). However, these measures
are not by construction or intention volatility neutral.
10
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ratios only when computed from signed options volume from detailed quote records (for
most markets not widely available) contain directional information data; moreover, OMS
can also clearly identify the sign and the strength of the directional information and indi-
cates when markets are driven by uninformed trading motives (high measure values). In
contemporary work Johnson and So (2012) find only negative information in options trad-
ing using the option to stock volume ratio (O/S) by Roll, Schwartz and Subrahmanyam
(2010) while we show that there is also substantial positive information in options trad-
ing. Moreover, they cannot differentiate between markets that are driven by uninformed
motives of trade and options markets that exhibit asymmetric information. Cao, Chen
and Griffin (2005) also provide evidence in support of informed trading but they focus
exclusively on takeover events.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.4, we develop our concept
of options market sidedness. Section 2 details the data and investigates the sidedness of
the options market around M&A announcements. Section 2.4 tests the relation of options
market sidedness and future stock returns. Section 3.5 considers trading strategies that
condition on options market sidedness. In Section 2.6, we study the links between informed
option demand and stock market trading. Section 2.7 considers the impact of informed
option demand on liquidity levels and pricing efficiency. Finally, Section 3.8 concludes the
paper.
2.2 Measuring Options Market Sidedness
Our measures of option market sidedness uses the fact that informed traders are most likely
to trade in high leverage options that consequently are the most information sensitive.
Therefore, associated with an increase in informed trading, the demand (which is proxied
for by changes in open interest) for those contracts should increase relative to contracts
that are less information sensitive.
We define an OMS measure for positive (OMS+) and negative (OMS−) information
trading, respectively. We compute the positive information measure OMS+ as the corre-
lation of the change in open interest of OTM call options and the change in open interest
of ITM put options. More formally, the value of the positive signal measure OMS+t is
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computed on each day t as
OMS+t =
1
τ
t∑
s=t−τ
(
∆OICs,OTM −∆OI
C
t−τ :t,OTM
)(
∆OIPs,ITM −∆OI
P
t−τ :t,ITM
)
√
σ2
∆OICt−τ :t,OTM
√
σ2
∆OIPt−τ :t,ITM
, (2.2.1)
for a backward looking window of τ days.6
Analogously, in case of negative information trading, the OMS− measure is the corre-
lation of the change in open interest of OTM put options with the change in the open
interest of ITM call options.
Intuitively, when either correlation is low then increases in demand for information
sensitive (out-of-the-money) contracts are not accompanied by increases in demand in less
sensitive (in-the-money) contracts. In the terminology of Sarkar and Schwartz (2009) the
market is one-sided and is characterized by asymmetric information.7 On the other hand
when the correlation is high then an increase in demand of information sensitive contracts
is also associated with an increase in less information sensitive contracts.8
Our measure is also able to capture when informed investors have a particularly strong
signal. In such cases there will be a particularly large demand for OTM options and in
equation (2.2.1) the deviation from the mean level of demand will be large and all other
things being equal the correlation will take lower values.
There are two advantages of using a correlation over alternative measures such as a
simple ratio, a difference in mean values or simple changes in open interest. First, the
correlation is standardized by the variation of the variables (so in a simple sense we control
6In our analysis, we compute the time series of the daily OMS measures for each security, for a τ = 30-
day backward looking correlation between daily changes in open interest. The choice of this time window
follows the idea that it would be rather counterintuitive to assume that most often options market informed
trading happens at longer-term horizons (cf., Easley et al. 1998). However, we do not know ex ante when
exactly informed traders trade. It would be implausible to expect that usually the informed traders buy
options on only one day. Therefore we focus on a time horizon that spans approximately the temporal
distance between two maturity dates to capture the gradual increase in informative excess demand in the
options market. We have also tested a decreased or expanded correlation window size within a reasonable
range of days (15 to 45 days), but our results remain qualitatively unchanged.
7Due to technical trading strategies, liquidity needs or hedging demand, there is always a certain natural
level of demand and supply across contract types.
8An alternative measure would relate the open interest OTM calls to OTM puts, but this measure
would not be able to distinguish the sign of the information.
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for volatility). Second, the variation is benchmarked against its own mean, implying that
we are considering above average deviations in open interest. Or put differently, we are
considering whether above average excess demand in OTM options coincides with above
average excess demand of ITM options.
We base our measure on changes in open interest since this arguably has a stronger
connection with informed option demand. Table 2.1 illustrates the effect on volume and
open interest of a transaction between Buyer A and Seller B.
Table 2.1: ∆OI vs. V olume. The table summarizes all possible four combinations for
the opening and closing of option positions between some buyer A and some seller B. The
column named ∆OI indicates the potential changes in the open interest related to the trading
combination and their sign. The column V olume reports whether there is a positive trading
volume.
Buyer A Seller B ∆OI V olume
1: buy to open sell to open > 0 > 0
2: buy to close sell to close < 0 > 0
3: buy to open sell to close = 0 > 0
4: buy to close sell to open = 0 > 0
In case 1 buyer A wants to buy a contract to open a new position and seller B has to
create a new position in order to cater to the demand, the open interest increases and there
is positive trading volume. Alternatively, in case 2, if buyer A enters the options market
to buy a contract to close a position, and seller B sells this contract, thereby closing a
previously held position, there is a decrease of open interest along with positive option
trading volume.
While both case 1 and case 2 result in a change in the open interest it is likely that
case 1 is going to contain the most information. Intuitively, the demand from informed
investors is going to result in the creation of new contracts and this is supported by the
findings of Ni et al. (2008), Pan and Poteshman (2006), Muravyev (2013), Lakonishok
et al. (2007), Bollen and Whaley (2004), Easley et al. (1998), Garleanu et al. (2009) or
Chesney et al. (2011). Put differently, for case 2 to contain information this requires that
the informed investor and the market maker to have open positions in this option, which
is on average relatively unlikely given that the signal is truly informative.
Furthermore, in cases 3 and 4, we observe positive trading volume, however, since in
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both cases one party opens and another party closes a position, there is no change in the
open interest even though we observe trading volume. This illustrates why using trading
volume is different from considering excess option demand and arguably why it is a more
noisy measure of informed demand.9
2.3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
In this section we describe the data selection, summarize the data and provide evidence
about options market sidedness around M&A announcement dates.
2.3.1 Data and Summary Statistics
Our daily options market data consist of all American option contracts for all available
US stocks at the intersection of OptionMetrics Ivy DB and CRSP stock market data
described below.10 The options have a standard settlement (i.e., per contract 100 shares
of the underlying are delivered at exercise). The sample period is January 1996 until
December 2009. We exclude option contracts with a maturity of more than 250 days
and observations with no or zero open interest to exclude options without liquidity (cf.,
Driessen et al. 2009). We merge this data with the daily stock market data from the
CRSP NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ return files. Only securities from the merged CRSP and
Compustat database are in the sample. We exclude stocks with a return history of less
than 24 consecutive months. We exclude observations at the 99% and 1% level with respect
to BM and we exclude stocks with a stock price below 1USD or with a return above 80%
or below -80%.11,12 After applying these filter rules, 4,155 firms remain in our final sample
and 35,349 call and put contracts resulting in more than 5 million daily observations for
each variable.
9The difference between changes in open interest and volume is also evident in the unconditional
correlation of OTM option changes in open interest and trading volume, which is only 0.1 for call options
and 0.08 for put options, respectively. Consistent with this, the unconditional correlation of the OMS
measure computed with changes in open interest and an OMS measure computed with trading volume
is very low and only 0.118 and 0.124 for OMS+ and OMS−, respectively. The low correlation between
option order imbalances and option volume in Muravyev (2013) also highlights the noisiness of option
volume as a measure of option demand.
10OptionMetrics Ivy DB is a comprehensive data set with information on the entire US equity options
market.
11The annual book-to-market ratio on day t is given by the previous year’s end-of-year book equity
divided by the corresponding year’s market equity (BM) (see Daniel and Titman 2006).
12Our results are robust to removing any of these cleaning rules.
14
Data and Descriptive Analysis
We then sort all option contracts of each stock in moneyness categories in order to aggre-
gate the option variables of interest for each moneyness group. Similar to e.g. Chakravarty
et al. (2004), Lakonishok et al. (2007) or Xing et al. (2010) we define the moneyness range
for options as the ratio of the strike price K and the stock price S (for call options KS and
for put options SK ).
13 For OTM options the respective ratio is larger than 1.05 and for
ITM options it is smaller than 0.95. Accordingly, ATM options have a moneyness range of
0.95–1.05. For the OTM part of our OMS measure we consider only those contracts that
are OTM on at least 2 out of 5 days during the fourth week before the maturity date.14
After selecting options into moneyness categories we aggregate the daily open interest
for each moneyness category, i.e., ITM Call, ITM Put, ATM Call, ATM Put, OTM Call,
and OTM Put.15 For each stock k we compute the median of the open interest of option
contracts in a moneyness category.16,17 The daily change in open interest is calculated
separately for call and put options within a moneyness category and subsequently used to
compute our measures of options market sidedness.
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for the OMS+ and OMS−. The overall number
of observations is roughly 5 million for OMS+ and OMS−.
OMS+ and OMS− are on average positively valued (0.43 and 0.46) and the 25% quan-
tile is also positive (0.11 and 0.16), which is to be expected since directionally informed
demand is neither permanent nor frequent; hence it would be surprising to observe a large
fraction of negative OMS values.
As control variables we construct alternative information measures the daily option
volume and option bid-ask spread. We aggregate the number of traded contracts (V OLjt,m)
for each stock as the median of the volume for call and put option (j = {C,P}) separately
13To test the robustness of our results with respect to our moneyness definition we also compute the
moneyness ratio as ln
(
K
F
/IVATM
√
T
)
, where F is the futures price and IVATM is the implied volatility
of ATM options of the respective stock. Our results qualitatively do not change if we use this ratio.
14We have also considered alternative OTM day selection rules up to two weeks before maturity and
with more or less minimum OTM days; our results are qualitatively unchanged.
15The daily preliminary open interest is reported at the end of each trading day and the final official
data is released on the following morning.
16We use the median in order to mitigate the impact of potential outliers.
17In what follows, we omit for reasons of simplicity the index k. Nevertheless, all measures and variables
are computed for each single underlying stock.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Sample Variables. The table provides summary descriptive
statistics for sample variables across the full sample period from January 1996 until December 2009.
The table reports the mean, the standard deviation (Std), the median, the 25 percent (Q25) and
the 75 percent quantile (Q75) across all sample firms. OMS+ and OMS− are the options market
sidedness measures for the positive and negative information case, respectively (for details see Section
3.4). BETA is the individual stock market beta, SIZE is the logarithm of market equity. BM is
the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio measured by book equity divided by, market equity using
the fiscal year-end value preceding year. The realized volatility (RV ) is in basis points and is defined
as in Ni et al. (2008) as 10,000 times the difference of an underlying stock’s intraday high and low
prices divided by the closing stock price. MOM is the cumulative return over a 60 days backward
looking window. STD is the average realized standard deviation obtained from the daily returns
over a 60 days backward looking window. SPREADCOTM and SPREAD
C
ITM are the median daily
relative bid-ask spreads of call options that are OTM or ITM. SPREADPOTM and SPREAD
P
ITM
are the median daily relative bid-ask spreads of put options that are OTM or ITM. SV OLCOTM and
SV OLCITM denote the square root of the daily median call option trading volume that are OTM
or ITM. SV OLPOTM and SV OL
P
ITM denote the square root of the daily median put option trading
volume that are OTM or ITM. The descriptives for the OMS measure, the daily option spreads and
option volume are formed using all days where the respective variable was nonzero.
Mean Std Q25 Median Q75 No. Obs.
OMS+t 0.423 0.398 0.114 0.473 0.751 5,015,363
OMS−t 0.461 0.397 0.158 0.526 0.795 5,396,556
BETA 1.206 0.418 0.842 1.095 1.442 7,011,930
SIZE 7.208 1.629 6.089 7.115 8.221 7,011,930
BM 0.784 5.784 0.256 0.446 0.745 7,011,930
RV 415.06 359.582 198.413 315.217 510.386 7,011,930
MOM 0.032 0.267 -0.091 0.0378 0.160 7,011,930
STD 0.0312 0.019 0.018 0.026 0.039 7,011,930
SPREADCOTM 1.108 0.780 0.303 1.028 2.000 6,918,180
SPREADCITM 0.100 0.145 0.047 0.075 0.111 6,920,299
SPREADPITM 0.115 0.180 0.049 0.078 0.121 6,799,572
SPREADPOTM 1.074 0.739 0.353 1.000 2.000 6,797,715
SV OLCOTM 4.423 4.558 1.871 3.162 5.292 6,918,180
SV OLCITM 3.507 3.399 1.581 2.739 4.123 6,920,299
SV OLPITM 3.741 4.429 1.581 2.739 4.472 6,799,572
SV OLPOTM 4.559 5.021 2.000 3.162 5.292 6,797,715
in each moneyness category m. Because the distribution of V OLjt,m is right-skewed we use
in our regressions SV OLjt,m, i.e., the square root of daily volume for call or put options.
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Similarly, we also control for bid-ask spreads. SPREADjt,m and SPREAD
j
t,m denotes
the median daily relative bid-ask spread of call or put options in different moneyness
categories m.
Table 3.1 provides also summary statistics for option spreads and volume. The spread
18The square root of the volume is useful to normalize the variable.
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size varies substantially with the moneyness ranges, the mean of the spread is roughly 1 for
the OTM options (SPREADCOTM , SPREAD
P
OTM ) and roughly 0.1 for the ITM options
(SPREADCITM , SPREAD
P
ITM ). This is in accordance with the well-known fact that it
is more expensive to trade in OTM options. Nevertheless, OTM options are usually the
most actively traded type of options, which is also the case in our sample. The normalized
options trading volume is relatively higher for OTM options (SV OLCOTM , SV OL
P
OTM ).
However, the difference between the trading volume of OTM and ITM options is not
extremely large, for instance for call options SV OLCOTM is 4.4 and SV OL
C
ITM is 3.5.
This is important since we correlate the ITM options with the OTM options, in order to
capture the information trading related excess demand. If the level of trading activities in
ITM options was extremely lower than for OTM options, it would be difficult to identify
information in OTM excess option demand.
Other variables that we extract from CRSP are the closing price, high and low prices,
shares outstanding and the volume as the total number of traded shares of stock. We
also use a proxy for the underlying’s daily realized volatility, which we define as in Ni et
al. (2008) as 10,000 times the difference of the underlying stock’s intraday high and low
prices divided by the closing stock price (RV ). Market equity is defined as the price of
a stock on day t multiplied by the shares outstanding. The logarithm of market equity
is used to measure firm size (SIZE). We compute momentum (MOM) as the 60 days
backward looking cumulative return and long-term volatility (STD) as the square root of
the averaged cumulative squared returns.
Also from CRSP we obtain a value weighted NYSE/AMEX index with dividends as
a proxy for monthly market returns. From all returns of the individual stocks and the
market index we subtract the average one month risk free rate from the Fama risk free rates
file as provided by CRSP. We obtain monthly market betas as in Easley et al. (2002) and
denote the individual stock market beta as BETA. In the daily cross-sectional regressions
we include the stock’s previous month’s market portfolio betas to control for the single
stock’s market risk exposure. Descriptive statistics for BETA, SIZE, BM , RV , MOM
and STD are in Table 3.1. As a proxy for stock market illiquidity, we compute the Amihud
(2002) illiquidity measure in basis points as ILLIQAmihud = 1× 1010 ∗ |RET |)/V olume,
where V olume is the daily trading volume of a stock. We extract annual fiscal year-end
17
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book equity values from the COMPUSTAT data base.
Earnings announcement dates (EAD) are obtained from the I/B/E/S Database.
2.3.2 Information in Option Demand around High Information Events
In this section, we use M&A announcements to validate that our measure captures in-
formed demand. Prior to M&A announcements there is arguably a significant amount of
asymmetric information that is resolved at announcement. This implies that we expect our
measure to decrease in the pre-announcement period (as there is an increase in informed
demand) and post-announcement we expect this decrease to be reversed. To ensure that
our measure captures directional information we pair OMS+ (OMS−) with events with
positive (negative) announcement day returns.
The M&A data is from the SDC Platinum database and we follow Schwert (1996) in
defining the announcement date as the first day when an official bid becomes known.
We exclude firms that have received another bid in the same year. We calculate the
cumulative change in OMS+ and OMS− from 7 days before the announcement day t = 0.
Figure 2.1 describes the change in the OMS measures over this period in the positive
(upper subfigure) and negative (lower subfigure) informed demand case.19 The plot of the
cumulative changes for the M&A dates is marked in green and with dots. As a benchmark
we also plot (in red and with triangles) the average OMS measure changes of firms not
making announcement. The figure illustrates that our as predicted, directly before the
M&A announcement, i.e., on the evening before the announcement day, we observe that
the cumulative change in OMS+ exhibits 27 times lower values than the benchmark case
and for OMS− it is more than 30 times lower.
Moreover, there is a significant reincrease in the measures ex post the M&A announce-
ment, which reflects that once the news become public and options markets become more
two-sided.
To verify the robustness of the M&A announcement date results, we also consider days
19We choose a 7-day window before the high information date as a reasonable time window before a
high information event where we would expect the major demand of investors with private information
related to the event. Given the high information content of the event, it is unlikely that investors obtain
the directional signal a long time before the event. However, our results do not qualitatively change if we
extend the time window within a sensible range.
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with large return movements, which arguably are also events of high information.20 The
plot of the cumulativeOMS measure changes around the extreme return dates is marked in
blue and with diamonds and confirms the patterns that we find for the M&A announcement
dates.
20In the positive information case we define high return events as days where the return is above the
average daily return within the subsample of days with positive returns and in the negative information
case we consider days where the return is below the average return on a negative return day.
19
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Figure 2.1: Informed Option Demand and High Information Events. In this figure, we compare
the mean values of the cumulative change in the OMS measures before M&A announcements and days
with large return movements as events of high information revelation. We define positive (negative)
information large return days as days when the return is above (below) the mean return of all days with
positive (negative) returns. As a control group we use the full sample average. The high information date
is defined as t = 0. We plot the cumulative changes of the OMS+ and OMS− measure for the 7 days
before high information events. The plot of the cumulative changes for the full sample is marked in red and
with triangles. The plot of the cumulative changes for the M&A dates is marked in green and with dots.
The plot of the cumulative changes for the extreme return dates is marked in blue and with diamonds.
The upper subfigure plots the different variables for the positive information case. The lower subfigure
plots the different variables for the negative information case. The full sample period is January 1996 to
December 2009.
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2.4 Option Market Sidedness and Future Stock Returns
In this section, we examine the relationship between options market sidedness and future
stock returns. In particular, we investigate whether an increase in options market one-
sidedness, i.e., lower OMS+ (OMS−) values, predicts higher (lower) stock returns.
2.4.1 Option Market Sidedness Sorted Stock Portfolio Returns
Panel A of Table 2.3 reports daily mean stock excess returns for equity portfolios that are
sorted into different groups according to the firm individual OMS measure value. The
OMS measure is a correlation and thus it takes values on a scale from -1 to +1. To
form stock portfolio groups, we set the portfolio break points at 0.2 interval steps of the
OMS+t−1 and OMS
−
t−1 measure, respectively, resulting in 10 portfolios. We compute the
mean excess returns at day t of these 10 portfolios across our sample firms.21 In Panel
A of Table 2.3 we observe that the OMS groups vary in their size from roughly 25,000
observations to more than 1 million. The relatively smaller (but still quite sizeable) number
of very low OMS is intuitive since negative OMS values reflect option demand induced
by extremely strong information signals. It is also more likely that private information
trading is reflected in a gradual decrease of the measure.
Consistent with option market one-sidedness being an indicator of asymmetric infor-
mation, we find for lower values of the OMS measure (i.e., the options demand is more
one-sided) higher future equity portfolio returns if we sort according to the positive infor-
mation measure and lower future returns for the negative information case. The average
daily return difference (0.12 for OMS+ and -0.11 for OMS−) between the portfolio that is
associated with the lowest OMS values (Low) and the portfolio of stocks with the highest
OMS values (High) shows that the average daily return spread from low to high OMS
values is highly significantly different from zero and exhibits also the right sign. If we
compare the lowest portfolio (1) with portfolio (9) the economic magnitude of the return
difference is even larger.
21We use stock returns that are in excess of the risk-free rate. If we risk-adjust them with respect to the
Fama-French and Carhart factors, the quality of the results remains unchanged.
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It is evident from Table 2.3 that the relation between the lagged OMS measures and
stock returns exhibits a nonlinear pattern. The returns decrease (increase) nonlinearly
with an increase in OMS+t−1 (OMS
−
t−1). This return pattern reflects substantial price
adjustments for extremely low OMS values and indicates that the OMS measure is able
to indicate when the information signal is strong, informed investors trade aggressively
and take larger positions. Analogously, these findings hold but with reversed signs for
the equity portfolio returns of the OMS−t−1 sorted portfolios. However, even with this
reincrease in returns, the return spreads between the lowest and highest portfolios are still
highly significantly different from zero.
In Panel B of Table 2.3, we compute an OMS measure using option trading vol-
ume (V olOMS+ and V olOMS−) instead of changes in open interest. The results show
that a volume based OMS measure is not successful in identifying when markets are
driven by asymmetric information and when by heterogenous beliefs. Sorting according
to V olOMS+ results in an insignificant return spread between the Low and the High
V olOMS group and and for V olOMS− the spread is significant but with the wrong sign
(the returns in the Low portfolio have to be lower than the returns in the High portfolio).
Moreover, we observe that almost all V olOMS value observations are ≥ 0, which further
supports the notion that for trading volume it is rather difficult to differentiate between
informed demand and other trading motives.
2.4.2 Cross-Sectional Stock Return Predictions
We use Fama and MacBeth (1973) (FMB) regressions to test the relation of future in-
dividual stock returns and the directional OMS measure.22 The empirical specification
reads as,
RETt = β0 + β1OMS
+
t−1 + β2OMS
−
t−1 + bCt + t, (2.4.1)
where RETt is the daily stock return in excess of the risk free rate.
23 β0, β1 and β2 denote
the coefficients of the intercept, the OMS+t−1 and the OMS
−
t−1 measure at day t − 1.
22We choose daily windows for the entire empirical part. Obviously, informative signals can persist
intradaily, for one or two days or for longer periods, depending on the nature of the signal. Most often,
the information asymmetry occurs at a daily or intradaily level, thus the daily windows that we use are a
viable choice (see also Pan and Poteshman 2006).
23If we risk adjust the returns with regard to the Fama-French and Carhart factors, the quality of the
results remains unchanged.
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Further, we include in (2.4.1) Ct, which is a vector of control variables such as firm size,
book-to-market ratio, market returns, lagged stock returns, long-term past stock returns,
long-term past stock return volatility and option volume. The corresponding coefficient
vector is b.
We conjecture a negative (positive) sign for β1 (β2), reflecting that OMS
+
t−1 (OMS
−
t−1)
takes lower values due to the positively (negatively) informed demand and predicts higher
(lower) returns in the future.
Table 2.4 reports the main FMB-regression results with stock returns as dependent
variable.24 We use percentage returns in the regressions and can therefore interpret the
estimated coefficients directly as a percentage change in returns the day after e.g. the
directional OMS measure drops from zero to minus one.
In column (I), we validate the predictive power of the directional OMS measure, firstly
without including any of the control variables. The coefficient of the OMS+t−1 measure is
negative and statistically significant. This supports our hypothesis that OTM call option
excess demand indicates positive information trading. Our results imply that a drop of the
OMS+t−1 measure from zero to minus one is associated with an increase of the returns on
the next day by 16 basis points (or an annualized 49% increase in returns). If we compute
the standardized coefficient we obtain for a one standard deviation decrease in OMS+ a
6.4 basis points increase in the next day’s return (or an annualized 16%).
The coefficient of the OMS−t−1 measure is as expected positive and significant. The
decrease in the return on the next day that is implied by an OMS− measure change from
zero to minus one is 15 basis points or 6.1 basis points for the standardized coefficient.
The t-statistics of our measures are smaller than in Pan and Poteshman (2006) (who
use private data) but much larger than those generally found in this literature.
In all columns we include squared terms of our OMS measures. The squared OMS
measure coefficients always exhibit the opposite sign to the respective original measure
indicating that a negative change in the directional OMS that is close to minus one, i.e.,
24To save space we omit the results for the stock related control variables in the table. They are available
on request.
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the information is stronger and options market are more one-sidedness, is associated with
a relatively larger return movement than a negative change in OMS close to zero.25
In column (II) we also add the contemporaneous OMS+ and OMS− measures in order
to validate the predictive power of the lagged OMS variables. The testable prediction for
this specification is that the contemporaneous term exhibits the opposite coefficient with
respect to the coefficients of the lagged OMS measures since at time t the information
becomes public and options markets exhibit less information asymmetry, i.e., the OMS
measures takes higher values. Furthermore, the results for the lagged coefficients should
qualitatively not be affected by including the contemporaneous term. This is exactly what
we find.
In column (III), we control in addition for various other variables related to market risk,
firm characteristics, liquidity and volatility. Our results are not affected by these controls.
Our OMS measure has two key components. First, the measure is based on changes
in open interest to capture demand. In Section 2.4.1, Table 2.3 we show that performs
better than volume as informed demand indicator. Second, by relating the demand for
information sensitive contracts to insensitive contracts the measure separates informed
demand from other trading motives. Therefore, we focus now on verifying that our measure
of option market sidedness is superior to other potential measures that we could compute
from changes in open interest.
In column (IV) we start with running a horse-race between the call-to-put-ratio (CP −
RATIO), which we compute for each stock as the ratio of daily changes in open interest
in call and in put option contracts minus one. As expected, we find that high values of the
CP −RATIO indicate bullish sentiment and high future returns. However, including the
CP −RATIO does not change our findings concerning the OMS measures and although
statistically significant the statistical and economic significance of the CP ratio is lower.26
In terms of economic significance, the standardized coefficient of the CP −RATIO is only
25We have also tested whether our results still hold if we run the above daily regressions for each year
in our sample separately. We find that the results are in almost all years qualitatively the same as for the
whole sample.
26The unconditional correlation between the CP − RATIO and the OMS measures is -0.02 for the
OMS+ and 0.002 for the OMS− measure, respectively. If we construct the ratio using trading volume,
the unconditional correlation between the ratio and the OMS variables is virtually zero.
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one third as large as the OMS measures (i.e., 2 basis points vs. 6 basis points on a daily
basis).27,28
In column (V), we include two alternative open interest based variables, ∆OI
C
OTM,t−1
and ∆OI
P
OTM,t−1. The variables are the means of the changes in the open interest of
OTM call and put options in a 30-day rolling window. The results show that the simple
average level effects of both excess demand variables have weak statistical and economical
predictive power (standardizing the coefficients yields a change in the next day’s returns of
1.8 (-3) bps for a one standard deviation change in ∆OI
C
OTM,t−1 (∆OI
P
OTM,t−1)). Including
these variables does also not affect the coefficients of the OMS variables.29 Thus, basic
levels are not sufficient, illustrating that relating OTM and ITM contracts is necessary to
differentiate between different trading motives that might change the open interest.
In column (VI) we add the difference between ∆OI
C
OTM,t−1 and ∆OI
P
OTM,t−1, which is
another alternative open interest based measure. Intuitively, the difference in both means
might become larger in case of positive informed trading and should exhibit large negative
values in case of negative information trading, yielding a positive regression coefficient.
However, the coefficient is negative, which indicates that this measure fails completely to
differentiate between changes in the open interest due to uninformed or informed reasons.
27Using alternatively for instance the simple call open interest, divided by the simple put open interest,
does not affect our results. Using a ratio of standardized changes in open interest does also qualitatively
not affect our results. All results are available on request.
28In unreported results, we include, as a control for market risk premia related option trading as explana-
tion to the patterns that we find. More specifically, we regress the individual stock returns on directional
OMS measures for positive and negative information trading at the index level (S&P500 equity index
options). Since it is very unlikely that informed traders exploit directional signals at the index level, a
significant negative (positive) coefficient for the positive (negative) information measure on the index level
in the return regressions would indicate that OMS also picks up market risk premia (e.g., Puhan 2014, Pan
and Poteshman 2006). However, we find only insignificant results for the coefficient of the index OMS
measures.
29The unconditional correlation between the ∆OI
C
OTM,t−1 and OMS
+ is -0.04 and between ∆OI
P
OTM,t−1
and OMS− the correlation is -0.06. If we construct the 30 day averages with levels or changes in trading
volume, the unconditional correlations are virtually zero.
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Table 2.4: FMB-Regression Results for Daily Individual Stock Excess Returns on the Direc-
tional OMS Measures and Controls. The table provides daily FMB-regression results of individual
stock’s excess returns (RET ) on the directional OMS measures as well as on control variables. Returns are
in percentages. OMS+t−1 and OMS
−
t−1 are the lagged options market sidedness measures for the positive
and negative information case, respectively (for details see Section 3.4). OMS2,+t−1 and OMS
2,−
t−1 are the
corresponding quadratic terms. SV OLCOTM and SV OL
C
ITM is the square root of the daily median call
option trading volume that are OTM or ITM. SV OLPOTM and SV OL
P
ITM is the square root of the daily
median put option trading volume that are OTM or ITM. CP −RATIO is a daily ratio of the aggregated
changes in open interest for call options divided by the aggregated changes in the open interest for put
options minus one. ∆OI
C
OTM,t−1 is a 30-day rolling window mean of the change in open interest in OTM
call options. ∆OI
P
OTM,t−1 is a 30-day rolling window mean of the change in open interest in OTM put
options. EAD is a dummy that is one if the day is an earnings announcement day and zero otherwise.
The results for the stock related control variables (Stock Controls) are omitted. Stock Controls includes:
EAD, market beta (BETA), size (SIZE), book-to-market (BM), momentum (MOM), volatility (STD).
The definitions of the control variables are summarized in Appendix 1. Newey-West robust t-statistics
are in parentheses (20 lags). *** indicate a significance at a 1% level, ** at a 5% level and * at a 10%
level. The R2 is the average cross-sectional adjusted R2. No. F irms is the overall number of stocks in the
regression. The sample period is January 1996 to December 2009.
RETt (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Constant 0.045 0.048* -0.087 -0.122** -0.095* -0.086 -0.051 -0.05
(1.59) (1.67) (-1.47) (-1.97) (-1.66) (-1.46) (-0.85) (-0.84)
OMS+t−1 -0.166*** -0.502*** -0.169*** -0.162*** -0.169*** -0.169*** -0.158*** -0.169***
(-11.55) (-8.08) (-11.57) (-10.13) (-11.68) (-11.66) (-12.11) (-11.49)
OMS−t−1 0.167*** 0.593*** 0.116*** 0.121*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.136*** 0.136***
(10.72) (9.62) (7.18) (7.46) (7.1) (7.15) (9.09) (7.45)
OMS2,+t−1 0.215*** 0.21*** 0.195*** 0.184*** 0.194*** 0.194*** 0.174*** 0.195***
(13.34) (13.12) (13.54) (11.93) (13.58) (13.5) (12.55) (13.43)
OMS2,−t−1 -0.255*** -0.254*** -0.227*** -0.239*** -0.224*** -0.226*** -0.223*** -0.225***
(-16.22) (-16.16) (-14.12) (-14.45) (-13.92) (-14.02) (-14.42) (-14.15)
OMS+t 0.344***
(6.06)
OMS−t -0.435***
(-7.6)
SV OLCOTM 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.067*** 0.077***
(21.39) (21.11) (21.51) (21.7) (19.62) (21.3)
SV OLCITM -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.017*** -0.077***
(-4.99) (-4.97) (-5.03) (-4.91) (-3.29) (-4.84)
SV OLPITM 0.082*** 0.08*** 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.062*** 0.081***
(13.60) (13.29) (13.45) (13.51) (9.82) (13.80)
SV OLPOTM -0.15*** -0.147*** -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.138*** -0.135***
(-28.00) (-27.21) (-28.56) (-28.45) (-26.20) (-28.09)
CP −RATIO 0.001***
(3.94)
∆OI
C
OTM,t−1 0.000*
(1.68)
∆OI
P
OTM,t−1 -0.001***
(-6.70)(
∆OI
C
OTM,t−1
−∆OIPOTM,t−1
)
-0.001***
(-5.61)
OMSσt−1 0.007
(1.47)
OMSCt−1 · EADt 3.56
(1.00)
OMSPt−1 · EADt -1.496
(-1.07)
Stock Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.003 0.006 0.112 0.119 0.113 0.113 0.128 0.132
No. F irms 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155
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A potential alternative explanation of our results could be that investors might have
information about the volatility of future returns (RV ).30 We control for volatility trading
by including a measure of volatility informed demand that we call OMSσ. We measure
the option demand of the volatility traders by selecting all closest to maturity ATM call
and put option pairs that could be part of a straddle strategy and correlate their change in
open interest for a 30-day backward looking window. More formally the measure reads as
OMSσ = corr(∆OICATM ,∆OI
P
ATM ), where ∆OI
C
ATM denote the changes in open interest
of ATM call options and ∆OIPATM the changes in open interest of ATM put options,
respectively.31 This measure of volatility informed option demand takes higher values
whenever the open interest of both sides of the ATM option pair exhibits a stronger
comovement, indicating volatility information related trading.
In Appendix 2 we verify that OMSσ is indeed informative about future stock price
volatility following Ni et al. (2008); we also show that before earnings announcement dates,
which are known to be preceded by two-sided stock markets (Sarkar and Schwartz 2009)
and followed by an increase in volatility (e.g., Ni et al. 2008, Beaver 1968), the predictive
power of OMSσ for future RV increases. In Appendix 2 we also show that OMS+ and
OMS− have no predictive power for future RV neither in normal times nor before earnings
announcement dates.
We start by adding in column (VII) of Table 2.4 the OMSσ measure. OMSσ does
not significantly predict stock returns. Furthermore, the results for the directional OMS
measures are unaffected by including OMSσ, showing that the predictive power of OMS+
and OMS− is not associated with volatility informed trading.
Finally in column (VIII), we control for earnings announcement dates, as times of het-
erogenous beliefs and an increased future volatility, by interacting the OMS measure with
30Previous work of e.g. Back (1993), Ni et al. (2008) and Puhan (2014) show that the options market
contains information on the future volatility of stock or index returns.
31Since the option Vega is greatest for at-the-money (ATM) options and volatility traders do not know the
direction of the future stock return movement, we make the common assumption that volatility informed
traders take straddle positions in ATM options in order to exploit their information (cf., Ni et al. 2008).
Buying a straddle implies the creation of a new long position in an ATM call and put option with the same
strike price and the same expiration date. Consequently, volatility informed trading results in a significant
increase in changes in open interest for both call ATM option contracts that is strongly associated with
the changes in open interest in ATM put options with the same maturity and strike price. This is also in
line with findings from a private data set in Ni et al. (2008).
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a dummy (EAD) that is equal to 1 if the date is an announcement date. If the predictive
power of the measure for stock returns is indeed due to directional information trading,
the predictive power should not increase before an earnings announcement day. Consistent
with this, we find that OMS+ ·EAD and OMS− ·EAD exhibit insignificant coefficients
and the results for the non-interacted OMS terms remain unaffected. This supports that
OMS+ and OMS− indeed capture directional information.
In order to examine more closely the information content of option demand for future
stock returns, we investigate next, similar to Pan and Poteshman (2006), the predictability
horizon of the OMS measure. If our measures indeed pick up persistent patterns of
directional information in option demand, we would expect the predictability to persist
for several days and not to revert too quickly. So we extend the predictability horizon
of OMS+ and OMS− respectively up to 20 trading days. Figure 2.2 plots the slope
coefficients of OMS+ on the left-hand side and the slope coefficients of OMS− on the
right-hand side. The dashed lines are the 95% confidence-intervals.
The plots show that the predictability is robust and relatively strong during the first
three weeks in the positive information case and during the first two weeks in the negative
information case. Subsequently, the predictability of OMS+ and OMS− decays further
and looses its economical and statistical significance. These results provide strong support
for our hypothesis that option market one-sidedness indicates directional informed trading.
In 3 we investigate the information flows between the options market sidedness measures
and stock returns. We test in a trivariate VAR system whether stock price changes Granger
cause options market one- or two-sidedness and vice versa. We find that the information
in the OMS measures is first reflected in the options market and moves only slowly into
the stock market, which is consistent with the persistent predictive power of the OMS
measures. Our analysis also reveals that stock market news trigger options market two-
sidedness, i.e., heterogeneous beliefs.
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Figure 2.2: Predictability Horizon of the OMS Measure for Future Stock Returns. In
order to obtain the plotted time series, we run daily FMB-regressions of the following form
RETt = β0 + β1OMS
+
t−i + β2OMS
2,+
t−i + β3OMS
−
t−i + β4OMS
2,−
t−i + bCt + t,
where i = {1, 2, . . . 20}. That is, we regress excess stock returns in percent at time t on the t− i lag
of the positive and negative information OMS measure (OMSjt−i with j = {+,−}) and the t− i lag
of the respective quadratic term (OMS2,jt−i). The vector of control variables (Ct) is as in the main
regression in (2.4.1). The left figure plots the slope coefficient of OMS+ measure. The right figure
plots the slope coefficient of OMS− measure. The dashed lines are the 95% confidence intervals. The
sample period is January 1996 to December 2009.
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2.4.3 Sorts on Firm Characteristics
In the literature on stock and options market informed trading, several firm characteristics
such as size are associated with an increased probability of informed trading in the options
market. For instance, Easley et al. (1998) show that informed traders more likely trade in
the options market if the underlying is smaller and less liquid and Ni et al. (2008) show
that this is the case for higher volatility stocks.
In order to study the cross-sectional implications of excess option demand, we build
quartile portfolios of stocks that are sorted according to the size or volatility of a firm
at the end of the previous year. Then, we run the regression in (2.4.1) for each quartile
portfolio.32 The expected signs of the coefficients for the OMS measures are as in the
above for regression model (2.4.1), however, we expect the absolute size of the coefficient
to be larger for smaller and for higher volatility firms.
The regression results for portfolios sorted according to a firm’s size or volatility are
reported in Table 2.5. As in the previous regressions we control for several other factors
such as past cumulated returns, lagged return, past standard deviation of the stock returns,
option volume or market risk sensitivity.
In the left part of Table 2.5, the coefficients of the call and put options market sided-
ness measure (OMS+t−1 and OMS
−
t−1) are as expected significantly negative and positive,
respectively. In line with the predictions from Easley et al. (1998) there is a stronger
relationship of private information trading and stock returns for smaller firms.
In the right part of Table 2.5, we consider cross-sectional regressions of the excess returns
of quartile portfolios that are sorted according to the yearly return standard deviation.
The coefficients of the OMS measure clearly increase in absolute terms with an increasing
stock return volatility. These results confirm that informed traders are more likely to trade
in higher volatility stocks.
Furthermore, we observe that in both sorting exercises, the results for the other portfo-
lios, i.e., larger and less volatile firms, still remain significant, indicating that the predictive
32We also ran regressions for stock trading volume sorted quartile portfolio excess returns. However, the
intuition for this sorting variable and the regression results are very similar to the size sorted portfolios.
Therefore, we do not report them for reasons of brevity. They are available on request.
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power of the OMS measures not restricted to small or highly volatile firms.33
33Another indication for the broad scope of the OMS measures is that excluding the observations in the
lowest option volume quantile also does not change our results.
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2.5 Trading Strategies
In this section, we assess the profitability of trading strategies based on our OMS mea-
sures. We consider strategies based on options and the underlying. We use simple trading
rules since our primary aim is not to find a return maximizing investment strategy but to
assess the economic significance of the predictive relation between options market sided-
ness and stock returns.
Lower values of the OMS measures indicate an increase in option market one-sidedness.
More specifically, lower values of OMS+ indicate higher future returns and lower values
of OMS− signal lower future returns. Hence, we choose low levels of the OMS measure
as positive or negative information trading signals. The trading signals are values of the
OMS measures that are at or below 0.34
The general trading procedure (no matter whether it is an option or an equity based
strategy) is as follows; whenever the trader obtains for the first time a trading signal in
a time window that starts three weeks before maturity and ends four days before the
maturity date, the investor trades on the subsequent day. Since the open interest is
reported in the evening, the trader can obtain the signal only after the exchange closes.
The last trade is possible on three days before maturity. In order to limit the portfolio
turnover, we allow for trading only at the first time a signal arrives. All positions are sold
simultaneously two days before maturity.35
In the first trading strategy we buy OTM call options in case of positive and OTM put
options in case of negative information as indicated by the OMS based trading signal.
This strategy implements the opening of new long positions that previous studies as well
as our paper associate most importantly with informed trading.36
34We have tested all strategies using different trading signal thresholds partly reported in 4. The trading
returns increase, the lower we require OMS to be, however, this comes at the cost of fewer observations
and a higher standard deviation in the returns to the trading strategies. Therefore, we choose in what
follows a relatively conservative threshold value.
35Note that for different ranges of trading windows we obtain qualitatively similar or even stronger
results.
36 For example, in the evening of 01/02/2006 a trader, who follows the first trading strategy, receives a
positive signal, e.g., the OMS+ takes values that are ≤ 0, for Apple Inc.. The next day he buys an OTM
call option with expiration date 01/21/2006. He sells the option on the Thursday (i.e., 01/19/2006) before
the option expires.
34
Trading Strategies
For the second strategy, we buy those stocks, for which we obtain positive information
signals from OMS+ and sell those stocks, for which we obtain a negative information
trading signal. Even though we are interested in informed trading in options markets, we
add this equity based strategy to alleviate concerns about option bid-ask spreads.37, 38
In the third strategy, we form delta-hedged portfolios in order to verify that our trading
strategy results are not heavily biased by a higher moment risk compensation. Delta-
hedging shuts off the directional exposure of the underlying by short-selling or buying
delta shares of the underlying contract in the long call or long put strategy, respectively.
Therefore, if the returns from the above trading strategies are not largely driven by higher
moment risk we would expect very low returns or returns that are insignificantly different
from zero.
To compute the strategy returns, we form portfolio groups with respect to an option’s
moneyness and time to maturity at the investment date. The moneyness groups are sorted
similar as in e.g. Chakravarty et al. (2004), Lakonishok et al. (2007) or Xing et al. (2010),
that is according to the ratio of the strike price K and the stock price S. For call options
we use KS and for put options we use
S
K . Clearly, a higher leverage makes an option
investment more attractive for an informed investor. However, the increasing transaction
costs with higher leverage (i.e. moneyness) create a trade-off between potentially higher
gains and potentially higher costs. Therefore, we limit our trading strategy to option
contracts with a moneyness of up to and including 1.3. The time to maturity groups are
formed according to the temporal distance between the point in time when the investor
receives the trading signal and the maturity date.39
Table 2.6 reports the trading strategy results.
37We use the stock closing price as reported in CRSP for the day after the trading signal.
38In 4 we provide results for trading strategies that account for different levels of transaction costs at
different trading thresholds. The results show that our results are fairly robust to including transaction
costs.
39We obtain the returns by first computing the average return for each trading round (i.e., maximum
one month of holding period) and then averaging over all month.
35
The Information Content of Option Demand
T
a
b
le
2.6:
M
e
a
n
P
o
rtfo
lio
R
e
tu
rn
s
fo
r
O
M
S
B
a
se
d
O
p
tio
n
T
ra
d
in
g
S
tra
te
g
ie
s
A
c
ro
ss
M
a
tu
ritie
s
a
n
d
M
o
n
e
y
n
e
ss.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
p
rov
id
es
m
ea
n
p
o
rtfo
lio
retu
rn
s
fo
r
tra
d
in
g
stra
teg
ies
u
sin
g
a
s
tra
d
in
g
sig
n
a
l
O
M
S
va
lu
es
a
t
o
r
b
elow
0
.
F
o
r
d
eta
ils
h
ow
O
M
S
is
co
m
p
u
ted
see
S
ectio
n
3
.4
.
W
e
fo
rm
p
o
rtfo
lio
g
ro
u
p
s
w
ith
resp
ect
to
th
e
o
p
tio
n
s’
m
o
n
ey
n
ess
a
t
th
e
in
v
estm
en
t
d
a
te
a
n
d
th
e
b
eg
in
n
in
g
tim
e
o
f
th
e
in
v
estm
en
t
in
rela
tio
n
to
th
e
m
a
tu
rity
d
a
te.
T
h
e
m
o
n
ey
n
ess
g
ro
u
p
s
a
re
so
rted
a
cco
rd
in
g
to
th
e
ra
tio
o
f
th
e
strik
e
p
rice
K
a
n
d
th
e
sto
ck
p
rice
S
.
T
h
e
d
ay
s
to
m
a
tu
rity
g
ro
u
p
s
a
re
fo
rm
ed
a
cco
rd
in
g
to
th
e
tem
p
o
ra
l
d
ista
n
ce
in
tra
d
in
g
d
ay
s
b
etw
een
th
e
d
ay
o
f
th
e
tra
d
in
g
sig
n
a
l
a
n
d
th
e
m
a
tu
rity
d
a
te.
W
e
rep
o
rt
sep
a
ra
tely
th
e
resu
lts
fo
r
ca
ll
(left
p
a
rt)
a
n
d
p
u
t
(rig
h
t
p
a
rt)
o
p
tio
n
p
o
rtfo
lio
s.
R
etu
rn
s
a
re
in
p
ercen
ta
g
es
a
n
d
co
m
p
u
ted
fo
r
th
e
resp
ectiv
e
h
o
ld
in
g
p
erio
d
o
f
th
e
in
v
estm
en
t,
w
h
ere
tw
o
d
ay
s
b
efo
re
m
a
tu
rity
a
ll
p
o
sitio
n
s
a
re
so
ld
.
T
h
e
fi
rst
stra
teg
y
(P
a
n
el
A
)
co
rresp
o
n
d
s
eith
er
to
lo
n
g
O
T
M
ca
ll
fo
r
p
o
sitiv
e
in
fo
rm
a
tio
n
O
M
S
b
a
sed
tra
d
in
g
sig
n
a
ls
o
r
to
lo
n
g
O
T
M
p
u
t
in
ca
se
o
f
n
eg
a
tiv
e
in
fo
rm
a
tio
n
O
M
S
b
a
sed
tra
d
in
g
sig
n
a
ls.
In
th
e
seco
n
d
stra
teg
y
(P
a
n
el
B
)
w
e
b
u
y
th
o
se
sto
ck
s,
fo
r
w
h
ich
w
e
o
b
ta
in
p
o
sitiv
e
in
fo
rm
a
tio
n
O
M
S
b
a
sed
tra
d
in
g
sig
n
a
ls
a
n
d
sim
u
lta
n
eo
u
sly
sh
o
rt
th
o
se
sto
ck
s,
fo
r
w
h
ich
w
e
o
b
ta
in
n
eg
a
tiv
e
in
fo
rm
a
tio
n
O
M
S
tra
d
in
g
sig
n
a
ls.
T
h
e
th
ird
stra
teg
y
(P
a
n
el
C
)
u
ses
d
elta
-h
ed
g
ed
p
o
rtfo
lio
s.
T
-va
lu
es
a
re
rep
o
rted
in
p
a
ren
th
eses.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
p
erio
d
is
J
a
n
u
a
ry
1
9
9
6
to
D
ecem
b
er
2
0
0
9
.
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
L
o
n
g
O
p
tio
n
O
n
ly
S
tra
teg
y
C
a
ll
O
p
tio
n
P
o
rtfo
lio
R
e
tu
rn
s
P
u
t
O
p
tio
n
P
o
rtfo
lio
R
e
tu
rn
s
T
im
e
to
M
a
tu
rity
(in
tra
d
in
g
d
ay
s)
3
-7
d
ay
s
8
-1
4
d
ay
s
1
5
-2
1
d
ay
s
3
-7
d
ay
s
8
-1
4
d
ay
s
1
5
-2
1
d
ay
s
]1
.0
;1
.1
[
2
6
.4
0
2
1
.2
5
2
2
.7
6
]1
.0
;1
.1
[
1
6
.6
3
1
4
.4
0
1
5
.4
5
(4
.4
2
)
(3
1
.1
2
)
(4
.5
5
)
(4
.4
5
)
(2
.2
9
)
(2
.2
1
)
KS
∈
[1
.1
;1
.2
[
1
2
.2
1
5
.6
7
2
7
.0
2
SK
∈
[1
.1
;1
.2
[
1
4
.0
2
2
2
.5
0
3
2
.4
0
(3
4
.7
3
)
(1
6
.0
2
)
(2
8
.0
4
)
(5
.1
0
)
(3
.7
9
)
(3
.8
4
)
[1
.2
;1
.3
[
9
.8
8
8
.8
6
1
7
.0
6
[1
.2
;1
.3
[
1
8
.0
3
2
5
.7
2
3
0
.1
2
(1
7
.0
7
)
(1
0
.1
4
)
(1
7
.4
2
)
(1
.7
6
)
(2
.6
1
)
(3
.9
8
)
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
L
o
n
g
-S
h
o
rt
S
to
ck
S
tra
teg
y
T
im
e
to
M
a
tu
rity
(in
tra
d
in
g
d
ay
s)
3
-7
d
ay
s
8
-1
4
d
ay
s
1
5
-2
1
d
ay
s
]1
.0
;1
.1
[
0
.1
4
0
.6
4
1
.5
0
(6
.3
2
)
(8
.1
7
)
(9
.9
6
)
KS
∈
[1
.1
;1
.2
[
0
.1
6
0
.7
3
1
.5
9
(7
.0
5
)
(9
.6
1
)
(1
0
.0
1
)
[1
.2
;1
.3
[
0
.6
9
1
.3
0
2
.2
2
(6
.1
0
)
(8
.9
7
)
(9
.2
7
)
P
a
n
e
l
C
:
D
elta
-H
ed
g
ed
O
p
tio
n
S
tra
teg
y
C
a
ll
O
p
tio
n
P
o
rtfo
lio
R
e
tu
rn
s
P
u
t
O
p
tio
n
P
o
rtfo
lio
R
e
tu
rn
s
T
im
e
to
M
a
tu
rity
(in
tra
d
in
g
d
ay
s)
3
-7
d
ay
s
8
-1
4
d
ay
s
1
5
-2
1
d
ay
s
3
-7
d
ay
s
8
-1
4
d
ay
s
1
5
-2
1
d
ay
s
]1
.0
;1
.1
[
-0
.2
1
0
.1
7
0
.4
3
]1
.0
;1
.1
[
0
.2
9
0
.7
7
0
.1
6
(-0
.2
9
)
(0
.6
0
)
(1
.0
1
)
(1
.5
5
)
(1
.6
5
)
(2
.1
7
)
KS
∈
[1
.1
;1
.2
[
0
.3
0
0
.1
8
0
.5
5
SK
∈
[1
.1
;1
.2
[
0
.4
3
0
.3
3
0
.1
7
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.5
7
)
(1
.2
5
)
(2
.5
3
)
(2
.7
2
)
(3
.8
8
)
[1
.2
;1
.3
[
-0
.1
6
0
.4
2
0
.9
6
[1
.2
;1
.3
[
0
.1
7
0
.1
3
0
.2
2
(-0
.3
5
)
(1
.2
2
)
(1
.8
4
)
(1
.2
9
)
(3
.1
4
)
(4
.1
2
)
36
Trading Strategies
On average in each trading round we are invested in option contracts for 430 different
stocks due to positive OMS based trading signals and in option contracts for 415 different
stocks due to negative signals depending on the strategy type. The size of the investment
universe is not only interesting from a risk perspective but also from the point of view of
an investor who would like to dedicate a notable amount of money into a strategy that
follows option market one-sidedness.
The returns in Panel A increase with moneyness and time to maturity. The average
portfolio returns for the different maturity and moneyness groups for the call option port-
folio range between roughly 9% and 27% per trading round. The returns for the long put
strategy are between roughly 14% and 32%. All returns are significant at a 1% level.
The results for the long-short strategy in Panel B are for all Fama-French and Carhart
factor adjusted returns across maturities and moneyness groups significantly larger than
zero, increase with moneyness, with the time to maturity and with the range between
0.14% and 2.22% per trading round.
Also for the delta-hedged strategy in Panel C we obtain results that are in line with our
hypotheses. Once we control for ∆-risk, the significance of the returns for the call option
portfolio evaporates completely and in many cases for the put portfolio. The negative
correlation between volatility and returns might be an explanation for why some of the
put portfolio returns remain significant.
In Appendix 4 we also report results of a second set of trading strategies, where we
choose as trading signals decreases in the OMS+ and OMS− measures. The results are
qualitatively the same as for the trading strategy that trades on the levels of the OMS
measures.
One possible interpretation of the predictability and the significant trading profits for the
long options and long-short stock strategy could be that options market sidedness picks-
up mostly momentum signals. Therefore, in Appendix 4 we also test whether the OMS
measure reflects more information than pure momentum.40 We find that option market
sidedness captures directional information in option trading that is clearly different from
40See Appendix 4 for details.
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pure momentum signals and that also helps to identify (private) directional signals for
securities that a simple momentum strategy would neglect.
2.6 Option Demand and Future Stock Market Trading
A possible alternative explanation of our results is that options market sidedness is related
to illiquidity of the stock. If more options market one-sidedness (i.e., lower OMS values)
indicates higher asymmetric information in the options market rather than illiquidity
premia, we would expect that option demand imbalances are not able to explain the
future and contemporaneous variation in stock market illiquidity. To test this, we regress
the stock illiquidity measure as suggested by Amihud (2002) (ILLQAmihud) on our options
market sidedness measures.
Second, we show in this section that two-sided (as measured by OMS) markets are
associated with higher stock market trading volume. This is important since it supports
that the strong return predictive power of OMS is not due to an increase in hedging
demand. To this end, we regress stock market trading volume on our OMS measures.
In Table 2.7, we report the results from FMB-regressions that explore the relationship
of stock market trading and options market sidedness.41
In columns (I) and (II), ILLQAmihud is the dependent variable. In column (I) we use the
lagged OMS measure as independent variable and in column (II) we use OMS contempo-
raneously. Neither the lagged nor the contemporaneous OMS measure yield a significant
coefficient. This provides support for our hypothesis that the return predictability, which
we find in the above, is not related to stock market liquidity premia.
In columns (III) and (IV), V OLStock is the dependent variable. In column (III) we
use the lagged OMS measure as independent variable and in column (IV) we use OMS
contemporaneously. The coefficients for all OMS measures are positive and significant,
reflecting a positive relation between upward level shifts in trading activities in the stock
market and a jointly increasing excess demand across all option contract types (i.e., two-
sided markets). Conversely, a more one-sided options market is correlated with lower
41We have also estimated panel OLS regressions with and without firm level fixed effects as well as with
standard errors clustered by firm level or by firm level and month. The quality of our results remains
unchanged.
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Table 2.7: FMB-Regression Results for Stock Liquidity Related Measures on the OMS
measure and Controls. The table provides daily FMB-regression results. In columns (I) and (II) the
dependent variable is the stock individual Amihud (2002) liquidity measure (ILLIQAmihud), in columns
(III) and (IV) we use the stock trading volume (V OLStock) as the regressand. ILLIQAmihud is computed
as (1 × 1010 ∗ |RET |)/V olume, where V olume is the daily trading volume of a stock. V OLStock is the
logarithm of the daily trading volume of a stock. OMS+t−1 and OMS
−
t−1 are the lagged options market
sidedness measures for the positive and negative information case, respectively (for details see Section
3.4). OMS2,+t−1 and OMS
2,−
t−1 are the corresponding quadratic terms. The other regressors are market beta
(BETA), size (SIZE), book-to-market (BM), lagged returns (RETt−1), momentum (MOM), volatility
(STD). The definitions of the control variables are summarized in Appendix 1. Newey-West robust t-
statistics are in parentheses (20 lags). *** indicate a significance at a 1% level, ** at a 5% level and * at a
10% level. The R2 is the average cross-sectional adjusted R2. No. F irms is the overall number of stocks
in the regression. The sample period is January 1996 to December 2009.
Dependent Variable ILLIQAmihud,t V OLStock,t
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Constant 0.259*** 0.259*** 1.320*** 1.328***
(19.32) (19.48) (46.32) (46.49)
OMSCt−1 0.001 0.034***
(0.58) (15.52)
OMSPt−1 0.000 0.039***
(-0.36) (23.38)
OMSCt 0.001 0.031***
(0.69) (15.69)
OMSPt -0.001 0.035***
(-0.81) (22.86)
ILLIQAmihud,t−1 0.483*** 0.482***
(66.57) (66.50)
V OLStock,t−1 0.781*** 0.781***
(157.8) (158.19)
BETA -0.048*** -0.048*** 0.393*** 0.392***
(-8.16) (-8.11) (19.69) (19.61)
SIZE -0.026*** -0.026*** 0.162*** 0.162***
(-20.20) (-20.32) (49.18) (49.19)
RET -0.078 -0.078 0.931*** 0.93***
(-0.91) (-0.92) (7.97) (7.85)
RETt−1 -0.032** -0.034** -0.599*** -0.6***
(-2.07) (-2.07) (-21.84) (-21.82)
MOM 0.009*** 0.01*** -0.124*** -0.124***
(2.73) (2.94) (-28.03) (-27.97)
STD -0.616*** -0.621*** 7.903*** 7.93***
(-14.09) (-14.09) (30.86) (30.90)
Adj. R2 0.345 0.345 0.848 0.847
No. F irms 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155
trading activities in the stock market. These findings supports the insight in Easley et
al. (1998) that informed trading in the options market is more likely for firms with lower
trading volumes. Moreover, it also emphasizes our hypothesis that trading in the stock
market (and hence options market trading that is potentially related to hedging demand)
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is related to level shifts in the demand across all option types and moneyness categories
and not to options market one-sidedness.
Overall, the results support our hypothesis that the predictive ability of OMS for stock
returns is associated with asymmetric information rather than with stock market trading
related risk premia, spillover effects or hedging demand.
2.7 Option Price Pressure and Informed Option Demand
A very natural extension of our study is to explore the response of options market makers
to options market sidedness, or, put differently, the relation between informed option
demand and price pressure in the options market.
Easley et al. (1998) find that the price pressure on call or put options increases with
the relative amount of informed traders and the probability of the arrival of a positive
or negative signal. Other studies like Back (1993), Cao and Wei (2010), Wei and Zheng
(2010), Garleanu et al. (2009), Muravyev (2013) and Ni et al. (2008) also show that
asymmetric information, and thus informed trading activities coincide with a widening of
option bid-ask spreads.42 This implies that market makers, who cannot perfectly hedge
their inventories, observe in the evening, when the open interest is reported, the demand
pressure in a particular option type and increase on the next day the option bid-ask spreads
for the respective contract (see e.g., Easley et al. 1998, Garleanu et al. 2009, Kyle 1982, Ni
et al. 2008).
Therefore, we expect that a higher options market one-sidedness (i.e., lower values of
OMS) predicts wider option bid-ask spreads for the respective options that are bought
by the informed investors.43
Using again FMB-regressions, we regress the OTM call and put spreads on the lagged
OMS+ and OMS− measure respectively and we also add stock specific control variables
e.g., size, past long-term stock returns and stock return volatility and options market
42See e.g. Madhavan (2000) for a comprehensive review of theoretical models that establish asymmetric
information and inventory risk costs of market making.
43Since market makers do not observe the open interest intra-daily, they can only react on the next
day to the information contained in open interest changes. This implies that the profits of the informed
investors are not quickly wiped out because of liquidity effects.
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specific controls such as option volume.
In Table 2.8 we report the option spread FMB-regression results.44
Table 2.8: FMB-Regression Results for Individual Firm Option Bid-Ask Spreads
on the OMS Measure and Controls. The table provides daily FMB-regression results us-
ing as dependent variables daily median individual firm bid-ask spreads for OTM call (model
(I) and (II)) and put (model (III) and (IV)) options, respectively. OMS+ and OMS− are
the options market sidedness measures for the positive and negative information case, respec-
tively (for details see Section 3.4). For the ITM and OTM option classification see Section
2. The other regressors are size (SIZE), book-to-market (BM), returns (RET ), momentum
(MOM), volatility (STD). The definitions of the control variables are summarized in Appendix
1. SV OLCOTM and SV OL
C
ITM denote the square root of the daily median call option trading
volume that are OTM or ITM. SV OLPOTM and SV OL
P
ITM denote the square root of the daily
median put option trading volume that are OTM or ITM. Newey-West robust t-statistics are
in parentheses (20 lags). *** indicate a significance at a 1% level, ** at a 5% level and * at a
10% level. The R2 is the average cross-sectional adjusted R2. No. F irms is the overall number
of stocks in the regression. The sample period is January 1996 to December 2009.
OTM Call Spread OTM Put Spread
Option Spreads (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Constant 0.002 -0.045** 0.016 -0.09***
(0.12) (-2.08) (0.81) (-4.46)
OMS+t−1 -0.018*** -0.011***
(-4.38) (-2.91)
OMS−t−1 -0.045*** -0.039***
(-9.24) (-8.91)
SIZE 0.009*** 0.009***
(4.75) (4.05)
RETt−1 -2.261*** 2.466***
(-35.45) (38.64)
MOM -0.562*** 0.533***
(-27.50) (26.63)
STD 0.896*** 0.795***
(3.12) (2.82)
SV OLCOTM -0.042***
(-28.31)
SV OLCITM 0.009***
(7.13)
SV OLPITM -0.002***
(-2.83)
SV OLPOTM -0.038***
(-28.55)
Adj. R2 0.001 0.08 0.002 0.068
No. F irms 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155
44In order to test whether firm effects change the quality of our results, we have also estimated panel
OLS regressions with and without firm level fixed effects as well as with firm level or firm level and month
clustered standard errors. Our results do not qualitatively change and we find no evidence for a substantial
firm effect.
41
The Information Content of Option Demand
The spread regressions in columns (I) and (III) confirm the expected negative relation
between the lagged OMS measures and the stock individual bid-ask spread. In addition,
the results are almost identical for both call and put option spreads, which corroborates
that the impact of the demand pressure is similar for the positive and negative information
case. All results are robust to the controls that we include in columns (II) and (IV).
Overall, the findings show that the OMS measure can be useful as a new liquidity measure
in the options market.45
Intuitively, the reaction of the market makers to the informed demand contributes to a
relative increase in future pricing inefficiencies between both market sides, for instance to
violations of the put-call parity (PCP).46 Therefore, we also test in this section whether
more one-sided options markets, i.e., lower OMS measure values, predict larger violations
of the PCP.
Apart from arguably the demand pressure of informed traders, there are many other
reasons in the real market that determine the empirically observed violations of the PCP.
For American options, the early exercise premium, and for all option types general frictions
such as short-sale constraints or taxes, can lead to violations of the PCP. However, for
our purposes the general fact that the PCP might be violated is irrelevant since we are
interested whether higher values of the PCP violations are associated with more one-sided
options markets.
Cremers and Weinbaum (2010) point out that deviations from the PCP are not only
related to inefficient pricing that could be easily arbitraged away and show that informed
trading may increase deviations from the PCP. In addition, in the sequential trading model
of Easley et al. (1998) informed trading can result in violations of the put-call parity. Thus,
we expect that options market one-sidedness also predicts absolute PCP deviations with
a positive sign.
Kamara and Miller (1995) and Ackert and Tian (2001) show that PCP deviations reflect
option liquidity risk by regressing PCP deviations on option liquidity risk proxies. In order
45In unreported results we find that options market sidedness does not affect option liquidity risk premia.
This is in line with the notion of informed option trading as exploitation of private directional information,
which by itself, however, remains unobserved by the uninformed investors.
46Previous studies such as Cremers and Weinbaum (2010) or Easley et al. (1998) provide evidence in
support of this hypotheses.
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to investigate the relation between our measure of option demand asymmetry and PCP
deviations, we first compute:
|PCP 1| = |aC − bP +Ke−rT − Sbid|, (2.7.1)
and
|PCP 2| = |aP − bC + Sask −Ke−rT |, (2.7.2)
where a and b denote the daily ask and bid price for the put and call options, respectively.
T is the time to maturity in days, K is the strike price and r is the risk free rate. The
FMB-regressions also control for several other stock individual and options market specific
factors such as size, book-to-market, past returns, historical volatility or trading volume.
Similarly to the spread regressions, we expect a negative coefficient for the lagged OMS
measures, implying larger future absolute PCP violations when options markets are more
one-sided.
The regression results in Table 2.9 yield as expected a negative predictive relation be-
tween the OMS measures and the PCP deviations. Whenever the option demand indicates
asymmetric information, the future PCP deviations increase.
This supports our hypothesis that informed trading in options markets creates a one-
sided demand pressure, which impacts the deviations of the pricing relations in the options
market. The findings imply that informed options market demand contributes to devi-
ations from no-arbitrage pricing relations, which puts a fundamental principle of most
option pricing approaches further into question.
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Table 2.9: FMB-Regression Results for Individual Firm Put-Call Parity Violations on the
OMS Measure and Controls. The table provides daily FMB-regression results for daily median indi-
vidual firm Put-Call Parity violations. Put-Call Parity violations are defined as described in Section 2.7.
OMS+t−1 and OMS
−
t−1 are the options market sidedness measures for the positive and negative informa-
tion case, respectively (for details see Section 3.4). OMS2,+t−1 and OMS
2,−
t−1 are the corresponding quadratic
terms. Ct is the vector of control variables that are specified below. The other regressors are market beta
(BETA), size (SIZE), book-to-market (BM), lagged returns (RETt−1), momentum (MOM), volatility
(STD). The definitions of the control variables are summarized in 1. SV OLCOTM denotes the square root
of the daily median OTM call option trading volume. SV OLPOTM denotes the square root of the daily
median OTM put option trading volume. Newey-West robust t-statistics are in parentheses (20 lags).
*** indicate a significance at a 1% level, ** at a 5% level and * at a 10% level. The R2 is the average
cross-sectional adjusted R2. No. F irms is the overall number of stocks in the regression. The sample
period is January 1996 to December 2009.
Put-Call Parity PCP 1 PCP 2 PCP 1 PCP 2 PCP 1 PCP 2
Constant 0.393*** 0.391*** -0.076 0.343*** -0.077 0.342***
(40.87) (53.00) (-1.32) (13.61) (-1.35) (13.72)
OMS+t−1 0.008 -0.021*** 0.002 -0.023*** -0.117*** -0.014*
(0.73) (-6.54) (0.15) (-7.62) (-3.64) (-1.94)
OMS−t−1 0.012 -0.017*** -0.014* -0.024*** -0.03** -0.03***
(1.14) (-3.48) (-1.69) (-6.00) (-2.17) (-3.29)
OMS2,+t−1 0.154*** -0.013
(4.29) (-1.52)
OMS2,−t−1 0.02 0.009
(1.01) (0.94)
BETA 0.04*** -0.009** 0.041*** -0.009**
(4.31) (-2.40) (4.32) (-2.44)
SIZE 0.054*** 0.012*** 0.055*** 0.012***
(8.43) (3.55) (8.53) (3.60)
BM 0.048*** 0.006** 0.048*** 0.006**
(6.43) (2.2) (6.44) (2.25)
RETt−1 -0.005 0.046*** -0.011 0.047***
(-0.22) (4.20) (-0.52) (4.31)
MOM 0.062*** 0.112*** 0.063*** 0.111***
(4.97) (18.46) (4.97) (18.33)
STD -0.325 -1.4*** -0.293 -1.394***
(-1.29) (-7.96) (-1.17) (-7.92)
SV OLCOTM -0.02*** -0.005*** -0.02*** -0.005***
(-9.17) (-6.20) (-9.13) (-6.18)
SV OLPOTM 0.01** -0.006*** 0.009* -0.006***
(1.96) (-9.71) (1.92) (-9.68)
Adj. R2 0.002 0.003 0.042 0.031 0.042 0.032
No. F irms 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155 4,155
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2.8 Conclusion
This paper combines the concept of market sidedness with excess option demand (changes
in open interest) to construct a new measure of the sign and magnitude of directional
information in publicly available options market data.
The guiding idea of our “options market sidedness” (OMS) measure is that if traders
obtain informative signals on the future direction of stock returns, and decide to exploit
their information in the options market, they create an imbalance in the excess option
demand between those contract types that they are likely to buy and other contract types
whose demand is predominantly driven by hedging demand, liquidity or noise trading.
The larger the informed demand, the more one-sided is the options market. Informed
investors tend to buy those contract types that allow them to take a leveraged position
on the direction of their information (i.e., OTM options).
Hence, the measure of OMS relates the changes in open interest of OTM option con-
tracts, that are likely to be used by directionally informed traders, with the changes in
open interest for low leverage (ITM) option contracts, that are unlikely to be used by
directionally informed traders and indicates trading on positive and negative signals as
well as the strength of the information at an individual security level.
Using daily data of all securities at the intersection of the OptionMetrics Ivy DB, CRSP
daily return files and Compustat from January 1996 until December 2009 we find: First,
the OMS measure for the call (put) market predicts increasing (decreasing) stock ex-
cess returns, beyond past returns and several other controls. Second, returns for option
and stock investment strategies that trade on the informed demand in options are high.
Third, prior to high information events such as M&A announcements, the one-sidedness
of the markets increases, consistent with the increased asymmetric information. After the
announcement the option demand is again more two-sided, reflecting the decrease in in-
formation asymmetry. Fourth, other trading motives such as volatility informed trading,
liquidity or hedging demand do not drive our results.
Our study also contributes empirical evidence to the potential sources of a demand
related option price pressure as modeled by Garleanu et al. (2009). We show that at
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higher levels of informed option demand future options market liquidity is lower and
pricing inefficiencies are larger.
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Stock Market Control Variables Definitions
1 Stock Market Control Variables Definitions
Table A1: Stock Market Control Variables Definitions.
Variable Definition
BM The previous year’s end-of-year book equity
divided by market equity (cf., Daniel and Titman 2006).
BETA Monthly market betas estimated as in Easley et al. (2002).
HI The underlying stock’s intraday high price.
LO The underlying stock’s intraday low price.
MOM 60 days backward looking cumulative return.
PRC The underlying stock’s closing price.
RV The underlying’s daily realized volatility, HI−LO
PRC
∗ 10, 000 (cf., Ni et al. 2008).
SHROUT Number of shares outstanding.
SIZE log(PRC ∗ SHROUT )
STD Square root of the 60 days backward looking average cumulative squared returns.
2 Controlling for Volatility Informed Trading
To validate our measure of volatility informed option demand we test, similar to Ni et al.
(2008), whether the OMSσ measure predicts the stock individual realized volatility RVt
by estimating the following FMB-regression:
RVt = β0 + β1OMS
σ
t−1 + β2OMS
σ
t−1 · EADt + b1Dt + b2Ct + t, (2.1)
with
Dt =
[
OMS+t−1 OMS
+
t−1 · EADt OMS−t−1 OMS−t−1 · EADt
]
(2.2)
as the vector of variables that control for directional informed trading. Ct is again a
set of control variables, which additionally includes current and lagged RV to control for
information in current and lagged RV . The corresponding coefficient vectors are b1 for
Dt and b2 for Ct. EADt is one if t is an earnings announcement date (EAD) for the
respective stock and is zero otherwise.
Previous literature shows stock return volatility is likely to increase after earnings
announcements (e.g., Ni et al. 2008, Beaver 1968) and the insight that volatility in-
formed investors are more likely to trade prior to earnings announcement dates (see
Ni et al. 2008, Sarkar and Schwartz 2009), we expect a positive slope coefficient for
OMSσ · EADt, i.e., β2 > 0 and (β2 + β1) > 0. For the OMSσ measure it is ambigu-
49
ous, which coefficient to expect because high and low volatility bets could result in an
increase in open interest of both contract types. However, we include the variable into
the regression in order to control for non-EAD times. A significant positive coefficient for
the OMSσ measure indicates that on average a large increase in ATM straddle trading is
associated with an increasing future volatility.
Since EADs are public knowledge and markets tend to be largely driven by diverse
beliefs prior to EADs (cf., Sarkar and Schwartz 2009, Choy and Wei 2012), we expect
the impact of directional informed trading before announcement dates to be negligible.
Thus, for the directional OMS measure we conjecture an insignificant coefficient for the
EAD interacted OMS measure. For the non-EAD interacted OMS measures, we expect,
if at all, negative signs for the coefficients, implying that decreasing OMS+ and OMS−
indicate for both market sides an increase in the future realized stock return volatility. This
is intuitive since the future price discovery in the stock market is most likely associated
with an increase in the return volatility, no matter whether the stock returns increase or
decrease.
Table A2 reports the results for the volatility predictive regressions.
We express the realized volatility in basis points, therefore the coefficients indicate daily
basis point changes after e.g. the OMS measure drops from zero to minus one. To save
space we omit the regression results of the controls. In row (I) the coefficients are significant
at the 1% level. The coefficient for the OMSσ is not straight forward interpretable due
to the fact that ATM straddle bets on increasing as well as decreasing volatility would
both increase the open interest in the respective call and put option pairs. However, the
EAD interacted OMSσ coefficient is directly interpretable since earnings announcements
are usually associated with an increase in return volatility. The coefficient of the EAD
interacted OMSσ measure is as expected positive and β2 + β1 > 0, implying that an
excess demand in call and put option ATM straddle pairs conditional on an EAD strongly
indicates trading on increasing future volatilities. This corroborates our expectations and
validates OMSσ as indicator of volatility trading.
In row (II) we add OMS+ and OMS− in order to verify the robustness of the results for
the OMSσ measure. Furthermore, this specification helps to provide support to the hy-
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pothesis that the OMS+ and OMS− measures are associated with directional information
trading. In particular, we are interested in the coefficient of the OMS measures around
EADs. The results show that indeed the EAD interacted directional OMS measures ex-
hibit neither for the positive nor for the negative information case a significant coefficient.
For the entire time series of the realized volatility, a lower directional OMS measure im-
plies for both market sides increases in the future realized stock return volatility, which is
in line with our expectations.
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3 Information Flows between OMS and Stock Returns
To investigate the information flows between the options market sidedness measures and
stock returns we test in a trivariate VAR system whether stock price changes Granger
cause options market one- or two-sidedness and vice versa.
For this purpose, we model the following VAR(5) system47:

RETt
OMS+t
OMS−t
 = c + 5∑
p=1
Bp

RETt−p
OMS+t−p
OMS−t−p
+ t
with Bp as a (3× 3) the coefficient matrix.
The VAR can be reformulated as an infinite vector moving average model, that is
VMA(∞):
Yt = µ + t + Ψ1t−1 + Ψ2t−2 + . . . , (3.1)
where Ψ1, Ψ2,. . . denote the MA coefficients. From (3.1) we compute impulse response
functions that give the response of the system variables to a one unit shock in one variable
of the VAR. We use the cumulative values of the impulse response function to measure
the total impact of a shock for up to 25 days. The resulting cumulative impulse response
functions for the relations of interest are displayed in Figure 3.
A one unit negative change in the innovation of the OMS+, i.e., an increase in options
market one-sidedness due to positive information, results in an increase of returns (left
upper panel in Figure 3). Analogously, the right upper panel in Figure 3 illustrates that
a negative shock from the OMS− measure on stock returns results in a decrease of stock
returns. The figures indicate that it takes several days until the impact of the shock in
the OMS measure on returns is fully incorporated. Hence, private information in options
markets at time t is only gradually incorporated into prices in t + 1 and throughout
the following days. The results further corroborate our hypothesis that more one-sided
markets indicate asymmetric information in the options markets and that indeed markets
47We tested a large range of different lag sizes and do not find substantial qualitative differences between
the specifications. Thus, we choose one trading week as a time window.
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are not efficient and directional information moves with a considerable lag from options
to stock markets.
Furthermore, the effects of return related shocks to the options market sidedness mea-
sures provide support to the notion that stock return news trigger joint demand shifts in
the options market and make it more two-sided. Positive return innovations in the stock
market result in an increase in OMS+, reflecting an increase in options market symmetry
simultaneously to the public news arrival and price readjustment in stock markets (left
lower panel in Figure 3). Similarly, negative return shocks have a positive impact on
OMS−, which analogously to the positive information case reflects an increase in options
market symmetry (right lower panel in Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Cumulative Impulse Response Function. The figure shows cumulative impulse response
functions using a horizon of 25 days and the VAR(5) specification: RETtOMS+t
OMS−t
 = c + 5∑
p=1
Bp
RETt−pOMS+t−p
OMS−t−p
+ t,
with Bp as a (3 × 3) coefficient matrix. The upper left panel depicts the cumulative impulse response
function (CIR) for a negative one unit change in the innovation of OMS+ on stock returns. The upper
right panel depicts the CIR function for a negative one unit change in the innovation of OMS− on stock
returns. The lower left panel depicts the CIR function for a positive one unit change in the innovation
of the stock returns on OMS+. The lower right panel depicts the CIR function for a negative one unit
change in the innovation of the stock returns on OMS−. The sample period for the VAR estimation is
January 1996 to December 2009. The dashed lines represent 95% confidence bounds.
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4 Additional Trading Strategy Results
As a first robustness check, we increase the trading threshold to study how sensitive our
strategy returns are to increasing the threshold. More specifically, we choose the 25%
quantile of OMS+ (0.11) and OMS− (0.16). In each trading round we are on average
invested in option contracts of 1462 different stocks associated with positive OMS trading
signals and in option contracts for 1553 different stocks associated with negative signals
depending on the strategy type. In Table A3 we report the trading strategy results.
In summary, the returns are lower than those for the OMS = 0 threshold but in
general the results are robust to increasing the trading threshold to the 25% quantile.
The decrease in returns is to be expected since we trade on a relatively larger fraction of
weaker informative or relatively uninformative signals. On the other hand, it also shows
that the results in the main text for the OMS = 0 threshold are not just driven by some
outliers that are averaged out once we increase the window of possible trading thresholds.
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Next, we introduce transaction costs to our benchmark case, i.e., the trading threshold
of OMS+ or OMS− being 0. Transaction costs for trading options are known to be
particularly large for OTM options and are significantly larger than those for stocks. For
instance, Ni (2010) and McKeon (2013) show that option trading returns for call options
are likely to be negative for the average investor. However, for a more sophisticated
investor with directional information and in particular also on the put market side, this
might be different. Hence, it is interesting to test whether the substantial returns to the
OMS based option trading strategies are relatively robust to accounting for transaction
costs.
However, there are some caveats to keep in mind when interpreting these results. First,
similar to Ni (2010) and McKeon (2013) we have no data on the actual trading accounts
and hence on the actual trading costs; we can only generally account for transaction costs
based on the option spread. Hence, these results are to be treated with caution since for
instance for institutional investors (which are also most likely to be the informed traders)
the transaction costs are much lower than what we assume here while for a retail investor
they could also be larger. Second, our trading strategy takes the perspective of an investor,
who tries to follow options market one-sidedness and is can only trade at least one day
(or potentially also several days) after the informed traders exert a one-sided demand
pressure on market makers. As we have seen in Section 2.7 informed trading increases
future spreads. Hence, in some situations the spreads might be significantly smaller for
the informed investor who as a consequence will be much less affected by transaction
costs than an uninformed trader who tries to follow the information that market one-
sidedness reveals. Third, one more caveat for interpreting these results is that our trading
strategy does not incorporate the spread size as a side condition, which is likely to be the
case at least for more sophisticated traders that often use trade algorithms that optimize
transaction costs.
Table A4 reports the results for rerunning the option trading strategies for the OMS = 0
threshold accounting for transaction costs that amount to 25% (Panel A) and 50% (Panel
B).
The results show that even after accounting for substantial transaction costs, trading
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on OMS still yields substantial returns. However, there is obviously a trade-off between
taking on leverage and the larger spreads that are implied by OTM options. Despite
the fact that OTM options are the most frequently traded option type, spreads increase
substantially the further the option is OTM. Therefore for some of the trading strategy
results, the profits become negative. However, for relatively longer investment periods and
also for closer to the money options, the returns are relatively robust to incorporating these
hypothetical transaction costs. Put options returns are also more robust to transaction
costs.
We would expect that choosing a more extreme (in terms of market one-sidedness)
trading threshold for OMS is also likely to improve the spread adjusted trading strategy
returns. To demonstrate the effect of lowering the trading threshold value of OMS we
report below trading strategy results using a threshold of OMS+ or OMS− being -0.2.
Using this trading threshold, we invest still into a fairly large amount of option contracts
for different underlyings, that is option contracts for 147 different company stocks on
average per trading round for positive information trading and option contracts on 139
different stocks on average per trading round for negative information trading.
Table A5 summarizes the results for rerunning the option trading strategies applying a
trading threshold of OMS = −0.2 and accounting for transaction costs that amount to
25% (Panel A) and 50% (Panel B).
The results highlight that the more informative the trading signal that we use, the more
robust is the trading strategy to transaction costs. The put option results remain all
qualitatively unchanged even when accounting for transaction costs amounting to 50%.
The results for the call options are also for almost all option types and investment durations
positive and significant, only for relatively far out of the money options with very short
times to maturity, the profits become insignificantly different from zero on average or are
negative.
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In a second set of trading strategies, we choose as trading signals decreases in the OMS+
and OMS− measures that are larger than the respective average decrease in OMS between
date t − 2 and t − 1 before a high information event (see Section 2.3.2), i.e., -0.055 for
OMS+ and -0.07 for OMS−.
In Table A6 we report mean returns of the portfolios that are formed in each trading
round (roughly one month) for each trading strategy, i.e., long call, long put, long-short
stock or delta-hedged, respectively. On average in each trading round we are invested in
option contracts of 941 different stocks due to positive OMS based trading signals and in
option contracts for 992 different stocks due to negative signals depending on the strategy
type.48
The results for the simple long put option strategy in the right part of Panel A show
that farther OTM options provide on average for each trading round higher portfolio re-
turns. The average portfolio returns for the different maturity and moneyness groups
range between 9.5% and 36% per trading round. The left part of Panel A shows the prof-
itability of OMS based OTM long call option strategies. The profits across all maturity
and moneyness groups range between 6% and 22% per trading round. The t-statistics in
parentheses are significant at a 1% level in almost all cases.
Panel B reports the results for the investment strategy that goes long in those stocks,
for which we obtain a positive OMS based trading signal, and that sells those stocks, for
which we obtain a negative information signal from OMS−. As in the above, we use stock
returns that are orthogonalized with respect to the Fama-French and Carhart factors. All
returns across maturities and moneyness groups are significantly larger than zero, increase
with moneyness and with the time to maturity and range between 0.47% and 2.24% per
trading round.
The economic significance of the options market sidedness hypothesis is further corrob-
orated by the results for the delta-hedged strategy in Panel C. Most of the delta-hedged
returns are statistically not different from zero and only some are slightly and significantly
larger than zero. This supports the view that it is directional information rather than a
48For very extreme values of ∆OMS (e.g., -0.2) these numbers go down below 50 and the trading
strategies yield very high positive returns but are also more volatile.
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higher moment risk compensation that shows up in the returns of the above strategies.
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Additional Trading Strategy Results
To test whether options market sidedness captures more that just momentum, we rerun
the trading strategies using three different approaches. We first sort the stocks in each
month m according to their average (m-2:m-12)-month stock return and then use the top
quintile as the winner portfolio and the bottom quintile as the loser portfolio.49 In our
first testing approach, we aim at shutting off momentum signals as major explanation of
the trading strategy returns. Therefore, we trade on positive signals only within the sub-
sample of stocks in the loser portfolio, i.e., those stocks that we would sell in a momentum
strategy. Additionally, we generate OMS based negative information signals and trade on
them by buying puts or shorting stocks only within the winner portfolio, i.e., the portfolio
of stock that we would buy in a momentum strategy. Intuitively, we restrict our positive
signal trading to the sample, where we would expect the least positive momentum and
the negative signal trading to the sample, where we would expect the least negative mo-
mentum. In these “reversed-momentum” subsamples we would expect substantially worse
or even economically insignificant results for our trading strategies if the options market
sidedness measure mainly picks-up momentum signals. The results are reported in A7. In
summary, the analysis shows that the returns that we generate by selecting investments for
“momentum” or “reversed-momentum” portfolios, conditioning on the OMS measures,
are on average higher for those portfolios that a traditional momentum trader would not
expect to perform well. This corroborates that options market sidedness captures infor-
mation in option trading that is clearly different from pure momentum signals and that
also helps to identify (private) directional signals for securities that a simple momentum
strategy would neglect.
49In unreported tests we also exclude the month of January or December or both months in order to
control for possible effects from window dressing and the January effect. Our results remain qualitatively
unchanged, however for some moneyness-maturity groups the profits are lower.
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Chapter 3
Volatility Information in Option Demand
3.1 Introduction
Options provide investors with the unique opportunity to trade on future volatility. If
the volatility expectation of certain investors changes for a fundamental reason, and those
investors trade accordingly before the average investor learns about the information, the
options demand is likely to be informative about future changes in volatility. At the aggre-
gate market level higher moment risk is also tightly linked with economic conditions and
hence the option trading process is also potentially informative about investors’ percep-
tions of macroeconomic risks. Intuitively, volatility information in option demand might
also be high for instance on days of substantial aggregate information asymmetry, such
as FOMC decisions on adjustments of the target rate or releases of data on unemploy-
ment, GDP, consumption or other important macroeconomic aggregates. Hence, demand
for index options is likely to project also investors’ uncertainty about macroeconomic
news. While the existence of higher moment risk premia is widely discussed and relatively
well understood in the literature, we know relatively little yet about how changes in the
investors’ expectation of volatility materialize in their trading decisions and how the in-
formation is incorporated into the market. This work fills in this void and provides new
insights about volatility information contained in index option demand. Additionally, the
paper studies whether the index option trading process is also useful to measure investors’
uncertainty about the macroeconomy.
To determine whether equity index option demand contains volatility information, I use
the concept of option market sidedness (OMS) furthered in Kehrle and Puhan (2014) to
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construct a measure of volatility or skewness informed index option demand (OMSσ). The
measure has the following intuition; since a common trading strategy to exploit volatility
information is the straddle trade (e.g., Ni et al. 2008) volatility informed trading results
in a joint excess demand (changes in open interest) for at-the-money (ATM) or close-to-
the-money call and put options with the same maturities.1,2 Hence to measure volatility
informed trading, I relate the changes in open interest of ATM or close-to-the-money call
options to the changes in open interest of ATM or close-to-the-money put options with
the same maturity.3
More specifically, OMSσ is the correlation between open interest changes of ATM call
and put options pairs that would be part of a straddle strategy in a 30-day backward
looking rolling window.4 The intuition for the measure is that higher values of the measure
indicate a stronger comovement of the excess demand in call and put options that would
be part of the same straddle trade, which signals an increased volatility informed demand.
On the other hand, lower values of the measure indicate less trading on information about
future volatility but rather about downside risk. It is well-known that market skewness
is negative since the 1987 market crash because investors started to fear future negative
jumps of the stock market. Consequently, if investors obtain signals that make them
anticipate higher skewness risk they tend to create new positions ATM (or near-the-money)
put options in order to either hedge against the market risk but also to take advantage of
raising option prices if the average investor has not obtained the new information yet.
To investigate whether index option demand contains information about future market
volatility and investor uncertainty about the macroeconomy, I use daily CRSP data of the
S&P500 stock index (SPX) and data on all option contracts on the index as provided by
OptionMetrics Ivy DB from November 2000 until December 2010.5
1A straddle that bets on an increase in volatility involves buying a put and a call with the same maturity
at the same strike price, and a straddle that should exploit future decreasing volatility goes short in these
option pairs. Since the option Vega is the greatest for ATM options, investors form straddle pairs by
trading in ATM or close-to-the-money options in order to profit the most from volatility changes.
2The open interest refers to the total number of option contracts, that have not been settled in the past
for the same underlying security. Since the number of outstanding option contracts is not fixed, changes
in open interest are an endogenous measure of option excess demand.
3In what follows I refer for simplicity only to ATM options even though also close-to-the-money options
that are up to 10% out-of-the money are included into the measure (see Section 2).
4That is, OMSσ is computed as OMSσ = corr(∆OICATM ,∆OI
P
ATM ).
5OptionMetrics data on SPX options starts in 1996, however, the data items needed to compute the
68
Introduction
I find that informed excess demand in straddle option pairs has predictive power for
future volatility beyond current, lagged volatility and even after controlling for changes in
market risk premia, the VIX and other variables. Furthermore, focusing on macroeconomic
news announcements as exogenous events of high aggregate uncertainty, I find that the
changes in open interest for straddle option pairs are larger and the predictive power of
OMSσ for index volatilities is significantly stronger before macronews announcements and
decrease after the announcement.
Trading on volatility informed option demand yields annualized Sharpe Ratios for strad-
dle strategies that in some cases almost double the Sharpe Ratios for a long investment in
the equity index. Sharpe Ratios (and returns) of the strategies increase with the strength
of the volatility informed trading, in particular during periods of high volatility.
In a robustness exercise, I verify that the results are not driven by trading on directional
(i.e., positive or negative) information at the index level. This finding is intuitive since
index options are predominantly used as a hedging tool rather than as an instrument to
take a directional bet on market-wide movements (cf. Pan and Poteshman 2006). The
fact that hedging plays a major role might also be related to the substantially larger
number of proprietary traders in index relative to equity options markets. Moreover, even
if an investor had superior market-wide information, for instance about unemployment, it
would not be clear how the market reacts to it once it becomes public news. Depending
on the expectations of the investors about the impact of changes in unemployment on
future economic growth, inflation, interest rates etc., stock markets might react positively
or negatively to the same piece of unemployment information (cf., Boyd et al. 2005).
The paper also speaks to the relation between informed volatility demand in options
and uncertainty about macroeconomic news. I find that a higher demand for straddle
option pairs before macroeconomic news announcements predicts larger uncertainty about
macroeconomic fundamentals. This implies that OMSσ is a potentially interesting new
measure of investor uncertainty about macroeconomic news. However, OMSσ is not
informative about the future levels or changes of the macroeconomic fundamentals by
themselves (e.g., does not predict GDP or GDP growth). This further corroborates that
realized volatility of the index are only available after November 2000.
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OMSσ captures excess demand in index options due to volatility informed trading, rather
than trading on directional signals of any kind.
I also investigate whether market makers react to volatility informed trading to protect
themselves and like this gradually incorporate the information in option prices. Consistent
with this, the results highlight that volatility informed demand triggers a widening of
spreads, particularly before days leading up to macroeconomic announcements and in
high volatility periods.
This paper contributes to the literature along several dimensions. First, so far only Ni
et al. (2008) investigate volatility informed trading using data of single equity options;
however, volatility information in index option demand has not yet been systematically
addressed even though options demand at the index level exhibits very different features
and motives of trade compared to the single equity market and despite the fact that
equity index options represent a substantial fraction of the derivatives market.6,7 Second,
the paper highlights and tests an easy to compute and low frequency way of measuring
volatility information in index options demand that is widely available for many markets
and sufficiently long times series and that is very useful to (i) predict future volatility,
(ii) differentiate between second moment or downside risk driven motives of index option
trades and (iii) detect times of high market uncertainty. Third, this work also adds to a
strand of literature that analyzes the impact of macro news on returns and volatilities in
stock markets.8 Yet, (volatility) informed trading in the (index) options market prior to
macroeconomic announcements is still unexplored in this literature. Furthermore, I also
show that volatility informed demand is useful as measure of macroeconomic uncertainty.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I detail the concept of
6For instance, according to the CBOE, the average daily volume in October 2012 was at an all-time
record with 134,961 for S&P500 stock index (SPX) weekly options and 657,892 for all SPX options.
Acworth (2012) reports that index options represent roughly 34% of the world wide derivative contract
volume compared to roughly 26% for the global contract volume share of individual equity options.
7Many other studies examine various aspects of directional information trading in the single stock
options market. See for instance Black (1975), Easley et al. (1998), Pan and Poteshman (2006), Kehrle
and Puhan (2014) or Chakravarty et al. (2004).
8Examples of such studies are Boyd et al. (2005), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Flannery and Protopa-
padakis (2002), Lucca and Moench (2012), McQueen and Roley (1993a), Orphanides (1992), Pearce and
Roley (1985), Nofsinger and Prucyk (2003), Beber and Brandt (2006), Va¨ha¨maa and A¨ijo¨ (2010), Chen
and Clements (2007), Savor and Wilson (2013) or Savor and Wilson (2012).
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options market sidedness and the measure volatility informed demand. Section 2 describes
the data and provides evidence about volatility informed demand around macronews an-
nouncements. Section 3.4, presents the main tests of a predictive relation between option
demand and index volatility. Section 3.5 highlights the economic significance of these
information in volatility informed demand with trading strategies. In Section 3.6, I inves-
tigate the impact of volatility informed demand on option market liquidity. Thereafter,
Section 3.7 provides insights about the information content of volatility informed option
demand about macroeconomic uncertainty. Section 3.8 concludes the paper.
3.2 Measuring Volatility Informed Option Demand
To measure volatility informed trading, I focus on ATM straddle options pairs as main
trading instruments of the volatility informed. This is intuitive, since the option Vega is
greatest for ATM options and volatility traders have information that prices move more (or
less) without knowing the direction of the price movement. Hence, a significant increase in
the association of the changes in open interest for option contracts that could be part of a
straddle strategy indicates trading on volatility information (see also Ni et al. 2008, Kehrle
and Puhan 2014).
So I compute the measure of volatility informed option demand OMSσ on each day t,
as the correlation of the changes in open interest of ATM call and put options with the
same strike price and maturity in a 30-day backward looking rolling window. Formally,
this reads as
OMSσt =
1
τ
t∑
s=t−τ
(
∆OICs,ATM −∆OI
C
t−τ :t,ATM
)(
∆OIPs,ATM −∆OI
P
t−τ :t,ATM
)
√
σ2
OICt−τ :t,ATM
√
σ2
OIPt−τ :t,ATM
, (3.2.1)
where τ denotes the size of the correlation window.9
9I choose this time window in order to capture as good as possible the gradual increase in informative
excess demand in the options market (cf. also Kehrle and Puhan 2014). Most informed trading is likely
to take place relatively close to maturity. However, ex-ante it is not clear, when exactly informed traders
trade. Intuitively, informed trader are usually not going to trade on one and only one day. Therefore,
using a 30-day window correlation yields at capturing the gradual increase in informative excess demand
in the options market. 30 days correspond to the usual temporal distance between two maturity dates.
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Intuitively, OMSσ is higher whenever the changes in open interest of the options on both
sides of the correlation comove stronger, indicating an excess demand in straddle pairs. On
the other hand lower values of the measure indicate less volatility informed demand. The
measure also captures when volatility informed investors trade on a particularly strong
signal. In such cases the excess demand for ATM straddle options will be particularly
strong and hence in equation (3.2.1) the demand for these options will exhibit a very high
deviation from the mean level; all other things being equal this will imply a higher value
of the correlation.
There are two appealing features of the correlation measure over alternative measures
such as a simple ratio, a difference in mean values or simple changes in open interest.
First, the correlation is a measure that standardizes the variables of interest and like this
controls for differences in the volatility of the correlated variables. Second, a correlation
allows me to focus on above average deviations in the changes in open interest. Hence,
the correlation measure enables me to identify instances of a joint above average demand
in ATM straddle option pairs.
Finally, there are several quite intuitive reasons why the correlation measure is computed
from changes in open interest. Arguably the change in open interest is an endogenous
measure of excess demand for options and provides a stronger link with informed option
demand than for instance trading volume, which could be used as an alternative option
trading measure.10 Intuitively, the demand from informed investors is associated with the
creation of new contracts (i.e., changes in open interest).11 Hence, the number of option
trades is less likely to be informative and mostly related to other trading motives such as
hedging demand or liquidity, which makes trading volume a more noisy measure of option
demand.12
Expanding or shortening the correlation window within a sensible range does not affect the quality of my
results.
10See Kehrle and Puhan (2014) for an in-depth discussion of this issue.
11See for instance also the evidence in Ni et al. (2008), Pan and Poteshman (2006), Muravyev (2013),
Lakonishok et al. (2007), Bollen and Whaley (2004), Easley et al. (1998), Garleanu et al. (2009) or Chesney
et al. (2011).
12The stark difference between changes in open interest and volume is also evident in the very low
unconditional correlation of changes in open interest and trading volume; the changes in open interest for
S&P500 ATM (OTM; ITM) call options and trading volume is 0.3 (0.2 ;0.001) and 0.34 (0.008; 0.1) for
put options.
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3.3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
This section describes and summarizes the data. Furthermore, it provides evidence about
volatility informed option demand around macroeconomic news announcements that val-
idates the measure of volatility informed option demand.
3.3.1 Option and Stock Index Data
The options market data consist of all option contracts for the S&P500 stock market
index at a daily frequency as provided by OptionMetrics Ivy DB.13 The sample period is
November 2000 until December 2010 resulting in 2,537 days.14 I exclude option contracts
with a maturity of more than 250 days. Overall the sample has 16,207 option contract
observations.
I define the moneyness for options according to the ratio of the strike price K and the
stock price S, similar to e.g., Chakravarty et al. (2004), Lakonishok et al. (2007) or Kehrle
and Puhan (2014). For call options the ratio is KS and for put options it is
S
K . An option
is OTM if the respective ratio is larger than 1.10 and it is defined as ITM if the ratio is
smaller than 0.90. Accordingly, ATM options have a moneyness range of 0.90–1.10.15
I create the daily open interest, spread and volume measures for each moneyness cate-
gory, i.e., ATM/ITM/OTM call and ATM/ITM/OTM put. As an aggregated daily open
interest I use the median over the open interest of option contracts in a moneyness cat-
egory. The daily change in open interest for call and put options is calculated for each
moneyness category.
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics for OMSσ.
OMSσ has a mean value of 0.1331 and the 75% quantile is still relatively low (0.37).
This is consistent with informed trading being less common than non-information based
trading and also with the fact that there is a general, hedging demand related, asymmetry
13The daily preliminary open interest is reported at the end of each trading day and released as the final
official data the following morning.
14The sample period is determined by the fact that the data items that I need to compute the realized
volatility of the SPX are only available after November 2000.
15I compute additionally the moneyness ratio as ln
(
K
F
/IVATM
√
T
)
, where F is the futures price and
IVATM is the implied volatility of ATM options of the respective stock. This alternative definition does
not change the quality of my results.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics. The table provides summary statistics for the full sample period
from November 2000 until December 2010. All data is daily. The table reports the mean, the standard
deviation (Std), the median, the 25 percent (Q25) and the 75 percent quantile (Q75). OMSσ is the
option demand imbalance measure that is related to volatility informed trading (for details see Section
3.2). SPXReturn(%) is the excess return of the S&P 500 index over the risk-free rate. RV is in
basis points and is defined as in Ni et al. (2008) as 10,000 times the difference of an underlying
stock’s intraday high and low prices divided by the closing stock price. V OLCATM , V OL
C
OTM and
V OLCITM denote the square roots of the median call option trading volume that are ATM, OTM or
ITM. V OLPATM , V OL
P
OTM and V OL
P
ITM denote the square roots of the median put option trading
volume that are ATM, OTM or ITM. N is the number of observations of each variable. The full
sample period is November 2000 to December 2010.
Variable Mean Std Q25 Median Q75 N
OMSσ 0.133 0.288 -0.074 0.148 0.369 16,207
SPX Return (%) 0.010 1.381 -0.595 0.068 0.6142 2,537
RV (bp) 152.113 114.278 82.524 121.784 185.82 2,537
V OLC,atm 8.3 5.8 4.0 7.10 11.5 16,207
V OLP,atm 10.3 7.1 4.6 8.9 14.4 16,207
V OLC,otm 17.8 9.1 12.2 16.3 21.2 16,207
V OLP,otm 25.3 9.2 19.3 23.2 29.1 16,207
V OLC,itm 4.5 3.4 2.0 3.7 5.9 16,207
V OLP,itm 4.4 4.1 1.8 3.3 5.6 16,207
between demand for put and call index options. This demand pattern also shows up in
the much larger number of trades in put options compared to call options.
As control variables I aggregate daily volume and spreads for ATM, OTM and ITM
option contracts. V OLjt,m denotes the daily median volume for m = {ATM, ITM,OTM}
call or put options, with j = {C,P}.16 SPREADjt,m denotes the median daily relative
bid-ask spread.
The stock market data for the S&P500 index is from the daily CRSP NYSE/AMEX/-
NASDAQ return files. The index returns (SPXReturn) are in excess of the average one
month risk free rate from the Fama risk free rates file as provided by CRSP. As a proxy
for the underlying’s daily realized volatility (RV ), I define, similarly to Ni et al. (2008), as
10,000 times the difference of the respective underlying’s intraday high and low prices di-
vided by the closing price. Summary statistics for the index returns and realized volatility
are also in Table 3.1.
Other control variables are momentum (MOM) that I compute as a 60 days backward
looking cumulative return and long-term volatility (STD), i.e., the square root of the
16I use the median values to control for the relatively larger dispersion in the higher valued quantiles.
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average cumulative squared returns in a 60 day backward looking window.
3.3.2 Volatility Information and Macro Announcements
This section uses macroeconomic news announcements to validate my measure of volatility
informed option demand. Macro announcements are exogenous events, which are often
followed by price adjustments in the stock market that lead temporarily to an increase
in volatility (Savor and Wilson 2012). Hence, I expect that OMSσ increases in the pre-
announcement period (indicating an increase in volatility informed demand) and post-
announcement I expect the measure to gradually decrease.
The data for macro announcement dates, analyst forecasts and the actual reported
data are from Money Market Services (MMS)/Informa Global Markets provided via the
Haver database.17 Similar to for instance Green (2004), I focus on 11 important economic
announcements and exclude an announcement if it is falls within a two day window after
the most recent announcement. The announcements are at a monthly frequency and
include unemployment, CPI, housing starts, index of leading indicators, trade balances,
nonfarm payrolls, PPI, retail sales, U.S. exports, U.S. imports and FOMC meetings where
information on potential changes of the Federal funds rate target is released. The overall
number of announcement dates in the sample is 1159. I require at least two days between
each macro announcement. After applying this rule, 568 announcement dates remain in
the sample.
Figure 3.1 plots the average OMSσ in a time window starting five days before and
ending five days after the macroeconomic announcement.
The figure highlights that on the days leading to a macro announcement, the comove-
ment of the changes in open interest for ATM straddle call and put option pairs increases
as expected above the full sample average up until a mean value of 0.186 and falls again
starting on the day of the announcement.
To validate that the RV increases in association with macro announcements, I compare
17The MMS data is the most commonly used dataset in studies that are involved with macro announce-
ments. For instance, Sarkar and Schwartz (2009), Andersen et al. (2007), Balduzzi et al. (2001), McQueen
and Roley (1993a), Green (2004), Hardouvelis (1988) and Urich and Wachtel (1984) use this dataset and
Pearce and Roley (1985) extensively investigate its properties.
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Figure 3.1: OMSσ and Macro Announcements. The figure plots the average daily OMSσ for a
time window that starts five days before and ends five days after a macroeconomic announcement date,
excluding observations with other macroeconomic announcements in the considered time window.
OMSσ is the option demand imbalance measure that is related to volatility informed trading (for
details see Section 3.2). The overall sample period is November 2000 to December 2010.
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the full sample RV with the RV around macroeconomic announcement dates. Figure 3.2
plots the average RV for a window starting five days before and ending five days after a
macroeconomic announcement.
The figure illustrates that on day t of the announcements (all announcements are in the
morning of the announcement date) RV increases and sharply decreases
In order to further explore how realized and implied volatilities and returns of the
S&P500 vary across days with different levels of the OMSσ measure, Table 3.2 reports the
means of these variables after sorting the data each month into OMSσ quartile portfolios.
In Panel A the sorting is for the full sample. Panel B only considers days with a
macro announcement on which the S&P500 index return decreased as “bad events” and
Panel C considers days with a macro announcement on which the S&P500 index return
increased as “good events”. Using the direct reaction of the stock market as criterion
to differentiate “good” from “bad” news events avoids the problem that investors seem
to evaluate the same type of macroeconomic information differently at different times.
Moreover, volatility and returns tend to be negatively correlated and negative news have
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Figure 3.2: Realized Volatility and Macro Announcements. The figure plots the average
daily realized volatility of the S&P500 (RV ) for a time window that starts five days before and ends
five days after a macroeconomic announcement date, excluding observations with other macroeco-
nomic announcements in the considered time window. RV is computed following Ni et al. (2008) as
10,000 times the difference of the respective underlying’s intraday high and low prices divided by the
closing price. The overall sample period is November 2000 to December 2010.
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on average a relatively larger impact on the first and second moments of the returns.
Comparing RVt across OMS
σ
t−1 groups shows in all panels that the difference in the
average RVt between high and low OMS
σ
t−1 quartiles (Hi − Lo) is positive and sizeable.
T-tests show that this difference is on average significantly different from zero in all panels.
These differences are significantly larger for the macro announcement date subsamples in
Panel B and C, supporting that around these dates volatility information trading is likely
to increase. Tests on differences in the mean returns show across panels that the differences
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Table 3.2: Variable Means Sorted by OMSσ. The table reports the means of
different variables after sorting each month the data into OMSσt−1 quartile portfolios
(for details regarding the construction of OMSσt−1 see Section 3.2). In Panel A the
sorting is for the full sample. Panel B only considers days with a macro announcement
on which the S&P500 index return decreased and Panel C considers days with a macro
announcement on which the S&P500 index return increased. RV ol is in basis points
and is defined as in Ni et al. (2008) as 10,000 times the difference of an underlying
stock’s intraday high and low prices divided by the closing stock price. SPX Return
is the excess return of the S&P 500 index over the risk-free rate. IV ol is in basis
points and is the implied volatility of the S&P500, computed as in Ni et al. (2008).
*** indicate a 1% level of significance, ** a 5% level of significance and * a 10%
level of significance for a t-test on an average significant difference from zero for the
Hi − Lo values of the the respective variable means across OMSσ groups. The full
sample period is November 2000 to December 2010. The number of observations is
16,207 and 2,537 days.
Panel A: Full Sample
RV ol(bp) SPX Return(%) IV ol(bp)
Low 124.419 0.016 1867.539
OMSσt−1
2 128.781 0.011 1902.443
3 164.497 0.031 2159.976
High 201.542 0.0108 2526.483
Hi− Lo 77.123*** -0.005 658.944***
Panel B: Bad News Events
RV ol(bp) SPX Return(%) IV ol(bp)
Low 126.186 -0.543 1872.378
OMSσt−1
2 127.493 -0.639 1894.849
3 141.667 -0.583 2073.199
High 231.360 -0.932 2556.892
Hi− Lo 105.174*** -0.390*** 684.514***
Panel C: Good News Events
RV ol(bp) SPX Return(%) IV ol(bp)
Low 132.382 0.681 1806.406
OMSσt−1
2 139.100 0.696 1920.197
3 184.56 0.940 2183.079
High 224.116 1.040 2600.453
Hi− Lo 91.7345*** 0.358*** 794.047***
for each group are significant between the event date sample and the full sample.18 The
differences are insignificant between the bad and the good news groups. Overall these
results provide further evidence for the non-directional nature of the information in the
excess option demand that is picked up with OMSσt−1.
Turning to the OMSσt−1 sorted average index return groups, one interesting observation
18The test results are omitted in the table to keep it better readable but naturally they are available on
request.
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is that for the full sample across OMSσt−1 there is no significant difference in the mean
returns, which is another indicator for the non-directional information content of OMSσt−1.
Between Panel B and C, there are obviously large return level differences. Since I have
defined the good and bad events relative to stock index increases or decreases after the
announcement, it is natural that the returns of the stock index are overall lower and in fact
highly negative in Panel B, whereas in Panel C the returns are positive and relatively high.
Across OMSσ within the bad news and the good news subsample there are differences in
returns, which correlate with the higher RVt across OMS
σ
t−1 groups.
The descriptives for the implied volatility (IV olt) show, compared to the RVt, similar
yet less strong patterns. The differences across OMSσt−1 for each subsample are similar
and substantially lower (in relative terms) than for the RVt. Similar to the results for
the RVt, tests on differences in the means show that the differences for each group are
significant between the event date and the full sample. However, the differences between
the bad and the good news groups are again insignificant.
3.4 Informed Option Demand and Future Volatility
To test the predictive power of OMSσ for future volatility, I follow Ni et al. (2008) and
estimate linear regressions of the realized S&P 500 index volatility (RV ) on the lagged
OMSσ measure and different controls with Newey-West robust standard errors.
RVt = β0 + β1OMS
σ
t−j + β2OMS
σ
t−j · It + b1D + b2C + t, (3.4.1)
with j = 1, . . . , 5 and
D =
[
RVt−1 . . . RVt−5 OMS+t−j OMS
+
t−j · It OMS−t−j OMS−t−j · It It
]
(3.4.2)
is the vector of variables that control for directional informed trading. I add lags of the
RV to control for information in RV that is accessible at the same time as and prior to
OMSσt−1. It is one if t is a macroeconomic news announcement date and is zero otherwise.
I also control for the V IX, as a measure of the market’s ex-ante perception about volatility
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risk. OMS+ and OMS− are controls for positive and negative informed option demand.19
C is a set of control variables, which additionally includes option volume V OLjt,m, where
V OLjt,m denotes the daily volume for m = {ATM, ITM,OTM} call or put options, with
j = {C,P}, and a measure for the standard deviation of the cumulated return of the past
60-days (STD). The corresponding coefficient vectors are b1 for D and b2 for C.
Table 3.3 reports the results for the RV regressions. Panel A, summarizes the results
for different regression models for which j is always equal to 1.
19Similar to Kehrle and Puhan (2014) I compute these measures to capture a potential impact of di-
rectional trading. So I correlate the change in open interest of options that provide investors with high
leverage (and hence are attractive for informed investors) with the changes in open interest of low leverage
options; i.e., OMS+ = corr(∆OICOTM ,∆OI
P
ITM ) and OMS
− = corr(∆OIPOTM ,∆OI
C
ITM ). Lower values
of the measure indicate more directionally informed demand, in the terminology of Kehrle and Puhan
(2014) the option market is more one-sided. A higher value of the measures indicates more heterogenous
beliefs.
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The results for the first regression model show that as expected OMSσ has predictive
power for RV beyond current and lagged volatility. The positive highly significant coeffi-
cient indicates that on average, the volatility informed option demand increases prior to
future increases in the index RV .
In the next row (II), I add OMSσt−1 signed with a dummy (I) that is equal to 1 if on day t
there is a macroeconomic announcement. After macroeconomic announcements on average
the volatility of the S&P500 increases for a certain period of time and therefore volatility
informed traders are more likely to trade in the options market on volatility signals prior
to macroeconomic news announcement dates. Consistent with this the coefficient for the
interacted OMSσt−1 is positive and highly significant.20
In row (III) I also include the contemporaneous OMSσ term. This does not change
the quality of the results. The coefficient of OMSσt exhibits the opposite sign compared
to the coefficient of the lagged variable. This is intuitive since at the time when the
news is revealed, the measure should start to take lower levels, indicating less asymmetric
information regarding volatility.
In the next regression model (column IV), I include the lags of OMS+ and OMS− to
control for trend or risk premia related trading motives. The coefficients for both measures
are insignificant, which is in line with the finding of Pan and Poteshman (2006) that index
option trading contains no directional information. This finding is also intuitive because it
is not clear in which direction the overall market reacts to these news. Hence, an investor
with directional information about macroeconomic fundamentals, such as GDP or labor
market news, would arguably very unlikely trade on this information with a directional
option investment. The results for OMSσt−1 are not affected by including OMS+ and
OMS−.
In regression model (V), I also add OMS+ and OMS− interacted with the macro
announcement dummy to validate that even before these events of high macroeconomic
information asymmetry, directional option demand has no impact on my results. As ex-
pected the coefficients of the interaction terms are insignificant and the results for OMSσt−1
20The unreported coefficient of the macro announcement dummy, which controls for volatility changes on
macro announcement dates that are unrelated to volatility informed trading, is also positive and significant.
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remain unaffected.
In the last regression model (VI) I add the first lag of the VIX as an additional control.
The VIX contains information about investors’ ex-ante perception of future volatility risk
and is widely used as an indicator for future volatility. Hence, it is interesting to study
whether the information in the options excess demand as measured by OMSσ is any
different from what we could learn anyway from using the VIX. The results show that
indeed OMSσ adds volatility information since the quality of the results for the OMSσ
related variables is not changed due to the addition of the VIX to the regression.
In Panel B, I predict, similar to Ni et al. (2008), realized volatility separately using
OMSσ with an increasing values of lagsize j. At least some of the j lags of OMSσ should
also exhibit positive significant coefficients if OMSσ captures actual informed demand.
Indeed, the coefficient for OMSσ is positive and highly significant for all j ≥ 2. For the
third and the fifth lag of OMSσ, the OMSσ · I is also positive and significant. The results
emphasize that OMSσ persistently picks up volatility information.
In Appendix 1 I show in a robustness exercise that OMSσ has no predictive power for
future index returns, which supports that OMSσ captures neither directional information,
nor expected market risk premia nor any such trading motives. Furthermore, 1 shows that
OMS+ or OMS− have no predictive power for future index returns, highlighting that
index option demand is not driven by directionally informed demand.
3.5 Trading Strategies
The results from the regression analysis provide strong evidence for OMSσ as a measure
of volatility informed index option demand. Yet, the question remains whether the infor-
mation in OMSσ is actually significant also in economic terms. Therefore, I consider next
the profitability of trading strategies conditional on the OMSσ measure.
If an increase or high values of the OMSσ indeed capture a volatility informed excess
demand in straddle option pairs, a trading strategy that conditions on an increase OMSσ
should result in at least non-negative or increasing returns.
Hence, I use the relative percentage changes in the measure, i.e., (∆OMSσ/OMSσ)∗100,
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as trading signal. Choosing a trading signal of this kind has the advantage that even in
the low volatility years, where the OMSσ measure can be negative, and yet experiences
several sharp run-ups, it is a useful measure to capture the effects of the joint excess
demand changes in options straddle pairs that obviously contain volatility information.
Using this trading signal, I set up a straddle trading strategy that should mimic the
trading behavior of the volatility informed investors. I compute the returns for a range
of OMSσ trading signal values. The trading strategy assumes that as soon as a trader
obtains a signal in a time window that starts three weeks before maturity and ends on the
Monday before the maturity date (the maturity date is usually a Saturday), the investor
takes a straddle position on the subsequent day. Since the open interest is reported in the
evening, the trader can obtain the signal only after the exchange closes. The last trade
is possible on the Tuesday before maturity. All positions are sold simultaneously on the
Tuesday four days before maturity.21
Table 3.4 provides annualized Sharpe Ratios for different benchmarks. The first (SRATM−SPX)
uses the SPX index as benchmark. The second is the most widely used version bench-
marked with the risk-free rate (SRATM−rf ). Furthermore, I compute the difference be-
tween SRATM−rf and the Sharpe Ratio of a long investment in the index that is bought
and sold at the same time as the straddle and benchmarked with the risk-free rate
(SRSPX−rf ). The most-right column reports t-statistics for the long straddle strategy
for the average strategy returns in each trading round (i.e., roughly one month). Panel
A summarizes the results for the full sample, Panel B for the years with an average RV
that is larger than the sample average and in Panel C for years with an average RV that
is below the sample average. Separating the sample in this way might provide interesting
insights on the nature and strength of the volatility information in option excess demand
at different times.
In Panel A the results show that for small and moderate increases the strategy gen-
erates significant profits that also beat a simple investment in the market. However, for
21Note that for different ranges of trading windows I obtain qualitatively similar or even stronger results.
However, in particular to avoid close to maturity effects on option prices, I prefer a more conservative
version of the trading strategy that requires the clearing of all investments several days before maturity
(cf. Day and Lewis 1988).
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Table 3.4: Trading on OMSσ. The table provides performance statistics for straddle pair option
trading strategies using different threshold values of the OMSσ measure as trading signal as detailed in
Section. OMSσ is computed as detailed in Section 3.2. Panel A reports results for the full sample, Panel
B provides results for high volatility years in the sample and Panel C for low volatility years in the sample.
SRATM−SPX is the annualized Sharpe Ratio for the straddle strategy return for each trading round using
the SPX as benchmark. SRATM−rf is the annualized Sharpe Ratio for the straddle strategy return for each
trading round using the risk-free rate as benchmark. SRATM−rf - SRSPX−rf is the difference between the
annualized Sharpe Ratio for the straddle strategy return for each trading round using the risk-free rate as
benchmark and the annualized Sharpe Ratio benchmarked with the risk-free rate for a strategy that goes
long in the market if OMSσ reaches the threshold and sells the position at the same date where the option
straddle position would be sold. For further details on the trading strategies see Section 3.5. T-values
are reported in parentheses. The full sample period is November 2000 to December 2010. The number of
observations is 16,207 and 2,537 days.
Panel A: Full Sample
∆OMSσ(%) SRATM−SPX SRATM−rf SRATM−rf − SRSPX−rf t-value
(0, 10] 4.501 4.523 0.233 (6.18)
(10, 50] 5.703 5.673 1.181 (2.33)
(50, 80] 0.663 0.554 -8.74 (2.12)
(80, 100] -0.902 -0.805 -6.668 (1.35)
(100,+∞) 1.91 1.893 1.529 (1.36)
Panel B: High Volatility Sample
∆OMSσ(%) SRATM−SPX SRATM−rf SRATM−rf − SRSPX−rf t-value
(0, 10] 3.437 3.471 -0.13 (3.49)
(10, 50] 7.137 7.098 -2.702 (2.30)
(50, 80] 4.012 3.882 4.051 (1.90)
(80, 100] 13.65 13.543 7.86 (1.86)
(100,+∞) 10.063 9.88 0.08 (2.27)
Panel C: Low Volatility Sample
∆OMSσ(%) SRATM−SPX SRATM−rf SRATM−rf − SRSPX−rf t-value
(0, 10] 4.687 4.737 0.4251 (5.08)
(10, 50] 2.911 2.978 0.831 (1.71)
(50, 80] -1.968 -2.011 -22.554 (0.82)
(80, 100] -8.736 -8.476 -12.77 (0.63)
(100,+∞) -2.067 -1.9825 -3.023 (1.19)
∆OMSσ/OMSσ trading signals on the interval above 80% and until an increase of 100%
the Sharpe Ratios become negative and the returns are not significantly different from zero
anymore. For the interval with changes of OMSσ that are larger than 100%, the Sharpe
Ratios are positive again and the strategy also beats, in terms of Sharpe Ratio, the long
index alternative, however the returns are on average not significantly different from zero.
For the interpretation of the results, I prefer to be very cautious in interpreting directly
the magnitudes of the Sharpe Ratios. Broadie et al. (2009) highlight, that the returns to
straddle strategies are very risky and most often violate the normality assumption behind
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the Sharpe Ratios. This seems to be also reflected in the results for the trading strategies
with more extreme trading signals.22
The mixed results in Panel A might be related to the fact that in low volatility times
there is less volatility information trading in the market and therefore the signals that
OMSσ captures are significantly weaker. If this is the case, I should find some evidence
for this in Panels B and C, where I implement the trading strategy separately for high
and low volatility times.
The results in Panel B emphasize that in high volatility times, there is a lot more
volatility information in the excess option demand of straddle option pairs. All profits are
highly significantly different from zero and the Sharpe Ratios are fairly high, up to 13.65
and up to twice as large as the Sharpe Ratio of the long index strategy; only in two cases
of smaller increases of OMSσ the value of SRSPX−rf is higher than SRATM−rf .
Considering next the results for the low volatility years in Panel C reveals that indeed
only in case of small or moderate increases in the volatility trading measure, the strategy
generates returns that are significantly different from zero and also have a Sharpe Ratio
that is slightly better than the Sharpe Ratio of the long index strategy.
3.6 Volatility Informed Demand and Option Liquidity
Market makers can observe at the end of the day the open interest and like this form
an opinion about the potential trading motives of the investors.23 Previous work shows
for single equity options that market makers, that cannot perfectly hedge, try to protect
themselves against directional and volatility informed demand by setting wider spreads
(on the next trading day).24 Hence, in this section I investigate whether this is also the
case for volatility informed trading in index options.
One concern might be that market makers may also respond with a widening of spreads
22For this reason I also choose not to rely on comparing mean returns but only performance statistics
that take the risk, which is related to the returns, into account.
23Market makers observe the open interest at the end of each day; hence, the information contained in
open interest changes only enters the market not before the subsequent day. This implies that the profits
of the informed investors are not quickly wiped out because of liquidity effects.
24See e.g., Easley et al. (1998), Garleanu et al. (2009), Kyle (1982), Kehrle and Puhan (2014) or Ni et
al. (2008).
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to higher uninformed trading activity, hence it is important to disentangle both explana-
tions from each other (cf., Ni et al. 2008). In order to clearly identify instances, which are
preceded by high aggregate information asymmetry, I use in this section macroeconomic
news announcements again as exogenous events of high aggregate information asymmetry
and increased levels of volatility.
To test whether volatility informed index option demand affects liquidity levels in the
index options market, I regress the spreads of the ATM call and put options separately on
OMSσt−1, OMSσt−1 interacted with a dummy It that is 1 in case of a macro announcement
day, the dummy itself and further controls for implied volatility, past returns and option
volume.
The regression model reads as
SPREADjt,ATM = β0+β1OMS
σ
t−1+β2OMS
σ
t−1 ·It+β3It+β4OMSσt−1 ·IV olSt+β5IV olSt+bC+t,
(3.6.1)
with j = {C,P} denoting whether it is the call or put option spread, C subsumes
the control variables, such as the first lag of the implied volatility IVt−1, option volume
V OLjt,ATM or a measure for the cumulated past 60-day returns MOM . Since the impact
of volatility informed trading is likely to depend on the volatility regime (high/low), I
also estimate regression models that include interaction terms of OMSσt−1 with dummies
(IV olSt) that are equal to one in a high (low) volatility state and zero otherwise. A high
volatility state is defined as a year where the average RV is above the average full sample
RV . The standard errors are heteroscedasticity adjusted (Newey-West) and the R2 is
adjusted for the number of regressors.
The results for the spread regressions are in Table 3.5. The results for the call spreads
are in columns (I)–(IV) and in the columns (V)–(VIII) provide the results for put options.
The results in Table 3.5 show that in all columns the coefficient for the announcement
date interacted OMSσt−1 measure is positive and highly significant. This supports that as
informational asymmetry increases in the days leading up to the macroeconomic announce-
ments, the impact of volatility informed demand also increases. This is also consistent
with market makers trying to protect themselves after observing a greater dissemination
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Table 3.5: Volatility Trading and Liquidity Levels. OMSσ is the option demand imbalance measure
that is related to volatility informed trading (for details see Section 3.2). I is an indicator that is 1 if the
day is an announcement day and the indicator is 0 otherwise. IV is the equally weighted average of the
implied volatilities of the straddle option pairs that are used to compute OMSσ. V OLCATM and V OL
P
ATM
are the square roots of the daily median ATM call and put option trading volume. MOM is obtained from
the daily return data as cumulative returns of the stock index over a 60 days backward looking window.
1HighV ola is a dummy that is 1 if a year has an above average RV and is zero otherwise. 1LowV ola is a
dummy that is 1 if a year has an above average RV and is zero otherwise. Newey-West robust t-statistics
are in parentheses (20 lags). The R2 is the adjusted R2. The full sample period is November 2000 to
December 2010. The number of observations is 16,207 and 2,537 days.
ATM Call Spread ATM Put Spread
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Const. -0.129 -0.262 -0.246 -0.220 -0.035 -0.239 -0.223 -0.231
(-2.22) (-3.72) (-3.26) (-2.48) (-0.59) (-3.33) (-2.87) (-2.52)
OMSσt−1 · It+1 0.278 0.224 0.261 0.260 0.450 0.393 0.405 0.402
(2.79) (2.29) (2.14) (2.13) (4.57) (4.07) (3.31) (3.29)
OMSσt−1 -0.246 -0.203 -0.350 -0.080 -0.259 -0.256 -0.436 -0.031
(-3.10) (-2.59) (-2.82) (-0.59) (-3.21) (-3.20) (-3.53) (-0.22)
IVt−1 0.443 0.464 0.178 0.210 -0.044 0.464 0.224 0.268
(1.55) (1.41) (0.46) (0.54) (-0.15) (1.38) (0.56) (0.67)
It+1 0.212 0.180 0.167 0.167 0.207 0.177 0.180 0.180
(6.19) (5.26) (4.14) (4.15) (6.04) (5.23) (4.46) (4.47)
V OLCATM 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(3.43) (3.81) (3.82) (5.12) (4.66) (4.67)
V OLPATM 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(4.67) (3.80) (3.72) (1.22) (1.34) (1.23)
MOM 0.538 0.643 0.619 1.063 0.905 0.873
(1.91) (1.90) (1.83) (3.75) (2.57) (2.48)
1HighV ola 0.022 -0.014
(0.39) (-0.25)
OMSσt−1 · 1HighV ola 0.319 0.470
(1.88) (2.75)
1LowV ola -0.030 0.003
(-0.54) (0.06)
OMSσt−1 · 1LowV ola -0.250 -0.38
(-1.50) (-2.27)
Adj. R2 0.014 0.04 0.04 0.035 0.016 0.035 0.034 0.032
of volatility information in the options market prior to macroeconomic announcements.
The results also highlight the impact of volatility informed trading on liquidity levels in
the options market. In columns (III), (IV), (VII) and (VIII) I investigate whether the
volatility state matters to the price impact of the non-announcement day related variation
in the OMSσt−1 measure by including dummies and dummy interacted OMSσt−1 measures
that condition on high and low volatility states, respectively. In the high volatility case
(columns III and VII), the simple macro announcement interacted OMSσt−1 remains sig-
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nificantly positively related with the spreads, and the high vola state interacted OMSσt−1
has a significantly positive coefficient. This implies that in high volatility states, volatil-
ity trading predicts a widening of spreads; at non-announcement times, indicated by the
coefficient of the non-interacted OMSσt−1 measure, the relationship is negative and sig-
nificant. On the other hand in the low volatility state (columns (IV) and (VIII)) the
interacted OMSσt−1 variable has a significantly negative coefficient while the coefficient for
the simple OMSσt−1 becomes even insignificant.
The results imply that volatility trading has a significant impact that decreases options
market liquidity levels whenever there is a lot of volatility information trading in the
market, hence particularly in high volatility times. When volatility informed investors
trade on decreases in the market volatility and the overall level of volatility is not very
high, the relationship between the time variation in the volatility informed trading measure
and the size of the next day’s option spreads is significantly negative.
3.7 Volatility Informed Demand and Investor Uncertainty
The last part of this paper examines the link between volatility informed option demand
and investor uncertainty about macroeconomic news. Market volatility, (changes in)
volatility risk premia and other second moment related measures are widely associated
with investor uncertainty about the economic prospects of an economy.
In particular, high uncertainty about the macro fundamentals is associated with higher
stock price volatility on the announcement day because arguably significant news are
incorporated in the asset prices on the day of the announcement. Hence, if OMSσ does
capture volatility information, I expect it to also predict the uncertainty about macro
fundamentals.
A very direct and common way of measuring (ex post) this uncertainty about macro
economic fundamentals is the surprise component of macroeconomic forecasts, i.e., the
standardized deviation of (the most recent) analyst forecasts from the subsequently an-
nounced true realization of the macro variable. Hence, if OMSσ is a significant predictor
of the surprise component of macroeconomic fundamentals this implies that OMSσ is
useful as an ex ante measure of investor uncertainty on macroeconomic news.
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To test the predictive power of OMSσ for investor surprises about macroeconomic
news, I first compute the surprise component of the announced macro variable.25 In
accordance with the previous literature (see e.g., Balduzzi et al. 2001, Flannery and
Protopapadakis 2002) I use the following standardized measure of macro announcement
surprises of announcement type j at time t:
Surpriset,k =
At,j − Ft,j
σj
, (3.7.1)
where At,j are the at day t announced values of the macro variable j, Ft,j are the at time
t most recent median forecast values for the macro variable j and σj is the unconditional
standard deviation of the innovations At,j −Ft,j . Obviously, the standardization of At,j −
Ft,j is useful to create a surprise measure that is comparable for each macro announcement.
Thereafter, I can aggregate the standardized surprise component over all announcement
types j and denote the aggregate surprise measure by Surpriset. Since surprises can be of
positive or negative sign, I then estimate the following regression using the absolute value
of the surprises:
|Surpriset| = β0 + β1OMSσt−1 + bC + ηt, (3.7.2)
where
C =
[
Ft V OL
C
t,ATM V OL
P
t,ATM MOMt It
]
(3.7.3)
as the vector of control variables.26 Ft is a standardized measure of analyst forecasts aggre-
gated for all announcement types j ∈ {CPI, durables, exports, FOMC,...,unemployment},
V OLCt,ATM and V OL
P
t,ATM are ATM call and put volume measures, MOM is a measure
that controls for past returns, which might also capture macroeconomic news uncertainty
and which I obtain from the daily index return data as cumulative returns of the stock
index over a 60 days backward looking window. I is an indicator that is 1 if the announce-
ment was bad news, i.e., stock prices drop on the announcement date, and the indicator is
25Note that I exclude observations of two or more announcements within a two day time window because
otherwise, it is difficult to identify the effect of an announcement day on OMSσ.
26Using only positive or only negative surprises as dependent variable yields qualitatively the same
results, which are available on request.
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0 otherwise. The intuition for including this term is that in case of bad news, the surprise
effect might be different from the effect in case of positive news (e.g., Boyd et al. 2005).
The results for the macro news surprise regressions are reported in Panel A of Table
3.6.
The first specification in Panel A reports the results for regressing the macro news sur-
prises only on OMSσt−1 and the forecast measure. As expected β is positive and significant,
i.e., an increase in the level of volatility informed trading correlates with a future increase
in the surprise component, showing that OMSσ is also useful as a measure of investor
uncertainty on macroeconomic news.
Including the control variables in the second regression model does not change the
quality of these results.
As a robustness check, I investigate next whether OMSσ is able to predict or at least
explain contemporaneously the true realization of the macro variable. If OMSσ captures
volatility information and investor uncertainty on macroeconomic news rather than index
return information, the measure should also not capture information about the realized
values of the macroeconomic fundamentals; this would require knowledge of the option
investors about the future announced value of the macro variable, which should not be
the case if OMSσ really captures uncertainty about macroeconomic fundamentals.
To test this, I use in Panel B of Table 3.6 the announced value of the macro variable itself
as dependent variable.27 I start first with using only OMSσt−1 as explanatory variable. In
the second regression I also control for and OMSσt and the forecast value of the macro
variable. In the third regression model I include instead Surpriset. The coefficients for
OMSσt−1 and also forOMSσt are insignificant, supporting thatOMSσ captures uncertainty
about macroeconomic fundamentals rather than information about the actual value of the
macro variable.
In Panel C, I additionally investigate whether OMSσ can predict or at least contempo-
raneously explain the (absolute) first difference of the macro variables. While information
about the level could be harder to obtain, the sign and the size of the change might be
27In order to make the macro variables comparable, I standardize them.
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Table 3.6: Volatility Trading and Macro Announcements: Further Regression Re-
sults. Panel A reports results for regressions that use the variable Surprise as dependent
variable and regress it on OMSσt−1, Forecast and different controls. Panel B reports results for
regressions that use the variable |∆Macrovar.| as dependent variable and regress it on OMSσt−1,
OMSσt and Forecast or Surprise. OMS
σ is the option demand imbalance measure that is re-
lated to volatility informed trading (for details see Section 3.2). F is the last analyst forecast
for a respective macro variable before the announcement date. Macrovar. is the standardized
value of the macro variable on the announcement date. |∆Macrovar.| is the absolute change
of Macrovar. on the announcement date. |Surprise| is the absolute value of the unexpected
part of the change in the macro variable that is computed as described in Section 3.7. MOM
is obtained from the daily return data as cumulative returns of the stock index over a 60 days
backward looking window. V OLCATM and V OL
P
ATM are the square roots of the daily median
ATM call and put option trading volume. I is an indicator that is 1 if the announcement was
bad news, i.e., stock prices drop on the announcement date, and the indicator is 0 otherwise.
Newey-West robust t-statistics are in parentheses (20 lags). The R2 is the adjusted R2. The
full sample period is November 2000 to December 2010. The number of observations is 16,207
and 2,537 days with 568 macro announcement days.
Panel A: |Surprise| = Const.+ β ×OMSσt−1 + B× Controls+ ηt
Const. OMSσt−1 F V OL
C
t−1,ATM V OL
P
t−1,ATM MOM I Adj. R
2
-0.81 1.076 0.081
(-8.27) (3.32)
0.344 0.701 -0.337 0.001 -0.001 -2.256 -0.076 0.126
(1.03) (1.70) (-2.61) (0.21) (-1.53) (-1.58) (-0.45)
Panel B: Macrovar. = Const.+ γ1 ×OMSσt−1 + γ2 ×OMSσt + γ3 × {F ∨ Surprise}+ νt
Const. OMSσt−1 OMS
σ
t F Surprise Adj. R
2
1.63 -0.51 0.003
(7.77) (-0.89)
0.006 0.055 -0.023 0.836 0.995
(0.46) (1.41) (-0.63) (157.35)
2.576 -0.037 -0.677 -0.080 0.148
(24.27) (-0.05) (-0.86) (-1.60)
Panel C: |∆Macrovar.| = Const.+ µ1 ×OMSσt−1 + µ2 ×OMSσt + µ3 × {F ∨ Surprise}+ ξt
Const. OMSσt−1 OMS
σ
t F Surprise Adj. R
2
0.45 0.22 0.001
(7.57) (0.93)
-0.215 -0.173 0.223 0.186 0.002
(-1.05) (-0.24) (0.33) (2.45)
0.546 -0.582 0.122 0.303 0.116
(4.44) (-0.85) (0.19) (2.72)
easier to infer.
So in Panel C of Table 3.6, I run the same regressions as in Panel B but now the
dependent variable is the aggregate standardized absolute value of the change between
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the previously announced value of each macro variable j and the value announced at time
t.
The results in Panel C reveal that OMSσ neither predicts nor explains the absolute
change in the macro variable, which provides further support to the non-directional na-
ture of OMSσ and its arguable benefits as a measure of aggregate uncertainty about
macroeconomic news.
3.8 Conclusion
Volatility information in stock index options trading is a relevant but yet understudied
research question. This study complements the existing literature by providing evidence
for volatility information in stock index option trading. Moreover, the paper highlights
that trading on future volatility importantly affects the liquidity in the index options
market and is useful to measure uncertainty about macroeconomic fundamentals.
In order to measure volatility informed option demand I use a measure of volatility
informed option demand (OMSσ) that is a rolling correlation of the changes in open
interest of those contract types that are likely to be used to trade on future volatility (i.e.,
ATM call and put options with same maturity). The measure predicts future volatility
beyond current and lagged realized volatility, the VIX and various other controls. Volatility
informed option demand increases prior to macroeconomic announcements. Furthermore,
the predictive power of OMSσ for the index volatility increases before macroeconomic
news announcements. The results also highlight that volatility informed option demand
captures investor uncertainty about macroeconomic news. The effects that I measure are
economically significant; trading on volatility informed option demand yields annualized
Sharpe Ratios that are up to twice as large as Sharpe Ratios on the corresponding long
index investment.
I also investigate the implications of volatility informed trading for liquidity levels in
the options market. I find that volatility informed demand increases trigger a widening of
spreads in particular before days leading up to macroeconomic announcements. Obviously,
market makers are not naive, recognize the volatility information related excess demand
patterns and try to protect themselves against future increases in volatility, in particular
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at times of high aggregate information asymmetry and periods of a higher volatilities
informed trading.
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Return Predictive Regressions
1 Return Predictive Regressions
As a robustness exercise, I investigate whether OMSσ has any predictive power for fu-
ture index returns or contains only volatility information as to validate that it is neither
directional information nor expected market risk premia or such trading motives that are
capture by OMSσ. Furthermore, I also test the return predictive power of OMS+ and
OMS−. If the measures have no predictive power for index returns this would further
support that the index option demand is not driven by directionally informed traders.
The empirical specification of the linear regressions with Newey-West robust standard
errors, which I use for the return predictability tests reads as,
RETt = β0 + β1OMS
σ
t−1 + β2OMS
+
t−1 + β3OMS
−
t−1 + bCt + t, (1.1)
with RETt as the daily S&P500 index return in excess of the risk free rate at day
t. β0, β1, β2 and β3 denote the coefficients of the intercept, OMS
σ
t−1, OMS
+
t−1 and
OMS−t−1. Further, I control in (1.1) for the contemporaneous terms of the volatility and
directional OMS measures as well as for the past 60 day average stock returns (MOM),
the past 60 day average stock return volatilities (STD) and the daily volume V OLjt,m for
m = {ATM, ITM,OTM} call or put options, with j = {C,P}.
Table A1 reports the results for the excess return regressions.
INSERT TABLE A1 ABOUT HERE
I start in column (I) with testing the predictive power of OMSσ. The insignificant
coefficient supports that OMSσ indeed captures volatility and not directional information.
Next, column (II) includes also the contemporaneous OMSσ in order to test whether
contemporaneously explains returns. The coefficients for the lagged and the contempora-
neous OMSσ term are both insignificant, corroborating the result from column (I).
Next, in column (III), I test whether the directional option demand measures, OMS+
and OMS−, have predictive power for future returns. The coefficients are insignificant,
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which is line with the evidence in Pan and Poteshman (2006) that at the index level there
is no directional information in option demand.
Similarly to the previous regressions I add in column (IV) also the contemporaneous
OMS+ and OMS−. The coefficients for the lagged and the contemporaneous OMS+ and
OMS− measures are all insignificant.
Finally, in column (V) I include all OMS variables and several option and stock index
related control variables. The results for the OMS measures remain insignificant.
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Table A1: Regression Results for Daily Realized Stock Index Returns on OMSσ and Controls.
The table provides daily regression results of the daily excess returns of the S&P500 on OMSσ as well as on
control variables. The results for some control variables are omitted to save space, however, they are listed
and defined below. OMS+ and OMS− are options market sidedness measures for the call and the put
market, respectively, that are obtained by correlating call and put option contracts (for details see Section
3.2). OMSσ is the option demand imbalance measure that is related to volatility informed trading (for
details see Section 3.2). MOM is obtained from the daily return data as cumulative returns of the stock
index over a 60 days backward looking window. STD is the average realized standard deviation obtained
from the daily returns over a 60 days backward looking window. V OLCOTM , V OL
C
ATM and V OL
C
ITM
are the daily median call option trading volume that are OTM, ATM or ITM. V OLPOTM , V OL
P
ATM and
V OLPITM are the daily median put option trading volume that are OTM, ATM or ITM. Newey-West robust
t-statistics are in parentheses (20 lags). The R2 is the adjusted R2. N is the number of observations. The
full sample period is November 2000 to December 2010. The number of observations is 16,207 and 2,537
days.
Excess Return S&P 500 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Const. 0.013 0.013 -0.032 -0.040 0.085
(0.61) (0.60) (-0.37) (-0.45) (0.94)
OMSσt−1 0.025 -0.023 0.382
(0.32) (-0.05) (0.78)
OMSσt 0.050 -0.190
(0.12) (-0.39)
OMS+t−1 0.040 -0.470 -0.590
(0.10) (-0.83) (-1.07)
OMS−t−1 0.044 -0.004 -0.070
(-0.15) (-0.01) (0.10)
OMS+t 0.521 0.541
(0.90) (0.97)
OMS−t 0.053 -0.193
(0.11) (-0.41)
MOM 2.853
(5.56)
STD -8.504
(-1.29)
V OLCt−1,OTM -0.000
(-1.10)
V OLPt−1,OTM 0.001
(0.50)
V OLCt−1,ITM -0.001
(-1.30)
V OLPt−1,ITM 0.001
(1.47)
V OLCt−1,ATM -0.000
(-1.36)
V OLPt−1,ATM 0.000
(3.75)
Adj. R2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.033
N 2,537 2,537 2,537 2,537 2,537
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Chapter 4
Financing Asset Sales and Business Cycles
joint with Marc Arnold and Dirk Hackbarth
4.1 Introduction
A crucial component of corporate investment decisions is the choice of the source of fund-
ing. In practice, asset sales play an important role for investment financing. For instance
in 2011, the French cement giant Lafarge targeted EUR 750 million (USD 1.1 billion)
of asset sales to refinance parts of its debt for the 2007 purchase of Egyptian Orascom
Cement. In the same year, Thomson Reuter’s announced to raise about USD 1 billion
by selling two businesses to fund further investments. In fall 2012, Petrobras announced
large asset sales to contribute to the financing needs of nearly USD 15 billion to fund its
five-year investment plan. While debt and equity are widely studied sources of investment
financing, asset sales are rarely considered. This is surprising, given that the average
amount of asset sales corresponds to roughly 44% of the average amount of newly issued
equity for U.S. manufacturing firms in Compustat between 1971 and 2010.
This paper analyzes the decision of firms to sell assets to fund investments (financing
asset sales). We uncover a novel aspect of this decision, that is, the relation between financ-
ing asset sales and the well-known debt overhang problem (Myers 1977). We show that
this relation explains stylized facts of empirically observed asset sale patterns. Recognizing
that future investment may be financed with asset sales also has important consequences
for corporate investment policy, and firm valuation. Furthermore, our study features orig-
inal insights on the amplification effects of real business cycle shocks on investment and
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asset sale decisions of firms. We incorporate business cycles in our analysis for two reasons.
First, while the cyclicality of external financing is intensively studied in recent papers, the
cyclicality of financing asset sales is not discussed (e.g. Korajczyk and Levy 2003) . Sec-
ond, previous work finds that business cyclicality is crucial to understand financing and
investment decisions (e.g., Chen and Manso 2010).
We document empirical facts for a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms that cannot
jointly be explained with traditional motivations for asset sales, such as financial distress
or financial constraints.1 As the incentive for asset sales is unobservable in our data, we
focus on the correlation between asset sales and investment. The idea behind this ap-
proach is that financing asset sales should be reflected in the correlation between asset
sales and investment. We explore firm-specific and business cycle related variables that
drive this correlation to draw conclusions about the main determinants of financing asset
sales. At the same time, the regression set-up allows us to control for other firm and
industry characteristics that are potentially correlated with asset sales. We find that the
correlation between asset sales and investment is significantly higher (i) for firms with
higher leverage, (ii) in bad business cycle states, (iii) for firms with a low cyclicality of
growth options in bad business cycle states, and (iv) for unconstrained firms.
Motivated by these stylized facts on financing asset sales, we derive the implications
of a structural model with intertemporal macroeconomic risk, embedded inside a repre-
sentative agent consumption-based asset pricing framework in the spirit of Bhamra et
al. (2010b) and Chen (2010). To generate financing needs, our model firms do not only
consist of invested assets but, following Arnold et al. (2013), also have a growth option
that is costly to exercise. We augment this model environment by incorporating business
cycle dependency of the equity issuance cost, the asset liquidity, and the growth option.
Moreover, the structural model approach allows us to relate financing asset sales to the
debt overhang (i.e., wealth transfer) problem between equityholders and debtholders by
analyzing equityholders’ endogenous choice between issuing new equity and selling assets
to finance the exercise of the growth option. The consumption-based asset pricing frame-
1See for instance, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) or Weiss and Wruck (1998) for papers that relate asset sales
to corporate distress and, for instance, Lang et al. (1995), Hovakimian and Titman (2006), Bates (2005)
for papers that highlight the role of asset sales as source of investment financing for constrained firms.
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work determines how aggregate risk and risk prices change with the business cycle. It
features a representative agent whose utility incorporates both, time and state preferences
(e.g. Duffie and Epstein 1992a, Duffie and Epstein 1992b). The agent’s preference for an
early resolution of uncertainty affects the stochastic discount factor and, hence, has an
impact on security prices. The changes between good and bad business cycle states are
driven by an observable Markov chain. This asset pricing approach directly links financing
asset sale decisions to asset prices and economic fundamentals.
Our analysis starts with a typical firm at initiation that consists of assets in place and a
growth option. It is initially financed with equity and risky debt. When the firm exercises
its growth option, the total asset volatility decreases, and total earnings increase. Hence,
the exercise creates a wealth transfer from equityholders to debtholders because debt be-
comes less risky. Due to this agency problem, equityholders invest too late compared to
an investment policy that maximizes the value of the expansion option (underinvestment).
Equityholders decide whether to fund the exercise cost of the growth option by issuing
equity or by selling assets. Selling assets when exercising the option increases leverage,
which renders debt more risky. The increase in the riskiness of debt associated with the
asset sale causes a reverse wealth transfer from debtholders to equityholders that mitigates
the wealth transfer problem. As a consequence, asset sales are relatively more attractive
to equityholders of firms that are more exposed to the wealth transfer problem.
The wealth transfer problem is larger for more leveraged firms (see e.g. Myers 1977)
because debt is riskier and, hence, more sensitive to earnings and asset volatility changes.
As a consequence, equityholders of more leveraged firms have a stronger incentive to use
financing asset sales. This insight provides a compelling explanation to our first stylized
fact that the correlation between asset sales and investment is significantly higher for firms
with larger leverage. Moreover, our model allows us to examine the endogenous relation
between business cycles and financing asset sales. In bad business cycle states, leverage
increases for a given level of earnings because the decrease in the asset value of a firm
is larger than the decrease in the debt value. At the same time, however, equityholders
optimally invest at a higher earnings level than in good business cycle states, which in-
duces a lower leverage at investment. Our results show that the first effect dominates,
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i.e., leverage at investment is higher in bad business cycle states. Since the wealth transfer
problem at option exercise is larger for higher levels of leverage, our model predicts that
equityholders tend to prefer financing asset sales during bad business cycle states. This
finding provides an explanation to our second stylized fact, i.e., to the increased correla-
tion between asset sales and investment in bad states. Finally, the model also shows why
firms with a less cyclical growth option tend to use more financing asset sales, conditional
on investing in bad states. The more valuable a firm’s growth option is in bad states, the
lower is the earnings level at which it optimally invests during bad states. A lower earnings
threshold for investment entails a higher leverage at investment. For a higher leverage,
the wealth transfer problem is more pronounced, which implies that equityholders have a
higher incentive to use financing asset sales during bad states.
To explore the dynamic features of our model, we simulate panels of model-implied
firms that are structurally similar to the Compustat sample. Each simulation generates
a time series of investment, financing, and default observations over the business cycles.
We compare these simulated observations to the empirical patterns to validate the model.
The model-implied dynamic patterns of financing asset sales provide an explanation to
the stylized facts on asset sales and investments that we document in our empirical anal-
ysis. In particular, we find that, on average, 39% of the investments in our simulations
are financed with asset sales. The simulated samples match our empirical finding (i) that
the correlation between asset sales and investment rises with leverage. The number of
firms that use financing asset sales conditional on investment increases to roughly 52%
for firms in the highest leverage tercile compared to 35% in the lowest tercile. Investment
and financing asset sales in the simulated samples are procyclical, and often peak at those
points in time at which the economy switches from a bad to a good state. The fraction
of firms that use financing asset sales to invest increases to 44% during bad states, and
decreases to 36% during good states, which reflects our empirical finding (ii) that the cor-
relation between asset sales and investment is higher in bad business cycle states. Finally,
we also match our empirical prediction (iii). The cyclicality of the growth opportunity
is important in that the fraction of firms that use financing asset sales to invest during
bad states in the simulated samples is particularly large for the subsample of firms that
have a less cyclical growth option. In sum, the simulation results show that our model, in
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which the wealth transfer problem drives the decision of firms to sell assets, yields dynamic
patterns of financing asset sales that explain the stylized facts in the Compustat data.
Our contribution is three-fold. First, we develop a dynamic model of investment and
financing that endogenizes the choice between equity and asset sales as funding source
and yields a set of novel insights and testable predictions that improve our understanding
about asset sale motives of firms.2 That is, we provide theoretical and empirical evidence
for agency conflicts between debt and equity as an important and heretofore neglected
motive for asset sales. Our findings complement previous work that associates asset sales
with alternative motives. Weiss and Wruck (1998), Hovakimian and Titman (2006), and
Bates (2005), for example, discuss investment funding needs of financially constrained or
distressed firms as a reason for asset sales. Warusawitharana (2008) argues that asset re-
allocations are mainly driven by firm-specific productivity shocks. More recently, Edmans
and Mann (2013) revisit the pecking order theory by examining the relative information
asymmetry associated with equity issuance and asset sales. Lang et al. (1995), and Bates
(2005) focus on the tradeoff between investment efficiency and agency costs of manage-
rial discretion associated with selling assets. Morellec (2001) is the only paper that also
considers agency conflicts between debt and equity in the context of asset sales. He high-
lights that asset liquidity increases the debt capacity only when bond covenants restrict
the disposition of assets close to bankruptcy. In contrast, we model asset sales to finance
investment and show that it is optimal for equityholders to negotiate debt covenants that
admit asset sales if their proceeds are used to purchase new assets.
Second, we contribute to a line of research that emphasizes the importance of cycli-
cality for capital structure and credit risk (see e.g. Hackbarth et al. 2006). We show
that incorporating the impact of business cycle shocks is crucial to jointly explain the
corporate investment and financing asset sale decisions. While the effect of cyclicality
2Equityholders’ choice between issuing equity and selling assets upon investment is a first step towards
understanding financing asset sales. A second step could be to consider more funding sources, such as
debt. Incorporating optimal debt restructuring upon investment yields a very large leverage choice because
equityholders do not incorporate the bankruptcy costs imposed by the new debt on initial debtholders.
This distortion would drive the investment and asset sale decisions of firms. Note that the problem can
not be solved by implementing a priority structure as suggested in Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) for a one
regime model. The reason is that, at initiation, it is not known at which threshold the growth option will
be exercised in our two regime model. A framework with initial debt renegotiation is needed to address
the problem, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
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on asset sales through the productivity channel is already explored (e.g. Maksimovic and
Phillips 2001, Yang 2008), the impact of cyclicality through the financing channel has so
far been neglected. A closely related paper that considers macroeconomic risk and the
debt overhang problem is Chen and Manso (2010). Their results emphasize the cyclical
nature of growth opportunities, and the increase of debt overhang in bad states. However,
they do not consider the role of asset sales. Our findings on the cyclical nature of financ-
ing asset sales also complement the empirical literature that suggests internal resources
are more important during worse economic times (e.g., Duchin et al. 2010, Lemmon and
Roberts 2010, Campbello et al. 2010, Campello et al. 2011).
Third, this paper integrates to a growing literature in corporate finance that uses simu-
lated panels based on structural models to explain stylized facts in real firm data (see e.g.,
Gomes and Livdan 2004, Hennessy and Whited 2007, Strebulaev 2007). As endogeneity
problems are hard to resolve with an appropriate empirical identification strategy, we use
our structural model to rationalize and support the stylized patterns about the relation
between financing asset sales and investments that we observe in the real data.
The paper proceeds as follow. In Section 4.2, we establish empirical facts on the corre-
lation between asset sales and investment. Section 4.3 introduces a structural model that
to explain these stylized facts. Section 4.4 presents the model solution, and Section 4.5
derives the predictions generated by our model for a typical firm at initiation. Finally, we
simulate model-implied economies of firms to analyze the aggregate dynamics of financing
asset sales in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Stylized Facts
In this section, we document empirical patterns for a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms.
In particular, we show that business cycle conditions, corporate investments, and time-
variation of growth opportunities are key determinants of financing asset sales.3 The data
on asset sales (Compustat item SPPE) does not reveal the motive behind the asset sales.
We can also not exploit a (quasi-) natural experiment or a discontinuity. Hence, we try to
identify firm characteristics and business cycle related factors that increase the correlation
3The sample period is 1971 to 2010. The final sample consists of 3,592 firms in Compustat. All variable
definitions, data cleaning filters and summary statistics for the sample are provided in 2.
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between asset sales and investment. The idea behind this approach is that more financing
asset sales should result in an increased correlation between contemporaneous investment
and asset sale. Moreover, focusing on this correlation allows us to abstract away from fire
sales of financially distressed firms. The reason is that it is unlikely that distressed firms
tend to invest heavily in those periods, in which they are forced to sell assets to repay
their debt (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1992). We document that the correlation between
asset sales and investments is higher (i) for firms with higher leverage, (ii) in bad business
cycle states, (iii) for firms with less cyclical growth opportunities in bad business cycle
states, and (iv) for unconstrained firms.
Table 4.1 reports results for OLS panel regressions that explore the correlation of asset
sales with investment, leverage, the cyclicality of a firm’s growth opportunities, financial
constraints and other controls for various firm characteristics. We include industry fixed
effects. The standard errors are autocorrelation robust and clustered at the industry level,
and the R2s are adjusted for the number of variables in the regression.4
In column (I), we investigate the relationship of asset sale with investment using growth
opportunities (q), measures of financial flexibility (cash flow and financial slack), and fi-
nancial leverage as controls. The regression coefficient of investment shows that asset
sale and investment are highly significantly and positively correlated. Lagged cash flows
and q exhibit a negative significant regression coefficient, while lagged financial slack and
coverage ratio are not significantly correlated with asset sale. The positive significant as-
sociation of asset sale and investment suggests that financing asset sales are a potential
source of investment funding. However, we cannot interpret this correlation by itself as an
indicator of whether the wealth transfer problem between equityholders and debtholders
is a potential motive for firms to use financing asset sales.
To explore this question, we first investigate factors known to be related to the wealth
transfer problem that potentially increase the correlation between investments and asset
sales. For instance, the wealth transfer problem increases with firm leverage (see e.g.
Myers 1977). Hence, in column (II), we explore the role of leverage for the relationship
between asset sale and investment using an interaction term of investment and leverage.
4The quality of our results remains unaffected if we use, e.g., two-step GMM estimations or two-way
clustering at the year and at the industry level or alternatively at the year and at the firm level.
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Table 4.1: Compustat Sample Asset Sale Determinants
The table reports parameter estimates for industry-fixed effect linear regressions and industry-clustered au-
tocorrelation robust t-statistics (in parentheses) with Asset Sale as dependent variable. Asset Sale are the cash
proceeds from the sale of fixed capital. Investment is equal to capital expenditures. Cash flow is the first lag
of the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization. q is the first lag of the sum
of the book value of total debt and market value equity divided by the book value of total assets. Leverage is
the first lag of (LT+PSTK-TXDB-DCVT). Financial Slack is the first lag of the sum of cash and short-term
investments. Investment, Cash F low, Asset Sale, and Financial Slack are scaled by the book value of the
beginning-of-period net fixed assets. The variable Cov. Ratio is the first lag of the ratio of EBITDA divided by
the interest expenses. Corr(q, Salesgr.) is the firm individual 5-year rolling correlation of the firm individual q with
the aggregate annual sales growth across all firms. SA Index is the first lag of the SA-Index that is computed
as −0.737 ∗ Total Assets + 0.043 ∗ (Total Assets)2 − 0.04 ∗ Age. Since the SA-index exhibits very high values by
construction, we scale the variable with 10× 107. Bad State is a dummy that is one if the aggregate sales growth
and the average annual equity return across all firms in the sample are, simultaneously, in the bottom 25% of all
years. ILow Z is a dummy that is one if a firm has a Z-Score (see Equation (B.2)) value below 3. The sample period
is 1971 to 2010. N is the number of observations in the corresponding regression. The full sample consists of an
unbalanced sample of 3563 U.S. manufacturing firms.
Dependent variable: Asset sale (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX)
Investment 0.020 0.003 0.019 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.003 0.020 0.005
(4.34) (0.35) (4.02) (4.99) (4.29) (4.27) (0.47) (4.28) (0.94)
Cash Flow -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-5.79) (-6.01) (-5.80) (-5.33) (-5.82) (-5.76) (-5.96) (-5.80) (-5.93)
q -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(-21.83) (-20.23) (-21.89) (-19.87) (-22.55) (-22.76) (-20.17) (-18.14) (-16.72)
Financial Slack -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(-0.47) (0.36) (-0.45) (1.34) (-0.52) (-0.51) (0.29) (-0.79) (0.00)
Cov. Ratio -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-1.27) (-1.07) (-1.25) (-0.97) (-1.29) (-1.29) (-1.11) (-2.70) (-2.71)
Leverage 0.012 0.004 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.004 0.012 0.004
(3.27) (0.89) (3.25) (3.13) (3.20) (3.21) (0.96) (3.37) (0.97)
Lever. x Invest. 0.043 0.040 0.036
(2.91) (2.76) (3.00)
Bad State x Invest. 0.014 0.019
(2.68) (2.25)
Bad State -0.004 -0.006
(-3.89) (-3.90)
Corr(q,Salesgr.) 0.001
(0.96)
Invest. x Corr(q,Salesgr.) -0.001
(-0.38)
Bad State x Corr(q,Salesgr.) 0.005
(2.26)
Invest. x Bad State x Corr(q,Salesgr.) -0.024
(-2.35)
SA-Index 0.009 -0.005 0.040
(7.94) (-1.03) (1.05)
Invest. x SA-Index 0.043 -0.298
(2.66) (-3.81)
Lever. x SA-Index -0.068
(-1.05)
Invest. x Lever. x SA-Index 0.548
(4.08)
ILow Z 0.000 0.000
(1.77) (1.43)
Invest. x ILow Z 0.007 -0.001
(1.35) (-0.07)
Lever. x ILow Z 0.001
(0.39)
Invest. x Lever. x ILow Z 0.011
(0.37)
Industry-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.032 0.033
No. of Obs. 24277 24277 24277 19807 24277 24277 24277 23972 23972
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If a higher leverage affects the relation between asset sales and investment, we expect a
positive coefficient for the interaction term. The result in column (II) confirms that the
correlation between asset sales and investment increases with leverage.
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Moreover, the simple investment and leverage coefficients become insignificant when we
add an interaction term between investment and leverage.5
Chen and Manso (2010) show that the wealth transfer problem is more severe in bad
states of the business cycle. Hence, we are interested in how the correlation between asset
sale and investment is related to macroeconomic conditions. In column (III) of Table
4.1, we incorporate in our first baseline regression the interaction between the investment
variable and a dummy that is equal to one in a bad business cycle states of our sample
economy.6 The positive coefficient on this interaction term shows that the correlation
between investment and asset sales is higher in business cycle downturns. This finding
emphasizes the importance of recognizing business cycle dynamics when explaining the
positive correlation of investment and asset sale.
To further explore the role of cyclicality for financing asset sales, we now investigate
whether firms, that have relatively valuable growth opportunities in bad states of the
business cycle, exhibit an increased correlation between asset sales and investment during
bad states. Chen and Manso (2010) demonstrate that a firm’s exposure to the wealth
transfer problem is linked to the cyclicality of its growth option. Therefore, we next test
whether we can link financing asset sales to the cyclicality of growth opportunities. To
this end, we add in column (IV) an interaction term that is the product of three variables.
The first one is investment, the second one is a dummy that is equal to one if the sample
economy is in a bad state and zero otherwise, and the third one corresponds to the cor-
relation between a firm’s growth opportunity and the aggregate business cycle state. To
construct the correlation measure, we estimate 5-year rolling window correlations between
the firm individual q and the aggregate sales growth in our entire sample.7 The intuition
5In unreported regressions, we also control for debt issuance. We find that debt issuance has no impact
on our qualitative results regarding the asset sale and investment correlation. The results are available
from the authors upon request.
6A year is defined as a bad business cycle year if the sample aggregate sales growth and the average
annual equity return across sample firms are, simultaneously, in the bottom 25% of all years. We choose
this definition of a business cycle downturn because sales growth combined with market based downturn
measures are a direct measure of the propagation of positive and negative shocks from the aggregate
economy onto the corporate level (see also the downturn definitions in, e.g., Opler and Titman 1994, Gilson
et al. 1990). Estimating a trend model of aggregate sales growth, similar to McQueen and Roley (1993b),
provides qualitatively similar results.
7We scale the firm individual q by the SIC3-industry average q to control for industry effects. To test
the robustness, we also use specifications in the spirit of the industry downturn definition in, e.g., Opler
and Titman (1994) or Gilson et al. (1990), whereat we correlate q with sales growth that is aggregated
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for this measure is that firms with a relatively lower correlation tend to exhibit relatively
more valuable growth opportunities in the bad state of the business cycle, while high cor-
relation firms have more cyclical growth opportunities.8 We find a negative coefficient
for the interaction term between investment, business cycle state and the cyclicality of a
firm’s growth opportunity, implying that in bad states of the business cycle, firms with a
relatively lower cyclicality exhibit a stronger relationship between investments and asset
sales. Notably, the significance of the positive investment coefficient is not wiped out after
including the interaction term in column (IV), only the size of the coefficient decreases.
The above results indicate along several dimensions that the correlation between asset
sales and investment increases with firm characteristics that the literature directly links
to an increased wealth transfer problem. An alternative explanation could be that the
positive relationship of leverage to the correlation between asset sales and investments is
caused by external financing constraints (e.g. Lang et al. 1995, Hovakimian and Titman
2006, Bates 2005). To analyze the potential role of financing constraints for the correlation
between asset sales and investment, we add in column (V) the SA-index as a proxy for
financial (un)constraints of a firm.9 The coefficient is positive and highly significant, im-
plying that firm size and age contribute to an increasing variation in asset sales.10 Yet, the
result does not answer the question whether financial constraints are an important driver
of the relationship between investments and asset sales. Therefore, we incorporate the in-
teraction of the SA-index with investment as an additional independent variable in column
at the SIC2-industry level, and find qualitatively similar results. Moreover, we use larger windows for the
correlation measure (e.g., seven years) without qualitatively affecting the results.
8The 25% quantile of the correlation distribution for all firms is -0.5, the median is 0.02, and the 75%
quantile is 0.56.
9According to Hadlock and Pierce (2010), the SA-index is useful to measure the financial constraints
of a firm. Related work supports the view that the ingredients of this index, i.e., size and age, capture the
financial constrainedness of a firm (see e.g. Hennessy and Whited 2007, Fee et al. 2009). Furthermore, size
and age are also often interpreted as information asymmetry measures (see e.g. Leary and Roberts 2010).
10Note that the magnitude of the coefficient is a matter of scaling. Since the SA-index is a combination
of total assets, squared total assets and age, its values are substantially higher than the values of asset
sales, which is a variable that is scaled with total assets. Therefore, we scale the SA-index by 10 × 107.
If we sort firms each year according to their SA-index values and interact investment with dummies that
are one if a firm is in the lowest or highest SA-index tercile, respectively, and zero otherwise, we find a
significant increase in the investment and asset sale relation for firms in the high SA-index group, and an
insignificant relation for firms in the low group. Moreover, the size of the coefficient for the high SA-index
group is comparable to the coefficients of the investment and leverage interaction in column (II). However,
because this approach requires to omit one third of our data, we prefer to present the results of the full
sample by directly using the SA-index as a scaling term.
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(VI). The interaction term is positive and significant, suggesting that unconstrained rather
than constrained firms exhibit a stronger relationship between investment and asset sales.
Next, we conduct another test of the question whether the increase in the asset sale and
investment correlation for higher leverage firms is indeed likely to be related to the wealth
transfer problem. For this purpose, we also incorporate the firm individual level of finan-
cial constraints into our analysis. It is well-known that less financially constrained firms
have a higher debt capacity, i.e., they can lever up their firm more easily (e.g. Kiyotaki and
Moore 1997, Almeida and Campello 2007, Hahn and Lee 2012, Hart and Moore 1994). Put
differently, debt overhang is not an agency problem that relates to financial constraints,
because it is more relevant for firms that are relatively unconstrained and can take on high
leverage. Therefore, we include in column (VII) an interaction term that scales invest-
ment with both variables, leverage and the SA-index. If our hypotheses on the relation
between financing asset sales and the wealth transfer problem are correct, then the coef-
ficient of this term should be positive and significant, indicating that for firms that are
less financially constrained the correlation between asset sales and investment increases
with leverage. The positive significant coefficient for the interaction term supports our
view. Notably, once we control for the effect of leverage, the interaction of investment and
the SA-index switches sign. Thus, higher leverage and, therefore, supposedly the wealth
transfer problem is the driving force of the increased correlation between asset sales and
investments for more unconstrained firms.
We argue that an increase in the correlation between asset sales and investments re-
flects an increase in financing asset sales rather than asset sales by financially distressed
firms that need to repay debt, i.e., fire sales (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 1992, Weiss and
Wruck 1998, Lang et al. 1995). To validate our hypothesis, we test in the final regression
models whether financial distress has an impact on the correlation between asset sales and
investment. We do so by including in column (VIII) an interaction term of investment and
a dummy that indicates if the firm individual Altman (1968) Z-score is below a value of
three, i.e., indicates that the firm is likely to be financially distressed. If financial distress
were a driver of the asset sale and investment correlation, we would expect a positive
significant coefficient for the interaction term. However, the regression results reveal an
insignificant coefficient for the interaction term. This finding supports our view that an
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increase in the correlation between asset sales and investment is likely to be related to
financing asset sales rather than to fire sales.
Finally, the results for the interaction between investment and leverage could also be
driven by financial distress. To address this concern, we include a new interaction term of
investment, leverage, and the Z-score dummy in column (IX). If financial distress were to
matter for the coefficient on the interaction between investment and leverage, we would
expect a positive coefficient on this new interaction term. However, the coefficient is in-
significant, and the interaction between investment and leverage by itself is hardly affected
(compared to column II) if we include the new interaction term. Thus, this establishes
that financial distress is not the driver of the positive impact of leverage on the correlation
between investment and asset sales.
To summarize, we illustrate novel stylized facts for the correlation between investments
and asset sales that cannot be explained by traditional motives for asset sales, such as
financial constraints or financial distress. Our regressions indicate that leverage, rather
than proxies for financial constraints or financial distress, drives the correlation between
investments and asset sales. We interpret our results as evidence that the well-known
wealth transfer problem is an important driver of financing asset sales.
4.3 Model setup
In this section, we study a structural model with time-varying macroeconomic conditions,
embedded inside a representative agent consumption-based asset pricing framework in
the spirit of Bhamra et al. (2010b) and Chen (2010). This framework determines how
aggregate risk and risk prices change with the business cycle. It links the fluctuations in the
first and second moments of aggregate growth rates to the valuation of corporate securities.
It is well suited to explore the role of financing asset sales over the business cycles, as it
allows us to endogenize the effect of cyclicality in a simple and realistic fashion. Moreover,
it shows how the values of equity, debt, and growth options that determine firms’ external
financing decisions are endogenously affected by time-varying business cycle conditions.
Following Arnold et al. (2013), each firm has one growth option that is costly to exercise.
The key innovation in our paper is that we allow firms to endogenously choose between
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financing the investment cost with the proceeds from the asset sales or the issuance of
new equity. Moreover, we incorporate business cycle dependent equity issuance cost, asset
liquidity, and cyclicality of the growth option. The structural model approach allows us to
analyze equityholders’ endogenous choice between issuing new equity and selling assets to
finance the exercise of the growth option in an economy with external financing frictions.
In addition, it easily lends itself to analyzing firm behavior in simulated panels.
A potential caveat for financing asset sales is the existence of covenants in credit con-
tracts that could restrict both investment and this source of internal financing. The
covenant literature, however, suggests that observed covenants provide firms with sub-
stantial flexibility to invest in expanding the business activities, and with respect to the
required investment financing with new equity or asset sales.11
4.3.1 Firm Earnings, Investment Financing and Time-Varying Business
Cycle Conditions
The economy consists of N different firms with assets in place and a growth option, a large
number of identical infinitely lived households, and a government serving as a tax authority.
There are two different aggregate states, namely, good (G) and bad (B) states. Aggregate
output, corporate earnings, and external financing frictions depend on the current state.
To model time-varying aggregate conditions, we define a time-homogeneous observable
Markov chain It≥0 with state space {G,B} and generator Q :=
[−λG λG
λB −λB
]
, in which
λi ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of leaving state i.
11Nini et al. (2009) provide evidence of a widespread use of covenants that restrict investments in
private credit agreements. Their results, however, suggest that capital expenditure covenants address
asset substitution and fire sales rather than investments in growth opportunities. In particular, the authors
find that capital expenditure restrictions are less likely in credit agreements of firms with more favorable
investment opportunities. They also show that banks and borrowers tend to leave the investment policy
unrestricted when credit quality is high, or as long as covenants are not violated. Chava et al. (2009) show
that bond covenants that restrict stock issuance are relatively rare compared to covenants that restrict
the issuance of debt. While covenants on asset sales are frequently used, they often explicitly allow firms
to sell assets in the ordinary course of business, or as long as the proceeds from the asset sale are used
to purchase new fixed assets (Smith and Warner 1979). Another common practice in asset covenants of
private corporate debt contracts is to restrict asset disposition only above a certain fixed amount (Bradley
and Roberts 2004).
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The aggregate output Ct follows a regime-switching geometric Brownian motion
dCt
Ct
= θidt+ σ
C
i dW
C
t , i = G,B, (4.3.1)
in which WCt is a Brownian motion independent of the Markov chain. The parameters θi
and σCi are the growth rates and volatilities of the aggregate output, respectively. To incor-
porate the impact of time-varying aggregate conditions, they are both regime-dependent.
In equilibrium, aggregate consumption equals aggregate output. The representative agent
has the continuous-time analog of Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences of stochastic differential
utility type (e.g. Duffie and Epstein 1992a, Duffie and Epstein 1992b). The dynamics of
the stochastic discount factor, the risk-free rates, ri, the market prices of consumption
risk, ηi, and the market prices of jump risk, κi, are derived in 1.1.
At any time, the earnings process of a firm follows
dXt
Xt
= µidt+ σ
X,C
i dW
C
t + σ
X,iddWXt , i = G,B, (4.3.2)
in which WXt is a standard Brownian motion describing an idiosyncratic shock, inde-
pendent of the aggregate output shock WCt and the Markov chain. µi are the regime-
dependent drifts; σX,Ci > 0, the firm-specific regime-dependent volatilities associated with
the aggregate output process; and σX,id > 0, the firm-specific volatility associated with
the idiosyncratic Brownian shock.
Denote the risk-neutral measure byQ. The expected growth rates, µ˜i, of a firm’s earnings
under the risk-neutral measure are given by
µ˜i := µi − σX,Ci ηi, (4.3.3)
and the risk-neutral transition intensities, λ˜i, by
λ˜i = e
κiλi. (4.3.4)
Intuitively, in bad times when marginal utility is higher, bad news about future earnings
are worse. Hence, by incorporating jump-risk into the expression in Equation (4.3.4), we
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link the historical probabilities of a change in the regime with the risk-neutral probabil-
ities. The main effect for the security prices is that, under the risk neutral measure, bad
states last longer and the economy switches faster from a good to a bad state.
Corporate taxes need to be paid at a constant rate τ , and full offsets of corporate losses
are allowed. Following Hackbarth et al. (2006), Chen (2010), and Bhamra et al. (2010b),
the unleveraged after-tax asset value of a firm can then be written as
Vt = (1− τ)Xtyi, i = G,B, (4.3.5)
with yi being the price-earnings ratio in state i determined by
y−1i = ri − µ˜i +
(ri − µ˜j)− (ri − µ˜i)
rj − µ˜j + p˜ p˜f˜j . (4.3.6)
p˜ := λ˜i + λ˜j is the risk-neutral rate of news arrival, and
(
f˜G, f˜B
)
=
(
λB
p˜ ,
λG
p˜
)
is the
long-run risk-neutral distribution. y−1 can be interpreted as a discount rate, in which
the first two terms constitute the standard expression if the economy stayed in regime i
forever, and the last term accounts for future time spent in regime j. As in Bhamra et al.
(2010b), the price-earnings ratio in the main analysis is higher in good states than in bad
states, i.e., yG > yB.
Finally, the volatility of the earnings process in regime i can be expressed as
σ¯i =
√(
σX,Ci
)2
+
(
σX,id
)2
. (4.3.7)
A firm’s expansion (growth) option is modeled as an American call option on its earnings.
In particular, a firm (i) can irreversibly exercise this option at any time t¯, (ii) needs to
pay the exercise cost Ki¯, and (iii) achieves additional future earnings of si¯Xt for all t ≥ t¯
for some factor si¯ > 0, in which i¯ is the realized state of the economy at the time of
exercise. In contrast to Arnold et al. (2013), both the exercise cost Ki¯ and the factor si¯
are regime-dependent to model firms with varying degrees of the cyclicality of their growth
option. If an expansion option is exercised, it is once and for all converted into assets in
place, so the firm consists of only invested assets.
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A firm can finance the exercise cost Ki¯ of the expansion option by either issuing new
equity or by selling assets in place. As suggested by the literature (e.g. Campello and
Hackbarth 2012), we explicitly incorporate external financing frictions, i.e., that new equity
financing is costly. In particular, each equity-financed $1 leads to a regime-dependent issue
cost of Υi¯. The regime dependency of Υi allows us to capture the notion that external
equity financing is more restricted during bad states (e.g. Erel et al. 2011). The cost Υi
can be interpreted as the linear component of the equity issuance cost. Hence, a firm with
access to equity financing in a given regime can finance the exercise cost Ki¯ by issuing
new equity of Ki¯(1 + Υi¯).
Pulvino (1998) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) argue that selling assets is costly.
The cost occurs because assets are partially firm-specific and the firm-specific component
is irreversibly lost in asset transfers, or because existing assets are not made-to-order and,
therefore, may require additional disassembling costs to tailor the assets to the buyer’s
specific needs. We incorporate this friction by stating that the proceeds from selling
assets on the market correspond to 0 ≤ Λi ≤ 1 times the value of the assets to the
firm. Consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1992), the parameter Λi can be interpreted as
the regime-dependent liquidity of the firm’s assets in place, and is calibrated such that
ΛG > ΛB. After exercising the expansion option, the firm obtains current earnings of
(si¯ + 1)Xt, i.e., si¯Xt from the expansion option, and Xt from existing assets in place. The
value of the existing assets in place at option exercise corresponds to (1 − τ)Xt¯yi¯. The
value of the assets required to be sold to finance the exercise cost of the expansion option
is given by Ki¯/Λi¯. Hence, the fraction
Ki¯/Λi¯
(1−τ)Xt¯yi¯ of current earnings needs to be sold to
finance the option exercise. As a result, total earnings of a firm at any point in time after
financing the exercise cost by selling assets correspond to(
si¯ + 1−
Ki¯/Λi¯
(1− τ)Xt¯yi¯
)
Xt. (4.3.8)
Firms take on (risky) debt because it allows them to shield part of the corporate income
from taxation. The debt maturity is assumed to be infinite. Once debt has been issued,
a firm pays a coupon c at each moment in time. Shareholders have the option to default
on their debt obligations. Default is triggered when shareholders are no longer willing to
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inject additional equity capital to meet net debt service requirements (e.g. Leland 1998).
If default occurs, the firm is immediately liquidated. Debtholders receive the liquidation
value of the total unleveraged asset value, i.e., of the unleveraged assets in place plus the
unleveraged growth option, less bankruptcy costs. The proceeds from liquidating the firm
upon default correspond to Λi times the total unleveraged asset value. The bankruptcy
costs include, for example, lawyers’ and accountants’ fees, or the value of the managerial
time spent in administering the bankruptcy. They correspond to a fraction 1 − αi of
the proceeds from liquidation, with αi ∈ (0, 1]. Hence, the recovery rates to debtholders
correspond to Λiαi times the unleveraged asset value upon default. The assumption that
debtholders also recover a fraction of the unleveraged expansion option implies that the
option is transferrable. Upon default, however, the expansion opportunities are far out-
of-the-money and have, consequently, only limited value. Hence, assumptions concerning
their transferability or recovery rates have a negligible impact on our results.
Equityholders face the following decisions. First, once debt has been issued, they select
the default, expansion, and investment financing policies that maximize the equity value.
Second, they determine the initially optimal capital structure by choosing a coupon that
maximizes the firm value. We do not incorporate debt restructuring neither when the
option is exercised nor at endogenous restructuring points.
4.4 Model solution
Firms can finance investments by selling assets or by issuing equity in each regime, which
leaves us with four different financing strategies: financing by issuing equity in good states
and selling assets in bad states, financing by issuing equity in both good states and bad
states, financing by selling assets in good states and issuing equity in bad states, and
financing by selling assets in both good and bad times. In what follows, the solution for
a firm that applies the first financing strategy, i.e., financing by issuing equity in good
states and selling assets in bad states, is derived in detail. The solutions for the second
to fourth financing strategies can be derived analogically. We first present the values of
corporate securities after investment, and for the growth option. We then solve for the
values of corporate securities before investment by backward induction.
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4.4.1 Value of corporate securities after investment
After exercising the expansion option, a firm consists of only invested assets, endowed with
the initially determined optimal coupon level. Let dˆi(X) denote the value of corporate
debt, tˆi(X) the value of the tax shield, and bˆi(X) the value of bankruptcy costs of a firm
with only invested assets. The standard solutions for the values of these securities are
derived in 1.2. The firm value after investment, vˆi(X), can be expressed as the value of
assets in place plus the tax shield minus bankruptcy costs:
vˆi(X) = (1− τ)yiX + tˆi(X)− bˆi(X). (4.4.1)
The total firm value equals the sum of debt and equity values. Hence, the equity value
after investment, eˆi(X), can be written as
eˆi(X) = vˆi(X)− dˆi(X). (4.4.2)
The default policy is chosen by equityholders to maximize the ex post value of equity.
As the equity value at the time of default corresponds to zero, this policy can be calculated
by equating the first derivative of the equity value to zero at the default boundary in each
regime:  eˆ′G(D∗G) = 0eˆ′B(D∗B) = 0 (4.4.3)
We solve this system numerically. The value of corporate securities is solved similarly for a
firm with a scaled level of earnings after investment. The default policy is then expressed
as a scaled earnings levels.
4.4.2 The value of the growth option
To study cyclicality of expansion options, we extend the model of Arnold et al. (2013) by
allowing regime-dependency of the additional earnings factor si, and the exercise cost Ki of
the option. For each regime i, a growth option is exercised immediately whenever X ≥ Xi
(option exercise region); otherwise, it is optimal to wait (option continuation region).
This structure results in a system of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) with associ-
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ated boundary conditions given in 1.3. The following proposition presents the value of the
growth option, Gi(X), in a leveraged firm (leveraged growth option) that finances the exer-
cise cost by issuing equity in good states, and by selling assets in bad states for XG ≤ XB.
Proposition 1. For any given pair of exercise boundaries [XG, XB], the value of the
leveraged growth option in regime i is given by
Gi(X) =

A¯i3X
γ3 + A¯i4X
γ4 0 ≤ X < XG, i = G,B
C¯1X
βB1 + C¯2X
βB2 + C¯3X + C¯4 XG ≤ X < XB, i = B
(1− τ)sBXyB −KB/ΛB X ≥ XB i = B
(1− τ)sGXyG −KG(1 + ΥG) X ≥ XG i = G

, (4.4.4)
where
βB1,2 =
1
2
− µ˜B
σ˜2B
±
√(
1
2
− µ˜B
σ˜2B
)2
+
2(rB + λ˜B)
σ˜2R
,
C¯3 = λ˜B
(1− τ)sGyG
rB − µ˜B + λ˜B
, (4.4.5)
C¯4 = −λ˜B KB/ΛB
rB + λ˜B
.
The parameters γ3 and γ4 correspond to the positive roots of the quadratic equation
(µ˜Bγ +
1
2
σ˜2Bγ(γ − 1)− λ˜B − rB)(µ˜Gγ +
1
2
σ˜2Gγ(γ − 1)− λ˜G − rG) = λ˜Bλ˜G. (4.4.6)
A¯Gk is a multiple of A¯Bk, k = 3, 4, with the factor l¯k :=
1
λ˜G
(rG+λ˜G−µ˜Gγk− 12 σ˜2Gγk(γk−1)),
i.e., A¯Bk = l¯kA¯Gk, and r
p
i is the perpetual risk-free rate given by
rpi = ri +
rj − ri
p˜+ rj
p˜f˜j , (4.4.7)
in which p˜ = λ˜1 + λ˜2 is the risk-neutral rate of news arrival and
(
f˜G, f˜B
)
=
(
λB
p˜ ,
λG
p˜
)
is
the long-run risk-neutral distribution.
[
A¯G3, A¯G4, C¯1, C¯2
]
solve a linear system given in
Section 1.3.
Proposition 1 determines the value of the growth option for any given pair of exercise
boundaries XG ≤ XB. The optimal exercise boundaries of the leveraged growth option
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will be determined in the next section, as they depend on the capital structure of the firm
holding the option. Additionally, note that the value of the growth option also depends
on both the asset liquidity and the equity issuance cost.
For the derivation of the values of corporate securities before investment, we also need
the value of an unleveraged option Gunlevi that corresponds to the value of an option in
an all equity financed firm. This value does not depend on the capital structure of a firm.
Hence, the optimal exercise boundaries simply maximize the value of the option. They
can, therefore, be directly derived by additionally imposing smooth-pasting conditions at
the corresponding option exercise boundaries as shown in 1.3.
As we consider a regime-dependent additional earnings factor si and exercise cost Ki of
the option, we also encounter the case in which the exercise boundary in good states, XG,
is larger than the exercise boundary in bad states, XB. It occurs when sB is considerably
larger than sG, or when KB is much smaller than KG. The solution of this case can be
obtained immediately by interchanging the regime names in the derivation of the presented
solution with XG ≤ XB.
4.4.3 Value of corporate securities before investment
Once the values of corporate securities after investment and of the growth option are
known, we can determine the values of corporate securities before investment of a firm
that finances the exercise cost by issuing equity in good times, and by selling assets in bad
times. Let di(X) denote the debt value of a firm with invested assets and an expansion
option in regime i = G,B, and Gunlevi the value of an unleveraged option derived in the
1.3. Proposition 2 states the value of debt before investment.
Proposition 2. For any given set of default and exercise boundaries [DG, DB, XG, XB],
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the value of infinite maturity debt in regime i is given by
di (X) =

αiΛi
(
(1− τ)Xyi +Gunlevi (X)
)
X ≤ Di, i = G,B,
C1X
βG1 + C2X
βG2 + C5X
γ3 + C6X
γ4
+λ˜G
αBΛByB(1−τ)
rG−µ˜G+λ˜G X +
c
rG+λ˜G
DG < X ≤ DB, i = G
Ai1X
γ1 +Ai2X
γ2 +Ai3X
γ3 +Ai4X
γ4 + c
rpi
DB < X ≤ XG, i = G,B
B1X
βB1 +B2X
βB2 + Z (X) + λ˜B
c
rPi (rB+λ˜B)
+ c
rB+λ˜B
XG < X ≤ XB, i = B
dˆG ((sG + 1)X) X > XG, i = G
dˆB
(
(sB + 1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯yB )X
)
X > XB, i = B,
(4.4.8)
where
βi1,2 =
1
2
− µ˜i
σ˜2i
±
√(
1
2
− µ˜i
σ˜2i
)2
+
2(ri + λ˜i)
σ˜2i
(4.4.9)
C5 = αBΛB
l¯3
l3
A¯unlevG3 , (4.4.10)
C6 = αBΛB
l¯4
l4
A¯unlevG4 , (4.4.11)
and
Z(X) = λ˜BB5X
γ1 + λ˜BB6X
γ2 . (4.4.12)
The parameters B5 and B6 are given by
B5 =
(sB + 1)
γ1AˆG1
rB − µ˜Bγ1 − 12 σ˜2Bγ1 (γ1 − 1) + λ˜B
(4.4.13)
and
B6 =
(sB + 1)
γ2AˆG2
rB − µ˜Bγ2 − 12 σ˜2Bγ2 (γ2 − 1) + λ˜B
, (4.4.14)
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and γk, k = 1, 2, 3, 4 are the roots of the quadratic equation
(
µ˜Bγ +
1
2
σ˜2Bγ(γ − 1)− λ˜B − rB
)(
µ˜Gγ +
1
2
σ˜2Gγ(γ − 1)− λ˜G − rG
)
= λ˜Bλ˜G. (4.4.15)
ABk, k = 1, 2, 3, 4, is a multiple of AGk with the factor
lk :=
1
λ˜G
(rG + λ˜G − µ˜Gγk − 1
2
σ˜2Gγk(γk − 1)), (4.4.16)
and rpi denotes the perpetual risk-free rate given by
rpi = ri +
rj − ri
p˜+ rj
p˜f˜j , (4.4.17)
in which p˜ = λ˜1 + λ˜2 is the risk-neutral rate of news arrival and
(
f˜G, f˜B
)
=
(
λB
p˜ ,
λG
p˜
)
is
the long-run risk-neutral distribution. dˆi (·) denotes the value of debt of a firm with only
invested assets.
[AG1, AG2, AG3, AG4, C1, C2, B1, B2] solve a linear system given in Section 1.4.
Proof. See 1.4.
Proposition 2 shows that the firm faces three different regions depending on the value
of X. Below the default threshold, i.e., X ≤ Di, the firm is in the default region in which
it defaults immediately. Debtholders receive a fraction αiΛi of the total after tax asset
value.
The firm is in the continuation region if X is between the default threshold and the
exercise boundary, i.e., if Di < X ≤ Xi. In this region, debt value is determined by three
components. The first component is the value of a risk-free claim to the perpetual stream
of coupon. The second and third components reflect the changes in the value of debt that
occur either due to the idiosyncratic shock reaching a boundary or due to a regime switch.
For the region DB < X ≤ XG, i.e., when the firm is in the continuation region in both
good states and bad states, the solution consists of five terms. The value of the risk-free
claim to the coupon is given by the last term. The coupon needs to be discounted by
the perpetual risk-free rate rpi that incorporates the expected future time spent in each
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regime. The first four terms capture the changes in value due to the idiosyncratic shock
X hitting a region boundary or due to a change of regime. When DG < X ≤ DB, i.e., the
firm is in the continuation region only in good states, the solution consists of six terms.
The last term is the value of the risk-free claim to the coupon, in which the discount rate
is given by the interest rate in good states, rG, increased by λ˜G to reflect the possibility
of a regime switch to the bad state. The first five terms capture the changes in debt value
that occur when the idiosyncratic shock reaches a boundary or when the regime switches
to the bad state triggering immediate default. For the region XG < X ≤ XB, i.e., when
the firm is in the continuation region only in bad states, the solution consists of five terms.
The last term is the value of a risk-free perpetual claim to the coupon. To account for a
possible regime switch to the good state, the discount rate is given by the interest rate in
the bad state, rB, increased by λ˜B. The remaining four terms capture the value changes
due to reaching a region boundary, either XG from above or XB from below, or due to a
regime switch to a good state triggering immediate option exercise financed with equity.
Finally, the debt value in the exercise region, reached when X > Xi, incorporates the
financing source for the option exercise cost. In the good states, the option exercise cost
KG is financed by issuing new equity of KG(1 + ΥG). Hence, the earnings of the firm are
scaled by sG + 1. In the bad states, the exercise cost KB is financed by selling
KB/ΛB
(1−τ)Xt¯yB
of the assets in place, such that the earnings of the firm are scaled by (sB +1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯yB ).
The value of the tax shield before investment can be calculated by using the solution
(4.4.8) in Proposition 2, in which c and α are replaced by cτ and zero, respectively,
and dˆi in the last line line of (4.4.8) is replaced by tˆi. The value of bankruptcy costs
before investment is derived by using the same steps as for debt value with two simple
modifications. First, c and α need to be replaced by zero and (1 − α), respectively.
Second, while the going concern value of the expansion option is given by its leveraged
value, the value of the option at default corresponds to its unleveraged value. Therefore,
the expansion option’s value switches from Gi(X) to αiΛiG
unlev
i (X) upon default. As
a consequence, the functional form of the solution (4.4.8) in the default region X ≤ Di
needs to be adapted to (1−αiΛi)yiX(1− τ)−αiΛiGunlevi (X) +Gi(X). The 1.5 shows the
resulting solution for the value of bankruptcy costs bi(X).
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Next, the total firm value before investment, fi, in regime i = G,B is given by the value
of assets in place (1− τ)yiX, plus the value of the expansion option Gi (X) and the value
of tax benefits from debt ti(X), minus the value of default costs bi(X), i.e.,
fi(X) = (1− τ)yiX +Gi(X) + ti(X)− bi(X). (4.4.18)
As the total firm value equals the sum of debt and equity values, the equity values
before investment of a firm that finances investment by issuing equity in a good state and
selling assets in a bad state, eESi (X, c), i = G,B, can be written as
ei (X, c) = fi (X)− di (X) = (1− τ)yiX +Gi (X) + ti (X)− bi (X)− di (X) . (4.4.19)
Equity-holders select the default and investment policies that maximize the ex post
value of equity. Denote these policies by D∗i and X
∗
i , respectively. The default policy
that maximizes the equity value is determined by setting the first derivative of the equity
values to zero at the default boundary in each regime. Simultaneously, optimality of the
option exercise thresholds is achieved by equating the first derivative of the equity values
at the exercise thresholds to the first derivative of the equity values of a firm with only
invested assets after expansion, evaluated at the corresponding earnings in both regimes.
These four optimality conditions represent smooth-pasting conditions for equity of a firm
that finances the option exercise cost by issuing equity in good states and selling assets in
bad states at the respective boundaries:
e′G(D
∗
G, c) = 0
e′B(D
∗
B, c) = 0
e′G(X
∗
G, c) = eˆ
′
G ((sG + 1)X
∗
G, c)
e′B(X
∗
B, c) = eˆ
′
B
(
((sB + 1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯yB )X
∗
B), c
)
.
(4.4.20)
The system is solved numerically. As the equations in system Eqs. (4.4.20) are evaluated
simultaneously, the four conditions are interdependent. Similar systems can be derived
for a firm that finances the option exercise cost by issuing equity in both good states and
bad states, by selling assets in good states and issuing equity in bad states, or by selling
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assets in both good states and bad states.
Denote by em,n∗i (X, c) the equity value given optimal ex post default and expansion
thresholds. The exponents m ∈ [E,S] and n ∈ [E,S] indicate the financing strategy
in good states and bad states, respectively. E denotes equity financing and S selling
assets. For each coupon level c, equityholders select the ex post financing strategy Ω∗i that
maximizes the value of equity, i.e.,
Ω∗i := argmaxm,n
(
em,n∗i (X, c)
)
. (4.4.21)
Debtholders anticipate the ex post optimal default and expansion policies, as well as the
optimal financing strategy of shareholders. As debt-issue proceeds accrue to shareholders,
they do not only care about the value of equity, but also about the initial valuation of
debt. Hence, the optimal capital structure is determined ex ante by the coupon level c∗
that maximizes the value of equity and debt, i.e., the value of the firm. Denote by f∗i (X)
the firm value given optimal default boundaries, expansion thresholds, and the optimal
financing strategy. The ex ante optimal coupon of the firm solves
c∗i := argmaxcf
∗
i (X). (4.4.22)
To summarize, equityholders face the following decisions: First, they choose the default
and expansion thresholds that maximize the ex post value of equity for each coupon and
financing strategy. Second, equityholders select the financing strategy that maximizes
the ex post value of equity for each coupon. Finally, they determine the initial capital
structure that maximizes the ex ante value of equity.
4.5 Results
In this section, we study the implications of the model for a typical model firm. We start
by describing parameter choices for our baseline calibration before we derive the hypothesis
in Section 4.5.2.
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4.5.1 Parameter choice
We summarize our parameter choices in Table 4.2. Panel A shows the firm characteristics.
The initial value of the idiosyncratic earnings X is set to 10. While the starting value for
earnings is arbitrary, our results do not depend on this choice. We set the tax advantage
of debt to τ = 0.15 as suggested in the literature (e.g., Hackbarth et al. 2006). Bhamra et
al. (2010b) estimate growth rates and systematic volatilities of earnings in a two-regime
model. Their estimates are similar to those obtained by other authors who jointly estimate
consumption and dividends with a state-dependent drift and volatility (e.g., Bonomo and
Garcia 1996). Hence, we set earnings growth rates (µi) and volatilities (σ
X,C
i ) to their
empirical counterparts reported in Bhamra et al. (2010b). The idiosyncratic volatility is
set to 0.168. Arnold et al. (2013) show that using this volatility calibration, a simulated
sample of firms with growth options has an average asset volatility of approximately 25%,
which corresponds to the average asset volatility of firms with rated debt outstanding (see
Schaefer and Strebulaev 2008).
The main costs of external equity discussed by Fazzari et al. (1988) are tax costs, ad-
verse selection premia, and flotation costs. Hansen (2001) and Corwin (2003) estimate
equity issuance costs around 7% for IPOs and SEOs, respectively. Altinkilic and Hansen
(2000) argue that equity costs derive mainly from the variable component. The linear
variable component estimated in Hennessy and Whited (2007) is 9.1%. Concerning cycli-
cality, Bayless and Caplinsky (1996) find that a typical hot market issuer would forego up
to 2.33% in additional equity value if he would issue in a cold market instead. To reflect
these empirical quantities, we choose as a benchmark case ΥG = 0.08 and ΥB = 0.1. This
setting gives us a cyclicality for the equity issuance cost of a two percentage points differ-
ence between good and bad states, and an average total equity issuance cost of 8.71%.12
In the comparative statics we vary the equity issuance cost to analyze how they affect the
decision of firms to sell assets to finance the investment cost.
There are only a few empirical studies that estimate the cost of selling assets. Pul-
vino (1998) finds costs of selling commercial aircrafts between zero and 14%. Strebulaev
12The weights for this average correspond to the long-run distribution of the Markov chain. One could
also simulate a large sample of firms and determine the weights according to the occurrence of equity issues
in the two states.
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Table 4.2: Baseline parameter choice
This table summarizes our baseline parameter choice. Panel A lists the annualized parameters of a typ-
ical Compustat firm. Panels B and C report our parameter choice for the expansion option and the
macroeconomy, respectively.
Parameter Parameter value
Panel A: Firm Characteristics Good State (G) Bad State (B)
Initial earnings level (X) 10 10
Tax advantage of debt (τ) 0.15 0.15
Earnings growth rate (µi) 0.0782 -0.0401
Systematic earnings volatility (σX,Ci ) 0.0834 0.1334
Equity issuance costs (Υi) 0.08 0.1
Asset Liquidity (Λ1) 0.9259 0.9091
Recovery rate (αi) 0.63 0.57
Panel B: Expansion Option Parameters of a Typical Firm
Exercise price (Ki) 298 260
Scale parameters (si) 1.0925 1.03
Panel C: Economy
Rate of leaving regime i (λi) 0.2718 0.4928
Consumption growth rate (θi) 0.0420 0.0141
Consumption growth volatility (σCi ) 0.0094 0.0114
Rate of time preference (ρ) 0.015 0.015
Relative risk aversion (γ) 10 10
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution (Ψ) 1.5 1.5
(2007) assumes that the cost of selling assets lies between 0.05 to 0.25%. Acharya et al.
(2007) show that creditors of defaulted firms recover 10 to 15 percentage points less in
a distressed state of the industry than in a healthy state of the industry, i.e., that asset
liquidity is cyclical. Overall, we only have vague empirical evidence on the appropriate
choice of the parameters for the cost of selling assets. Hence, to avoid that our results are
driven by this choice when analyzing firms’ endogenous financing decisions, we set Λi¯ such
that Ki¯/Λi¯ = Ki¯(1 + Υi¯), i.e., the friction adjusted cost of exercising the expansion option
by selling assets corresponds to the one of exercising the expansion option by issuing new
equity. This calibration yields ΛG = 0.9259 and ΛB = 0.9091.
One caveat of the presented analysis is that the equity issuance cost and asset liquidity
are hard to estimate. We address this issue in two different ways. First, we base our
parameter choice on empirical results of previous works. Second, we perform numerous
robustness checks with alternative equity issuance cost and asset liquidity parameters. The
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tests show that our qualitative predictions are not affected by varying these parameters
within plausible ranges.
Bankruptcy costs are assumed to be 30% of the unleveraged assets’ liquidation pro-
ceeds. Recovery rates are Λi(1 − 0.3), so they are 0.63 in good states and 0.57 in bad
states. These values are in accordance with the unconditional standard of 0.6 used in the
literature (e.g. Hackbarth et al. 2006, Chen 2010), and with the notion in Acharya et al.
(2007) that recovery rates fall during bad states.
Panel B of Table 4.2 shows the parameters we use to capture growth options. We select
exercise prices of KG = 298 and KB = 260, respectively. The ratio KG/KB corresponds
to the ratio of the value of a given level of earnings in good states to the value of the same
earnings in bad states. In other words, the exercise price changes by the same factor as
the price of assets in place when the regime switches. We validate the robustness of our
predictions by presenting the results for alternative choices of the absolute level of Ki.
The scale parameter si depends on the cyclicality of the firm’s option. We use baseline
scale parameters of sG = 1.0925 and sB = 1.03. These parameters imply that, given
optimal financing at initiation, the average q is 1.3. The q of a model firm is obtained by
dividing the value of the firm by the value of its invested assets. To calculate the average q,
the initial q in good and bad states is weighted by the long-run distribution of the Markov
chain. To generate typical firms with different degrees of the cyclicality of the expansion
option, we alter sG and sB while keeping the size of the average q at initiation fixed at its
empirical counterpart.
Finally, Panel C, lists the variables describing the underlying economy. The rates of
leaving regime i (λi), the consumption growth rates (θi), and the consumption growth
volatilities σCi are estimated in Bhamra et al. (2010b). In the model economy, the ex-
pected duration of regime B (R) is 3.68 (2.03) years, and the average fraction of time
spent in regime B (R) is 64% (36%).
The annualized rate of time preference, ρ, is 0.015; the relative risk aversion, γ, is equal
to 10; and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, Ψ, is set to 1.5. This parameter
choice is commonly used in the literature (e.g., Bansal and Yaron 2004, Chen 2010). It
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implies that the nominal interest rates are rG = 0.0736 and rB = 0.0546. The relative
decline in the value of invested assets following a shift from good to bad states is equal to
12.61%, which is similar to the one assumed in, e.g., Hackbarth et al. (2006).
4.5.2 Derivation of the model predictions
Exercising an expansion option has two implications for a firm that finances the exercise
cost of the option by issuing equity. First, it increases total earnings. Second, the total
asset volatility decreases because the expansion option is riskier than the assets in place
(see e.g. Arnold et al. 2013). Both effects induce a wealth transfer from equityholders to
debtholders as debt becomes less risky. This wealth transfer problem is more severe for
firms with larger leverage. The reason is that if leverage increases, debt becomes riskier
and, consequently, more sensitive to earnings and asset volatility changes.
The cost of exercising the expansion option by selling assets can be larger than the ones
of exercising the expansion option by issuing new equity, i.e., Ki¯/Λi¯ may be larger than
Ki¯(1 + Υi¯). At the same time, however, selling assets upon investment increases leverage
which renders debt more risky. The corresponding wealth transfer from debtholders to
equityholders ameliorates the initial wealth transfer problem from the exercise of the ex-
pansion option. Hence, equityholders trade off the incremental friction cost of selling assets
over the equity issuance cost against the reduction in the wealth transfer when deciding
whether to sell assets or to issue equity to finance the exercise of the expansion option.
As the wealth transfer problem is more severe for firms with larger leverage, equityholders
of such firms have a particularly pronounced tendency to finance the expansion option by
selling assets. This insight leads to our first model prediction.
Prediction 1. Equityholders of firms with a larger leverage have a higher tendency to
finance the exercise cost of the expansion option by selling assets.
Prediction 1 explains why we find that, empirically, the correlation between asset sales
and investment is higher for firms with larger leverage.
The wealth transfer problem has an impact on equityholders’ investment timing. The
equity value maximizing earnings thresholds for the option exercise of a firm that finances
the investment cost by issuing equity are plotted in Figure 4.1. The lower solid line
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depicts the optimal investment threshold for various levels of leverage in the good state.
The higher solid line is the corresponding threshold in the bad state. As expected, the
firm invests earlier in the good state. We refer to the investment thresholds without debt
(at zero leverage) as the option value-maximizing threshold. The larger the leverage, the
later the equityholders invest compared to the option value-maximizing threshold due to
the wealth transfer problem (underinvestment). The dashed lines in Figure 4.1 depict the
optimal investment thresholds of a firm that sells assets to finance the exercise cost of the
option. The lower dashed line is the threshold in the good state, the higher dashed line
the one in bad times.
Figure 4.1: Optimal Investment Thresholds. This figure shows the earnings levels at
which equityholders optimally exercise the growth option for a range of corporate leverage
ratios. The lower and upper solid lines are the optimal investment thresholds for a firm
that finances the exercise costs of the option by issuing equity in good states and bad
states, respectively. The lower and upper dashed lines are the corresponding investment
thresholds for a firm that finances the exercise costs of the option by selling assets.
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For the baseline specification and most alternative parameter combinations, financing
asset sales mitigate the underinvestment problem compared to equity financed investment.
The option exercise thresholds for financing asset sales in Figure 4.1 are closer to the op-
tion value-maximizing threshold, particularly for large leverage firms in which the wealth
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transfer problem is more pronounced.13
Figure 4.2 illustrates the quantitative effect of allowing equityholders into financing asset
sales on the value of a firm.
Figure 4.2: Financing Asset Sales and Firm Value. This figure illustrates the impact
of financing asset sales on the value of firms. The solid line shows the relationship between
the increase in the value of a firm from admitting financing asset sales and the scale
parameter sG for high leverage firms. The parameter sB is obtained by deducing 0.0625
from sG. High leverage firms have an initial leverage ratio of 0.75. Leverage is defined
as debt value divided by the value of the firm. The dashed and dotted lines plot the
relationship for medium leverage firms with an initial leverage of 0.5 and for low leverage
firms with an initial leverage of 0.35, respectively.
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The solid line shows the relationship between the increase in the value of a firm from
permitting financing asset sales and the scale parameter sG for high leverage firms. The
parameter sB is obtained by deducing 0.0625 from sG. High leverage firms have an initial
leverage ratio of 0.75. The remaining parameters are set according to the baseline firm.
13For certain parameter combinations with a high scale parameter si, and a low exercise costKi, financing
asset sales can also induce overinvestment such that the dashed thresholds in Figure 4.1 decrease with
leverage. The reason is that the expansion option is almost immediately exercised for these parameter
combinations. As a consequence, the investment cost constitutes a much larger fraction of the asset value
upon exercise than for parameter combinations for which the option is exercised at a larger level of X.
Hence, the impact on leverage from financing asset sales is also larger, and the corresponding higher
wealth transfer can induce equityholders to exercise the option at an earnings level below the option
value-maximizing threshold.
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In particular, the friction cost of selling assets corresponds to the one of issuing new eq-
uity. Hence, we measure the pure impact of permitting financing asset sales on firm value
from a mitigation of the underinvestment problem. The dashed and dotted lines plot the
relationship for medium leverage firms with an initial leverage of 0.5 and for low leverage
firms with an initial leverage of 0.35, respectively. The value of all firms increases with
financing asset sales because their allowance induces equityholders to follow an option
exercise policy that is closer to the First Best than in the case in which financing asset
sales are prohibited. This finding explains why it is optimal for equityholders to negotiate
conventions in asset sale covenants that still allow the firm to use financing asset sales as
described in the literature (e.g., Smith and Warner 1979, Bradley and Roberts 2004, Nini
et al. 2009). The larger the scale parameter and the higher the leverage in Figure 4.2, the
stronger the positive impact of permitting financing asset sales on the value of a firm. The
reason is that the mitigation of the underinvestment problem from financing asset sales
is particularly valuable if the value of the growth option is high, and the wealth transfer
problem is large due to high leverage.
We now investigate how the wealth transfer problem of the baseline firm depends on
different states of the business cycle. During bad times, leverage increases because the
assets of a firm lose more value relative to the decrease in value of the outstanding debt.
At the same time, Figure 4.1 shows that equityholders optimally invest at a higher level
of earnings than in the bad state. A higher investment threshold induces a larger asset
value upon investment, and, hence, a lower leverage. To see which effect dominates, Fig-
ure 4.3 plots leverage upon investment for a baseline firm with an initially optimal capital
structure and endogenous choice of the financing strategy for a range of equity issuance
cost parameters. The equity issuance cost parameter in good states, ΥG, is plotted on
the x-axis. The corresponding equity issuance cost parameter in bad states is determined
by adding 0.02. In this way, we maintain the same difference between the equity issuance
costs in good states and bad states as in the baseline parameter specification. The figure
shows that leverage at the optimal investment threshold during bad states (dashed line)
is always higher than during good states (solid line). Because the wealth transfer problem
is more severe for higher leverage, and because asset sales ameliorate this problem, equi-
tyholders’ trade off the cost of financial frictions against the debt overhang cost, which
133
Financing Asset Sales and Business Cycles
leads to the second model prediction.
Prediction 2. Firms are more likely to fund investments by selling assets during bad
business cycle states.
Prediction 2 provides an explanation for why the correlation between asset sales and in-
vestment is significantly higher during bad business cycle states in our Compustat sample.
Figure 4.3: Leverage at Investment. This figure shows the leverage ratios upon invest-
ment of a firm that optimally finances the exercise costs of the option in good states (solid
line) and bad states (dashed line).
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Leverage at Option Exercise in Bad States
The procyclical nature of aggregate investment (see e.g. Barro 1990) suggests that
growth options are generally more valuable during good times than during bad times.
We argue that the degree of this cyclicality of the growth option is different across firms.
To model a firm with a relatively higher value of the expansion option in the good states,
i.e., with a higher cyclicality of the expansion option, relative to the baseline firm, we
increase the scale parameter in good times, sG, from 1.0925 to 1.099, and decrease the
scale parameter in bad states, sB, from 1.03 to 1.005, leaving the average q at initiation
unchanged at 1.3.14 A higher scale parameter in good times, and a lower scale parameter
14The cyclicality of the expansion option can also be altered by changing the investment cost Ki. The
qualitative predictions from our model also hold in this case.
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in bad times induce that it is relatively more attractive to exercise the option in the good
state, and relatively less attractive to exercise in the bad state compared to the baseline
firm. The optimal investment threshold in the good state decreases from 20.18 to 19.67,
and the one in the bad state increases from 20.48 to 22.23. Hence, firms with a relatively
higher value of the expansion option in good times have a lower probability to invest
during bad times. Additionally, Figure 4.4 compares leverage levels upon investment of
the baseline firm to the ones of the firm with a more valuable growth option in a good
state. The lower and higher solid lines depict leverages upon investment for a range of
equity issuance parameters for the baseline firm in good times and bad states, respectively.
The lower and higher dashed lines show leverage ratios at investment in good and bad
times of the firm with a more valuable growth option in good states. Since the baseline
firm optimally invests at a lower earnings threshold in bad times than the firm with a
more cyclical growth option, it has a lower asset value and, hence, a higher leverage at
investment during bad times. As the wealth transfer problem is more severe for firms
with higher leverage, and because equityholders trade off the financial friction cost differ-
ential between equity issuance and asset sales against the reduction in the wealth transfer
problem when selecting the financing source, we can phrase our third model prediction.
Prediction 3. Firms with a more valuable expansion option during bad business cycle
states are more likely to finance investments by selling assets during bad business cycle
states than firms with a more cyclical expansion option.
This prediction explains our empirical finding that the correlation between asset sales
and investment is higher for firms with a low cyclicality of the expansion option during
bad times.
Figure 4.5 summarizes the implications of the wealth transfer problem upon investment
on equityholders’ endogenous financing choice for the baseline firm. On the x-axis, we again
plot the equity issuance cost in a good state. The y-axis shows the interest payments that
determine a firm’s leverage ratio. On the left hand side of the solid line, equityholders
optimally select equity financing in both regimes. On the right hand side of the dashed
line, firms prefer financing asset sales in both regimes. Between the two lines the firms’
optimal financing strategy yields the issuance of equity in good times, and selling assets
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Figure 4.4: Leverage at Investment and Cyclicality of the Growth Option. The
lower and higher solid lines are the leverage ratios upon investment of the baseline firm
that optimally finances the exercise costs of the option in good states and bad states,
respectively. The lower and higher dashed lines are the corresponding leverage ratios
upon investment of a firm with a more cyclical growth option than the baseline firm.
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in bad times. Remember that in case of the baseline firm with an equity issuance cost of
0.08 in good states and 0.1 in bad states, the cost of selling assets, Λi, is calibrated such
that the friction cost of issuing equity corresponds to the friction cost of selling assets.
In an unleveraged firm as shown on the x-axis, equityholders simply select the financing
source based on this financing friction cost: If the equity issuance cost in good states is
smaller than 0.08, they finance the exercise cost of the option by issuing equity; otherwise,
they finance this cost by selling assets. The figure shows that for larger interest payments,
the range of equity issuance costs for which equityholders prefer equity financing in both
regimes declines, and the range for which they prefer selling assets increases. The reason
is that asset sales reduce the wealth transfer problem in particular for high leverage firms,
and equityholders trade off this reduction against the incremental friction cost of selling
assets over issuing equity when selecting the financing source.
The figure also demonstrates the higher propensity of equityholders to select financing
assets sales during bad business cycle states. The region in which they select financing
136
Aggregate Dynamics of Simulated Samples
Figure 4.5: Optimal Financing Choice. This figure depicts equityholders’ optimal
financing choice. In the region to the right of the dashed line, they select asset sales in
good states and bad states to finance the exercise costs of the option. In the region to the
left of the solid line, they issue equity in good states and bad states. Between the dashed
and the solid lines, equityholders issue equity in good states, and sell assets in bad states
to finance the exercise costs.
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asset sales in both regimes (on the right side of the dashed line) is smaller than the region
in which they optimally sell assets during bad states (on the right side of the solid line).
4.6 Aggregate Dynamics of Simulated Samples
The analysis of a typical firm at initiation in Section 4.5.2 contributes to our understand-
ing of the optimal choice between asset sales and equity issuance as sources of investment
financing. In this section, we investigate the dynamic properties of a simulated model-
implied economy, following the work of Bhamra et al. (2010a). The simulation approach
is important for two reasons. First, the analysis of a typical firm at initiation in Section
4.5.2 does not allow us to analyze the dynamic features predicted by our model. We need
to simulate the model to generate time series of investment, financing, and default obser-
vations over the business cycles. Comparing the resulting simulated data patterns to the
ones observed in our Compustat sample enables us to validate our model. We can also
measure how the propensity of model firms to use financing asset sales relates to firm and
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business cycle characteristics. This analysis helps us to confirm our explanations for the
empirical regression results on the relation between investments and financing asset sales,
and to derive new predictions on the impact of time-varying business cycle conditions on
the dynamic time serial patterns of financing asset sales.
Second, the investment, financing, and default probabilities are nonlinear in firm char-
acteristics. Hence, the analysis of a typical (average) firm does not explain the average
behavior of a cross section of real firms. To solve this issue, it is important to measure
the investment, financing, and default rates for simulated samples of firms that match the
observed cross sectional distribution of real firm characteristics. The dynamic features
of the average rates in these simulated matched samples can then be compared to the
empirical average behavior of real firms. They are also used to derive new predictions.
4.6.1 Details on the Simulation
At the beginning of each simulation we generate an economy of model-implied firms.
More specifically, we set up a grid of different firms, each featuring a unique combination
of coupon, scale parameters, and equity issuance costs. Coupons range from two to the
largest possible value such that no firm defaults immediately. The step size takes a value
of two. Scale parameters for firms with a less cyclical growth opportunity range from
0.79 in the good state and 0.73 in the bad state, and for firms with a more cyclical
growth opportunity from 0.80 in the good state and 0.71 in the bad state to the largest
possible value such that the option is not exercised immediately, with a step size of 0.3.
Equity issuance costs range from 0.04 to 0.09 in the good state, with a step size of 0.005.
The equity issuance costs parameter in the bad state is obtained by adding 0.02 to the
corresponding value in the good state. The remaining parameters are equal to those of
the baseline firm.15 The grid contains 849 different firm types. The earnings path of each
firm type is then simulated forward 25 times over 10 years. Firms are exposed to the
same macroeconomic shocks, but experience different idiosyncratic shocks, resulting in a
model-implied economy populated by more than 20, 000 different firms. This economy has
a broad range of leverage ratios, growth opportunities, and equity issuance costs.
15We have verified in simulations for various alternative grids (available upon request) that the results
are qualitatively identical.
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Next, we calculate the average leverage, Tobin’s q, and equity issuance costs for each
firm in our Compustat sample to match the model-implied economy to the cross sectional
distribution of real firms (we define all empirical variables in 2). We consider a total of
1352 Compustat firms for which we obtain all three measures. Firms with a q value below
1.15, and above 2.15 are winsorized because our model-implied economies hardly contain
firms with extremely low or high values of the growth option.16
To match the model-implied economy with their empirical counterpart we select for
each observation in the Compustat sample the firm in the simulated economy that has the
minimal Euclidean distance with respect to leverage, q, and the equity issuance costs. The
matching is accurate, with an average Euclidean distance of 0.0226. The procedure allows
us to construct a cross sectional distribution of model-implied matched firms that closely
reflects its empirical counterpart. The matched firms are quarterly simulated forward over
60 years under the historical probability measure. The equityholders of each firm behave
optimally conditional on current earnings and on the current business cycle: If current
earnings are below the corresponding regime-dependent default boundary, they default
immediately; if current earnings are above the corresponding regime-depending option
exercise threshold, they exercise the expansion option and select the optimal financing
source for the option exercise costs; otherwise, equityholders take no action. To maintain
a balanced sample of firms when we simulate the matched firms over time, we exogenously
introduce new firms. In particular, we replace each defaulted or exercised firm by a new
firm whose growth option is still intact. Replaced firms have the same initial parameter
values as the corresponding defaulted or exercised firm at initiation. To ensure robustness
of our results, the entire simulation is repeated 100 times. We record and analyze the
simulated matched samples.
4.6.2 Results for the Simulated Matched Samples
In this section, we first show that a typical simulated matched sample exhibits realistic
properties to validate our model approach. We then provide additional support for the
ability of our model to explain the empirical patterns that we observe in the Compustat
16Firms with a growth option that accounts for less than 13% of the total firm value almost never
exercise their option, and firms with a growth option that accounts for more than 54% of the total firm
value almost immediately exercise their option.
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data, and discuss novel predictions for financing asset sales.
Table 4.3 reports the average over all simulations of the mean values, as well as the
standard deviations of these means for important variables of the simulated matched
samples. Besides the results for the full sample period, we also provide statistics that
condition on the bad and good states, respectively.
Table 4.3: Simulated Sample Results
The table provides summary statistics for the simulated matched samples over the full sample period,
bad states, and good states. The sample period is 50 years with simulated quarterly observations. Each
simulated sample consists of 1352 firms that are matched to our Compustat sample. Firms are replaced
in case of investment or default. We report the mean of the mean values of 100 simulated samples, and
the standard deviation (Std) of the mean across simulations. Total Assets (TA) is the total value of
firm assets. Investment, Asset Sale and EquityF inance are dummy variables that are 1 if firms invest,
sell assets, or issue equity, respectively. Leverage is the firm’s leverage. Leverage and Equity V alue are
scaled by total assets. The q of model firms is obtained by dividing the value of the firm by the value of
its invested assets. The variable Cov. Ratio is computed by dividing firm earnings by interest expenses.
Summary Statistics
All States Bad State Good State
Variable Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Total Assets (TA) 197.1 17 163.96 12.8609 213.507 10.9017
Investment 0.0456 0.0063 0.0413 0.0067 0.0423 0.0052
Asset Sales 0.0176 0.0077 0.0175 0.006 0.0155 0.0079
q 1.472 0.0392 1.3994 0.0317 1.5087 0.0282
Cov. Ratio 2.0556 0.2036 1.9941 0.2230 2.0940 0.1756
Leverage 0.3942 0.0383 0.4454 0.0369 0.3679 0.0267
Equity V alue/TA 0.6057 0.0383 0.5545 0.0369 0.6329 0.0264
Equity F inance 0.0279 0.0074 0.0237 0.007 0.0268 0.0077
The key properties of the simulated matched samples are structurally similar to our
Compustat sample. As in our empirical sample (see Appendix 2, Table B1), firms in the
simulated samples exhibit, on average, procyclical asset values, q, coverage ratios, and
equity values. The average corporate leverage is countercyclical. The matched samples
also exhibit several other structural features of the Compustat data. For instance, as in
our Compustat sample, high q firms have on average a lower leverage and invest more
than low q firms.
Next, we investigate in more detail the dynamics of equity financing and investments
predicted by a typical simulation of a matched sample. Figure 4.6 shows the time series
of the relative amount of firms that issue equity in the typical sample. The shaded areas
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represent bad states. Our model firms exhibit procyclical aggregate equity issuance pat-
terns that correspond to well established findings in the empirical literature (e.g., Choe et
al. 1993, Bayless and Caplinsky 1996).
Figure 4.6: Aggregate Equity Financing. This figure plots the aggregate ratio of
firms in a typical simulated economy that issue equity over time. The shaded regions are
bad states, and the white regions are good states.
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Figure 4.7 depicts the time series of the investment rate of the typical simulated matched
sample. The investment rate is the fraction of firms that exercise their expansion option.
The aggregate investment pattern is procyclical (see for corresponding evidence in the
empirical investment literature e.g., Barro 1990, Cooper et al. 1999).
Figure 4.7: Aggregate Investment. This figure plots the aggregate ratio of firms in a
typical simulated economy that invest over time. The shaded regions are bad states, and
the white regions are good states.
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Figure 4.8 shows the time series of the aggregate default rate of the typical simulated
sample. Aggregate defaults are countercyclical, and often spike in the beginning of a bad
state. This pattern is consistent with empirical observations (see e.g., Duffie et al. 2007,
Das et al. 2007).
Figure 4.8: Aggregate Default. This figure plots the aggregate ratio of firms in a typical
simulated economy that default over time. The shaded regions are bad states, and the
white regions are good states.
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After verifying that the model features realistic sample properties, we now analyze the
predictions of our model concerning the cyclical nature of financing asset sales. Figure 4.9
depicts the time series of the relative number of firms that sell assets to finance the exercise
costs of the option in the typical simulated sample. Financing asset sales are generally
procyclical, but often peak at those points in time at which the economy switches from a
good to a bad state. The peaks occur because the investment threshold slightly decreases
for firms with a less cyclical growth option when the business cycle switches from a good
to a bad state, which leads to clustered investment of those firms with a current earnings
level between the thresholds. As the propensity for financing asset sales is relatively large
during bad states, the clustered investment of firms with a less cyclical growth option at
the beginning of a bad state causes the peaks. Decreasing the proportion of firms with a
less cyclical growth option reduces the peaks, and, hence, the investment rate during bad
states. It does, however, not affect the relative propensity of firms to use financing asset
sales during bad states.
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Figure 4.9: Aggregate Financing Asset Sales. This figure plots the aggregate ratio of
firms in a typical simulated economy that sell assets over time. The shaded regions are
bad states, and the white regions are good states.
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In Figure 4.10, we compare the time series of the investment rate (solid line) to the time
series of the financing asset sales rate (dashed line) in the typical simulated sample. The
distance between the dashed line and the solid line decreases during bad states, which
indicates that asset sales are a relatively more important financing source for investment
activities in bad states. Hence, Figure 4.10 illustrates that the aggregate dynamics of
asset sales and investment across states generated by our model are consistent with our
finding in the Compustat data that the correlation between asset sales and investment is
significantly higher during bad business cycle states.
Figure 4.10: Aggregate Investment and Financing Asset Sales. This figure plots
the aggregate ratio of firms in a typical simulated economy that invest (solid line), and
the aggregate ratio of firms that sell assets (dashed line) over time. The shaded regions
are bad states, and the white regions are good states.
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In Table 4.4 we summarize additional features of the aggregate model dynamics of
financing asset sales that corroborate our predictions from a typical firm at initiation. The
conditional asset sale ratio is the percentage of firms in the simulated matched samples
that, upon investment, finance the exercise costs of the option by selling assets. Since we do
not have to be concerned about various sources of omitted variables or other determinants
of asset sales in our simulated samples, we can directly use the conditional asset sale ratios
to explain the correlation results we obtain in the Compustat sample. Overall, 47% of the
investments in the simulated samples are financed with asset sales. If we only consider
firms that are in the highest leverage tercile, this ratio increases to 54%. For firms in
the lowest leverage tercile, the ratio decreases to 42%. The result that highly leveraged
firms in the simulated matched samples have a higher tendency to use financing asset
sales upon investment provides support to our model prediction 1, and to the finding in
the Compustat data that the correlation between asset sales and investment increases in
leverage.
In bad states, the conditional asset sale ratio increases to roughly 54%, and amounts to
43% in good states. This finding confirms our model prediction 2 that firms have a higher
propensity to sell assets upon investment during bad states, which is also corroborated
by the increased correlation between asset sales and investment during bad business cycle
states in the real data.
Finally, we analyze which firms drive the high conditional asset sale ratio during bad
times in our simulated samples. The last four rows in Table 4.4 report the asset sale ratios
for firms in the simulated samples with a relatively low (L) and high (H) cyclicality of the
expansion option during good and bad states, respectively. Firms with a low cyclicality
have the highest ratio during bad business cycle states, which supports our model predic-
tion 3, and explains the increased correlation between asset sales and investment for firms
with less cyclical growth opportunities during the bad state in the real data.
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Table 4.4: Conditional Asset Sale Ratios
The table provides summary statistics for conditional asset sale ratios from the simulated samples. Asset
sale and investment are both dummy variables that are equal to one in case of an asset sale or an investment,
respectively. To calculate conditional asset sale ratios, we aggregate over all simulations the asset sale and
investment observations for the sample that we consider, and divide the sum of asset sale observations by
the sum of investment observations. We compute this ratio for all firms, for firms in the highest and the
lowest leverage terciles with resorting in every period, during bad and good states, and for firms with a
more (H) or less (L) cyclical growth option. For details on the simulation see Section 4.6. Lbad and Lgood
are asset sale rates of firms with a low cyclicality of the expansion option during bad and good states,
respectively. Hbad and Hgood indicate the rates for firms with a high cyclicality in the two states.
Asset Sale Conditional on Investment
Total Asset Sales 38.79%
High Leverage Firms 52.45%
Low Leverage Firms 35.34%
Bad States 43.77%
Good States 36.26%
Lbad 55.71%
Lgood 42.82%
Hbad 51.81%
Hgood 52.45%
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4.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the decision of firms to sell assets to finance investments (financ-
ing asset sales). We derive and explain a novel aspect of this decision, that is, the relation
between financing asset sales and the well-known wealth transfer problem between equity-
holders and debtholders at investment for firms with risky debt (Myers 1977). The model
incorporates the impact of cyclicality on investment opportunities, financing decisions,
and asset liquidity, which helps us to understand the drivers of financing asset sales.
The starting point of our work are empirical patterns of financing asset sales from a
sample of U.S. Compustat firms. In the regression analysis, we focus on the correlation
between asset sales and investment because it is unlikely that distressed firms tend to
invest heavily in those periods, in which they are forced to sell assets to repay their debt.
We explore the firm-specific and business cycle related variables that potentially drive this
correlation. We find that the correlation between asset sales and investment is significantly
higher (i) for firms with higher leverage, (ii) in bad business cycle states, (iii) for firms
with a low cyclicality of the expansion option in bad business cycle states, and (iv) for
unconstrained firms. Our empirical results cannot be explained by traditional motives for
asset sales, such as financial distress or external financing constraints.
Against the backdrop of these stylized facts, we study a structural model with time-
varying business cycle conditions, embedded inside a representative agent consumption-
based asset pricing framework, that endogenizes the choice between asset sales and equity
issuance to fund capital expenditures. Notably, equity issuance cost, asset liquidity, and
the growth option are subject to cyclicality.
At investment, the decrease in the asset volatility and the increase in earnings make
debt less risky and hence transfers value from equityholders to debtholders. This mecha-
nism leads to the well-known wealth transfer problem that induces underinvestment. The
results from our model show that the wealth transfer problem is exacerbated for firms with
higher leverage because their debt is riskier and hence more sensitive to asset volatility
and earnings changes.
On the other hand, selling assets upon investment increases leverage and hence makes
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debt riskier. The corresponding wealth transfer from debtholders to equityholders ame-
liorates the initial wealth transfer problem from the exercise of the expansion option. We
show that the equityholders’ trade off between the incremental friction cost of selling assets
over the equity issuance cost and the reduction in the wealth transfer problem explains
the empirical patterns we observe for financing asset sales in our Compustat sample.
We also examine the model’s dynamic predictions by simulating model-implied firm
samples over time that are structurally similar to our Compustat sample. The simulations
generate investments, financing, and default patterns that are similar to the ones empir-
ically observed. We also find that financing asset sales are procyclical, and often peak at
those points in time at which the economy switches from a bad to a good state.
Overall, we contribute to identifying empirical and theoretical determinants of financing
asset sales. In addition, we highlight the importance of cyclicality for explaining corporate
financing and investment decisions. The observation that the wealth transfer problem can
drive financing asset sales enriches our understanding of corporate financing decisions.
To this end, our work suggests directions for further theoretical and empirical research.
Future theoretical research could model to what extent managers use financing asset sales
over the business cycle to maximize their personal utility. From an empirical perspective,
the relationship between the wealth transfer problem and financing asset sales may help
explain debt covenant structures observed in corporate practice.
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Derivations
1 Derivations
1.1 The stochastic discount factor, risk-free rates, and market prices of
risk
Suppose the continuous-time analog of Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences of stochastic differ-
ential utility type (e.g. Duffie and Epstein 1992a, Duffie and Epstein 1992b). The utility
index Ut over a consumption process Cs solves
Ut = EP
[∫ ∞
t
ρ
1− δ
C1−δs − ((1− γ)Us)
1−δ
1−γ
((1− γ)Us)
1−δ
1−γ − 1
ds |Ft
]
, (A.1)
in which ρ determines the rate of time preference, γ is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion for a timeless gamble, and Ψ := 1δ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
for deterministic consumption paths. Incorporating the separability of time and state
preferences and assuming that Ψ > 1, i.e., that agents have a preference for early resolution
of uncertainty and require expected returns that increase in the uncertainty about future
consumption, are necessary to capture the impact of aggregate risk on corporate security
values.
Bhamra et al. (2010b) and Chen (2010) show that solving the Bellman equation associ-
ated with the consumption problem of the representative agent yields that the stochastic
discount factor mt follows the dynamics
dmt
mt
= −ridt− ηidWCt + (eκi − 1) dMt, (A.2)
in which Mt determines the compensated process associated with the Markov chain. ri are
the regime-dependent risk-free interest rates. The parameters ηi denote the risk prices for
systematic Brownian shocks affecting aggregate output. The market prices of consumption
risk ηi increase in the agents’ risk aversion and consumption volatility. κi are the relative
jump sizes of the discount factor when the Markov chain leaves state i, i.e., they are the
market prices of discount factor jump risk.
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Risk-free rates, and the market prices of consumption and jump risk are defined as
ri = r¯i + λi
[
γ − δ
γ − 1
(
w
− γ−1
γ−δ − 1
)
− (w−1 − 1)] , (A.3)
ηi = γσ
C
i , (A.4)
κi = (δ − γ) log
(
hj
hi
)
, (A.5)
with i, j = G,B, i 6= j. The parameters hG, hB solve the following non-linear system of
equations (e.g. Bhamra et al. 2010b):
0 = ρ
(1− γ
1− δ
)
hδ−γi +
(
(1− γ) θi − 12γ (1− γ)
(
σCi
)2 − ρ1− γ
1− δ
)
h1−γi + λi
(
h1−γj − h1−γi
)
(A.6)
The risk-free rates ri consist of the interest rate if the economy stayed in regime i forever,
r¯i, plus a second term adjusting for possible regime switches. The no-jump part of the
interest rates, r¯i, are given by
r¯i = ρ+ δθi − 1
2
γ (1 + δ)
(
σCi
)2
, (A.7)
and
w := eκB = e−κG (A.8)
measures the size of the jump in the real-state price density when the economy shifts from
bad states to good states (see, for example Proposition 1, Bhamra et al. 2010b).
1.2 Derivation of the values of corporate securities after investment
The valuation of corporate debt. Our valuation of corporate debt of a firm that consists of
only invested assets in a two regime setting follows (Hackbarth et al. 2006). We consider
the case in which the default boundary in good states is lower than the one in bad states,
i.e., DˆG < DˆB. If the firm defaults, debtholders receive a fraction Λiαi of the unleveraged
after tax asset value (1 − τ)Xyi. A debt investor requires an instantaneous return equal
to the risk-free rate ri. The instantaneous debt return corresponds to the realized rate of
return plus the coupon proceeds from debt. Therefore, an application of Ito’s lemma with
regime switches shows that debt satisfies the following system of ODEs.
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For 0 ≤ X ≤ DˆG :  dˆG(X) = αGΛG(1− τ)XyGdˆB(X) = αBΛB(1− τ)XyB. (A.9)
For DˆG < X ≤ DˆB : rGdˆG(X) = c+ µ˜GXdˆ′G(X) +
1
2 σ˜
2
GX
2dˆ′′G(X) + λ˜G
(
αBΛB(1− τ)XyB − dˆG(X)
)
dˆB(X) = αBΛB(1− τ)XyB.
(A.10)
For X > DˆB : rGdˆG(X) = c+ µ˜GXdˆ
′
G(X) +
1
2 σ˜
2
GX
2dˆ′′G(X) + λ˜G
(
dˆB(X)− dˆG(X)
)
rB dˆB(X) = c+ µ˜BXdˆ
′
B(X) +
1
2 σ˜
2
BX
2dˆ′′B(X) + λ˜B
(
dˆG(X)− dˆB(X)
)
.
(A.11)
The boundary conditions read
lim
X→∞
dˆi (X)
X
<∞, i = G,B, (A.12)
lim
X↘DˆB
dˆG(X) = lim
X↗DˆB
dˆG(X), (A.13)
lim
X↘DˆB
dˆ′G(X) = lim
X↗DˆB
dˆ′G(X), (A.14)
lim
X↘DˆG
dˆG (X) = αGΛG(1− τ)DGyG, (A.15)
and
lim
X↘DˆG
dˆB (X) = αBΛB(1− τ)DByB. (A.16)
Condition (A.12) expresses the no-bubbles condition. The remaining boundary conditions
are the value-matching conditions (A.13), (A.15), and (A.16), and the smooth-pasting
condition at the higher default threshold DˆB for the debt function in good state dˆG(·),
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Eq. (A.14). The functional form of the solution is
dˆi(X) =

αiΛi(1− τ)Xyi X ≤ Dˆi i = G,B
Cˆ1X
βG1 + Cˆ2X
βG2 + C3X + C4 DˆG < X ≤ DˆB, i = G
Aˆi1X
γ1 + Aˆi2X
γ2 +Ai5 X > DˆB, i = G,B,
(A.17)
in which AˆG1, AˆG2, AˆB1, AˆB2, AG5, AB5, Cˆ1, Cˆ2, C3, C4, γ1, γ2, β
G
1 , and β
G
2 are real-valued
parameters to be determined.
First, consider the region X > DˆB. We start by using the standard approach of plug-
ging the functional form dˆi(X) = Aˆi1X
γ1 + Aˆi2X
γ2 + Ai5 into both equations of (A.11).
Comparing coefficients and solving the resulting two-dimensional system of equations for
Ai5, we find that
Ai5 =
c (rj + λ˜i + λ˜j)
rirj + rj λ˜i + riλ˜j
=
c
rpi
, (A.18)
and that AˆGk is always a multiple of AˆBk, k = 1, 2, with the factor lk :=
1
λ˜G
(rG + λ˜G −
µ˜Gγk− 12 σ˜2Gγk(γk−1)), i.e., AˆBk = lkAˆGk. Using these results when comparing coefficients
again, it can be shown that γ1 and γ2 are the negative roots of the quadratic equation
(µ˜Bγ +
1
2 σ˜
2
Bγ(γ − 1)− λ˜B − rB)(µ˜Gγ + 12 σ˜2Gγ(γ − 1)− λ˜G − rG) = λ˜Bλ˜G. (A.19)
Due to the no-bubbles condition for debt stated in Eq. (A.12), we take the negative roots.
Next, we solve the region DˆG ≤ X ≤ DˆB. Plugging the functional form dG(X) =
Cˆ1X
βG1 + Cˆ2X
βG2 + C3X + C4 into the first equation of (A.10), we find by comparison of
coefficients that
βG1,2 =
1
2
− µ˜G
σ˜2G
±
√(
1
2
− µ˜G
σ˜2G
)2
+
2(rG + λ˜G)
σ˜2G
C3 =
λ˜GαBΛB(1− τ)yB
rG + λ˜G − µ˜G
(A.20)
C4 =
c
rG + λ˜G
.
We then plug the functional form (A.17) into conditions (A.13)–(A.16), and obtain a four-
dimensional linear system in the remaining four unknown parameters AˆG1, AˆG2, Cˆ1, and
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Cˆ2 :
AˆG1Dˆ
γ1
B + AˆG2Dˆ
γ2
B +AG5 = Cˆ1Dˆ
βG1
G + Cˆ2Dˆ
βG2
B + C3DˆB + C4
AˆG1γ1Dˆ
γ1
B + AˆG2γ2Dˆ
γ2
B = Cˆ1β
G
1 Dˆ
βG1
B + Cˆ2β
G
2 Dˆ
βG2
B + C3DˆB
αGΛG(1− τ)DˆGyG = Cˆ1Dˆβ
G
1
B + Cˆ2Dˆ
βG2
B + C3DˆB + C4
l1AˆG1Dˆ
γ1
B + l2AˆG2Dˆ
γ2
B +AB5 = αBΛB(1− τ)DˆByB.
(A.21)
Define the matrices
Mˆ :=

Dˆγ1B Dˆ
γ2
B −Dˆ
βG1
B −Dˆ
βG2
B
γ1Dˆ
γ1
B γ2Dˆ
γ2
B −βG1 Dˆ
βG1
B −βG2 Dˆ
βG2
B
0 0 Dˆ
βG1
B Dˆ
βG2
B
l1Dˆ
γ1
B l2Dˆ
γ2
B 0 0
 (A.22)
and
bˆ :=

C3DˆB + C4 −AG5
C3DˆB
αGΛG(1− τ)DˆGyG − C3DˆB − C4
αBΛB(1− τ)DˆByB −AB5
 , (A.23)
such that Mˆ
[
AˆG1 AˆG2 Cˆ1 Cˆ2
]T
= bˆ. The solution for the unknown parameters is
given by [
AˆG1 AˆG2 Cˆ1 Cˆ2
]T
= Mˆ−1bˆ. (A.24)
The value of the tax shield can be calculated by the formula for the value of debt, in
which c is replaced by τc, and α is equal to zero. The value of bankruptcy costs is simply
obtained by replacing c by zero, and α by 1− α.
Default policy. The value of equity corresponds to the firm value minus the value of
debt. The firm value is given by the value of assets in place plus the value of the option
and the tax shield minus default costs. Once debt has been issued, managers select the
ex post default policy that maximizes the value of equity. Formally, the default policy is
determined by equating the first derivative of the equity value to zero at the corresponding
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default boundary:  eˆ′G(Dˆ∗G) = 0eˆ′B(Dˆ∗B) = 0. (A.25)
We solve this problem numerically.
Capital structure. Denote by fˆ∗i (X) the firm value of a firm with only invested assets,
given optimal ex post default thresholds. The ex ante optimal coupon of a firm solves
cˆ∗ := argmaxcˆfˆ
∗
i (X). (A.26)
For a firm that receives scaled earnings after investment, the value of corporate securities
is solved analogically by replacing X with the scaled level of earnings. For example, if
the firm exercises the option in boom, and finances the exercise cost by issuing equity, the
scaled earnings correspond to (sG + 1)X. The default boundaries Dˆ
∗
G and Dˆ
∗
B are then
expressed in terms of the scaled earnings levels.
1.3 Derivation of the value of the growth option
The case in which XG < XB:
We present the derivation of the value of the growth option for a firm that finances
the option exercise by issuing equity in good states and selling assets in bad states. The
value of the growth option for a firm with an alternative financing strategy can be derived
analogically. For each regime i, the option is exercised immediately whenever X ≥ Xi
(option exercise region); otherwise, it is optimal to wait (option continuation region).
This structure results in the following system of ODEs for the value function.
For 0 ≤ X < XG : rGGG(X) = µ˜GXG′G(X) + 12 σ˜2GX2G′′G(X) + λ˜G (GB(X)−GG(X))rBGB(X) = µ˜BXG′B(X) + 12 σ˜2BX2G′′B(X) + λ˜B (GG(X)−GB(X)) . (A.27)
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For XG ≤ X < XB : GG(X) = (1− τ)sGXyG −KG(1 + ΥG)rBGB(X) = µ˜BXG′B(X) + 12 σ˜2BX2G′′B(X) + λ˜B ((1− τ)sGXyG −KB(1 + ΥB)−GB(X)) .
(A.28)
For X ≥ XB :  GG(X) = (1− τ)sGXyG −KG(1 + ΥG)GB(X) = (1− τ)sBXyB −KB/ΛB. (A.29)
Whenever the process X is in the option continuation region, which corresponds to system
(A.27) and the second equation of (A.28), the required rate of return ri (left-hand side)
must be equal to the realized rate of return (right-hand side). The realized rate of return
is calculated by applying Ito’s lemma for regime switches. In this region, the last term
captures the possible jump in the value of the growth option due to a regime switch. It
can be expressed as the instantaneous probability of a regime shift, λ˜G or λ˜B, times the
associated change in the value of the option. The first equation of (A.28) and the system
(A.29) state the payoff of the option at exercise. The process is in the option exercise
region in these cases. The boundary conditions are given by
lim
X↘0
Gi (X) = 0, i = G,B, (A.30)
lim
X↘XG
GB(X) = lim
X↗XG
GB(X), (A.31)
lim
X↘XG
G′B(X) = lim
X↗XG
G′B(X), (A.32)
lim
X↗XB
GB (X) = (1− τ)sBXByB −KB/ΛB, (A.33)
and
lim
X↗XG
GG (X) = (1− τ)sGXGyG −KG(1 + ΥG). (A.34)
Condition (A.30) ensures that the option value goes to zero as earnings approach zero.
Conditions (A.31) and (A.32) are the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions of
the value function bad times at the exercise boundary in good times. The remaining
conditions (A.33)–(A.34) are the value-matching conditions at the exercise boundaries in
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a good state and a bad state, respectively.
The functional form of the solution is given by
Gi(X) =

A¯i3X
γ3 + A¯i4X
γ4 0 ≤ X < XG, i = G,B
C¯1X
βB1 + C¯2X
βB2 + C¯3X + C¯4 XG ≤ X < XB, i = B
(1− τ)sBXyB −KB/ΛB X ≥ XB i = B
(1− τ)sGXyG −KG(1 + ΥG) X ≥ XG i = G
(A.35)
in which A¯G3, A¯G4, A¯B1, A¯B2, C¯1, C¯2, C¯3, C¯4, γ3, γ4, β
B
1 , and β
B
2 are real-valued parameters
to be determined.
First, consider the region 0 ≤ X < XG, and plug the functional form Gi(X) = A¯i3Xγ3 +
A¯i4X
γ4 into both equations of (A.27). Comparison of coefficients shows that A¯Gk is a
multiple of A¯Bk, k = 3, 4, with the factor l¯k :=
1
λ˜G
(rG + λ˜G − µ˜Gγk − 12 σ˜2Gγk(γk − 1)),
i.e., A¯Bk = l¯kA¯Gk. Using this result when comparing coefficients, we find that γ3 and γ4
correspond to the positive roots of the quadratic equation
(µ˜Bγ +
1
2
σ˜2Bγ(γ − 1)− λ˜B − rB)(µ˜Gγ +
1
2
σ˜2Gγ(γ − 1)− λ˜G − rG) = λ˜Bλ˜G. (A.36)
The reason for taking the positive roots is given by boundary condition (A.30).
Next, consider the region XG ≤ X < XB. Plugging the functional form GB(X) =
C¯1X
β1 + C¯2X
β2 + C¯3X + C¯4 into the second equation of (A.28), we find by comparison
of coefficients that
βB1,2 =
1
2
− µ˜B
σ˜2B
±
√(
1
2
− µ˜B
σ˜2B
)2
+
2(rB + λ˜B)
σ˜2B
,
C¯3 = λ˜B
(1− τ)sGyG
rB − µ˜B + λ˜B
, (A.37)
C¯4 = −λ˜B KB/ΛB
rB + λ˜B
.
The remaining unknown parameters are A¯G3, A¯G4, C¯1, and C¯2. Plugging the functional
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form (A.35) into conditions (A.31)–(A.34) yields
C¯1X
βB1
G + C¯2X
βB2
G + C¯3XG + C¯4 = l¯3A¯G3X
γ3
G + l¯4A¯G4X
γ4
G , (A.38)
C¯1β
B
1 X
βB1
G + C¯2β
B
2 X
βB2
G + C¯3XG = l¯3A¯G3γ3X
γ3
G + l¯4γ4A¯G4X
γ4
G , (A.39)
C¯1X
βB1
B + C¯2X
βB2
B + C¯3XB + C¯4 = (1− τ)sByBXB −KB/ΛB, (A.40)
and
A¯G3X
γ3
G + A¯G4X
γ4
G = (1− τ)sGyGXG −KG(1 + ΥG). (A.41)
This four-dimensional system is linear in its four unknowns A¯G3, A¯G4, C¯1 and C¯2. We
define the matrices
M¯ :=

l¯3X
γ3
G l¯4X
γ4
G −X
βB1
G −X
βB2
G
l¯3γ3X
γ3
G l¯4γ4X
γ4
G −βB1 X
βB1
G −βB2 X
βB2
G
0 0 X
βB1
B X
βB2
B
Xγ3G X
γ4
G 0 0
 , (A.42)
and
b¯ :=

C¯3XG + C¯4
C¯3XG
−C¯3XB − C¯4 + (1− τ)sByBXB −KB/ΛB
(1− τ)sGyGXG −KG(1 + ΥG)
 , (A.43)
such that M¯
[
A¯G3 A¯G4 C¯1 C¯2
]T
= b¯. The solution to the remaining four unknowns is
given by [
A¯G3 A¯G4 C¯1 C¯2
]T
= M¯−1b¯. (A.44)
The unleveraged value of the growth option. The unleveraged value of the growth option
is calculated by additionally imposing the smooth-pasting boundary conditions at option
161
exercise:
lim
X↗XunlevB
Gunlev
′
B (X) = (1− τ)sByB (A.45)
and
lim
X↗XunlevG
Gunlev
′
G (X) = (1− τ)sGyG. (A.46)
The solution method is analog to the one for the leveraged option value up to and including
Eq. (A.37). System (A.38)–(A.41) is augmented by the two equations corresponding to
the additional smooth-pasting boundary conditions:
C¯unlev1 β
B
1
(
XunlevB
)βB1 −1
+ C¯unlev2 β
B
2
(
XunlevB
)βB2 −1
+ C¯3 = (1− τ)sByB (A.47)
and
A¯unlevG3 γ3
(
XunlevG
)γ3−1
+ A¯unlevG4 γ4
(
XunlevG
)γ4−1
= (1− τ)sGyG. (A.48)
The full system is six-dimensional with the six unknowns A¯unlevG3 , A¯
unlev
G4 , C¯
unlev
1 , C¯
unlev
2
XunlevG , and X
unlev
B , linear in the first four unknowns and nonlinear in the last two un-
knowns. It is solved numerically.
The case in which XG ≥ XB:
The solution of the case XG ≥ XB can be obtained immediately by renaming regimes
in the solution of the presented case for XG < XB.
1.4 Firms with invested assets and an expansion option
We first present a proof for the valuation of corporate debt in the case in which DG < DB,
DˆG < DˆB, and XB > XG.
Proof of Proposition 2. An investor requires an instantaneous return equal to the risk-
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free rate ri for holding corporate debt. The application of Ito’s lemma with regime switches
shows that debt must, consequently, satisfy the following system of ODEs.
For 0 ≤ X ≤ DG : dG (X) = αGΛG
(
(1− τ)XyG +GunlevG (X)
)
dB (X) = αBΛB
(
(1− τ)XyB +GunlevB (X)
)
.
(A.49)
For DG < X ≤ DB :
rGdG (X) = c+ µ˜GXd
′
G (X) +
1
2 σ˜
2
GX
2d′′G (X)
+λ˜G
(
αBΥB
(
(1− τ)XyB +GunlevB (X)
)− dG (X))
dB (X) = αBΛB
(
(1− τ)XyB +GunlevB (X)
)
.
(A.50)
For DB < X < XG : rGdG (X) = c+ µ˜GXd′G (X) + 12 σ˜2GX2d′′G (X) + λ˜G (dB (X)− dG (X))rBdB (X) = c+ µ˜BXd′B (X) + 12 σ˜2BX2d′′B (X) + λ˜B (dG (X)− dB (X)) . (A.51)
For XG ≤ X < XB : dG (X) = dˆG ((sG + 1)X)rBdB (X) = c+ µ˜BXd′B (X) + 12 σ˜2BX2d′′B (X) + λ˜B (dˆG ((sG + 1)X)− dB (X)) .
(A.52)
For X ≥ XB :  dG (X) = dˆG ((sG + 1)X)dB (X) = dˆB ((sB + 1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯yB )X) . (A.53)
In system (A.49), the firm is in the default region in both good states and bad times. In
this region, debtholders receive αiΛi
(
(1− τ)Xyi +Gunlevi (X)
)
at default. The firm is in
the continuation region in good state, and in the default region in bad states in system
(A.50). For the continuation region in good states , the left-hand side of the first equation
is the rate of return required by investors for holding corporate debt for one unit of time.
The right-hand side is the realized rate of return, computed by Ito’s lemma as the expected
change in the value of debt plus the coupon payment c. The last term expresses the possible
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jump in the value of debt in case of a regime switch, that triggers immediate default. Eqs.
(A.51) describe the case in which the firm is in the continuation region in both good and
bad states. The next system, (A.52), treats the case in which the firm is in the exercise
region in good states and in the continuation region in bad states. After exercising the
option, the firm owns total assets in place with value (1− τ)Xyi + (1− τ)si¯Xyi, reflecting
the notion that the exercise cost of the growth option can be financed by issuing equity in
good states. The value of debt must then be equal to the value of debt of a firm with only
invested assets, i.e., dG(X) = dˆG((sG + 1)X), which is the first equation in (A.52). The
second equation in this case is obtained by the same approach as in (A.51). The last term
captures the notion that a regime switch from bad states to good states triggers immediate
exercise of the expansion option with equity financing. Finally, (A.53) describes the case
in which the firm is in the exercise region in both good and bad states. In the good states,
the earnings of the firm are scaled by sG + 1. In the bad states, the exercise cost KB is
financed by selling KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯yB of the assets in place, such that the earnings of the firm are
scaled by (sB + 1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯yB ).
The system is subject to the following boundary conditions.
lim
X↘DB
dG (X) = lim
X↗DB
dG (X) , (A.54)
lim
X↘DB
d′G (X) = lim
X↗DB
d′G (X) , (A.55)
lim
X↘DG
dG (X) = αGΛG
(
(1− τ)DGyG +GunlevG (DG)
)
, (A.56)
lim
X↘DB
dB (X) = αBΛB
(
(1− τ)DByB +GunlevB (DB)
)
, (A.57)
lim
X↘XG
dB (X) = lim
X↗XG
dB (X) , (A.58)
lim
X↘XG
d′B (X) = lim
X↗XG
d′B (X) , (A.59)
lim
X↗XG
dG (X) = dˆG ((sG + 1)XG) , (A.60)
and
lim
X↗XB
dB (XB) = dˆB
(
(sB + 1− KB/ΛB
(1− τ)Xt¯yB
)XB
)
. (A.61)
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Eqs. (A.54) and (A.55) are the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions for the debt
value in the good state at the default boundary of the bad state. Eqs. (A.58) and (A.59)
are the corresponding conditions for the debt value in the bad state at the option exercise
boundary of the good state. Eqs. (A.56) and (A.57) show the value-matching conditions
at the default thresholds, and Eqs. (A.60) and (A.61) are the value-matching conditions
at the option exercise boundaries. The default thresholds and option exercise boundaries
are chosen by equity-holders. Hence, we do not have the corresponding smooth-pasting
conditions for debt.
To solve this system, we start with the functional form of the solution, in which
AG1, AG2, AB1, AB2, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, B1, B2, B4, β
G
1 , β
G
2 , β
B
1 , β
B
2 , γ1, γ2, γ3, and γ4 are
real-valued parameters to be determined (or to be confirmed).
We first consider the region DB < X ≤ XG. Plugging the functional form di(X) =
Ai1X
γ1 +Ai2X
γ2 +Ai3X
γ3 +Ai4X
γ4 +Ai5 into both equations of (A.51) and comparing
coefficients, we find that
Ai5 =
c(rj + λ˜i + λ˜j)
rirj + rj λ˜i + riλ˜j
=
c
rpi
. (A.62)
As in 1.2, AGk is always a multiple of ABk, k = 1, . . . , 4, with the factor lk :=
1
λ˜G
(rG+λ˜G−
µ˜Gγk − 12 σ˜2Gγk(γk − 1)), i.e., ABk = lkAGk. Using this relation and comparing coefficients,
it can be shown that γ1, γ2, γ3, and γ4 correspond to the roots of the quadratic equation
(µ˜Bγ +
1
2 σ˜
2
Bγ(γ − 1)− λ˜B − rB)(µ˜Gγ + 12 σ˜2Gγ(γ − 1)− λ˜G − rG) = λ˜Bλ˜G. (A.63)
According to (Guo 2001), this quadratic equation always has two negative and two positive
distinct real roots. The value of debt in both regimes is subject to boundary conditions
from below (default) and above (exercise of expansion option). To meet all boundary
conditions, we use four terms with the corresponding factors Aik as well as the exponents
γk, which requires the usage of all four roots of Eq. (A.63). The no-bubbles condition is
not considered again because it is already implemented in the value function dˆi of a firm
with only invested assets. The unknown parameters for this region are AGk, k = 1, . . . , 4.
Next, we examine the region DG ≤ X ≤ DB. Plugging the functional form dG(X) =
C1X
βG1 + C2X
βG2 + C3X + C4 + C5X
γ3 + C6X
γ4 into the second equation of (A.50), we
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find by comparison of coefficients that
βG1,2 =
1
2
− µ˜G
σ˜2G
±
√(
1
2
− µ˜G
σ˜2G
)2
+
2(rG + λ˜G)
σ˜2G
, (A.64)
C3 = λ˜G
αBΛB(1− τ)yB
rG + λ˜G − µ˜G
, (A.65)
C4 =
c
rG + λ˜G
, (A.66)
C5 = αBΛB
l¯3
l3
A¯unlevG3 , (A.67)
and
C6 = αBΛB
l¯4
l4
A¯unlevG4 . (A.68)
The unknown parameters remaining in this region are C1 and C2.
Finally, we consider the region XG < X ≤ XB. Plugging the functional form B1XβB1 +
B2X
βB2 +Z (X)+ λ˜B
c
rPi (rB+λ˜B)
+ c
rB+λ˜B
into the second equation of (A.52) and comparing
coefficients, we find that
Z(X) = λ˜BB5X
γ1 + λ˜BB6X
γ2 . (A.69)
(A.70)
The parameters B5 and B6 are given by
B5 =
(sB + 1)
γ1AˆG1
rB − µ˜Bγ1 − 12 σ˜2Bγ1 (γ1 − 1) + λ˜B
, (A.71)
and
B6 =
(sB + 1)
γ2AˆG2
rB − µ˜Bγ2 − 12 σ˜2Bγ2 (γ2 − 1) + λ˜B
. (A.72)
The unknown parameters remaining in this region are B1 and B2.
To solve for the unknown parameters AG1, AG2, AG3, AG4, C1, C2, B1, and B2, we plug
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the functional form (4.4.8) into the system of boundary conditions (A.54)–(A.61):
4∑
k=1
AGkD
γk
B +AG5 = C1D
βG1
B + C2D
βG2
B + C3X + C4 + C5X
γ3 + C6X
γ4
4∑
k=1
AGkγkD
γk
B = C1β
G
1 D
βG1
B + C2β
G
2 D
βG2
B + C3X + C5γ3X
γ3 + C6γ4X
γ4
αGΛG
(
(1 + τ)DGyG +G
unlev
G (DG)
)
= C1D
βG1
G + C2D
βG2
G + C3DG + C4 + C5D
γ3
G + C6D
γ4
G
4∑
k=1
lkAGkD
γk
B +AB5 = αBΛB
(
(1 + τ)DByB +G
unlev
B (DB)
)
4∑
k=1
lkAGkX
γk
G +AB5 = B1X
βB1
G +B2X
βB2
G + Z(XG) +B4 (A.73)
4∑
k=1
lkAGkγkX
γk
G = B1β
B
1 X
βB1
G +B2β
B
2 X
βB2
G +XGZ
′(XG)
4∑
k=1
AGkX
γk
G +AG5 = dˆG ((sG + 1)XG)
B1X
βB1
B +B2X
βB2
B + Z(XB) +B4 = dˆB
(
(sB + 1− KB/ΛB
(1− τ)Xt¯yB
)XB
)
.
Using matrix notation, we can write
M :=

Dγ1B D
γ2
B D
γ3
B D
γ4
B −D
βG1
B −D
βG2
B 0 0
γ1D
γ1
B γ2D
γ2
B γ3D
γ3
B γ4D
γ4
B −βG1 D
βG1
B −βG2 D
βG2
B 0 0
0 0 0 0 D
βG1
G D
βG2
G 0 0
l1D
γ1
B l2D
γ2
B l3D
γ3
B l4D
γ4
B 0 0 0 0
l1X
γ1
G l2X
γ2
G l3X
γ3
G l4X
γ4
G 0 0 −X
βB1
G −X
βB2
G
l1γ1X
γ1
G l2γ2X
γ2
G l3γ3X
γ3
G l4γ4X
γ4
G 0 0 −βB1 X
βB1
G −βB2 X
βB2
G
Xγ1G X
γ2
G X
γ3
G X
γ4
G 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 X
βB1
B X
βB2
B

(A.74)
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and
b :=

−AG5 + C3DB + C4 + C5Dγ1B + C6Dγ2B
C3DB + γ1C5D
γ1
B + γ2C6D
γ2
B
−C3DG − C4 − C5Dγ3G − C6Dγ4G + αGΛG
(
(1− τ)DGyG +GunlevG (DG)
)
−AB5 + αBΛB
(
(1− τ)DByB +GunlevB (DB)
)
−AB5 + Z (XG) +B4
XGZ
′ (XG)
−AG5 + dˆG ((sG + 1)XG)
−Z (XB) +B4 + dˆB
(
(sB + 1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯yB )XB
)

.
(A.75)
The solution to the remaining unknowns is now given by
[
AG1 AG2 AG3 AG4 C1 C2 B1 B2
]T
= M−1b. (A.76)
The case in which DG < DB, DˆG < DˆB, and XG > XB:
Going through the same steps as in the previous case gives us
M :=

Dγ1B D
γ2
B D
γ3
B D
γ4
B −D
βG1
B −D
βG2
B 0 0
γ1D
γ1
B γ2D
γ2
B γ3D
γ3
B γ4D
γ4
B −βG1 D
βG1
B −βG2 D
βG2
B 0 0
0 0 0 0 D
βG1
G D
βG2
G 0 0
l1D
γ1
B l2D
γ2
G l3D
γ3
B l4D
γ4
B 0 0 0 0
Xγ1B X
γ2
B X
γ3
B X
γ4
B 0 0 −X
βG1
B −X
βG2
B
γ1X
γ1
B γ2X
γ2
B γ3X
γ3
B γ4X
γ4
B 0 0 −βG1 X
βG1
B −βG2 X
βG2
B
l1Xγ1B l2X
γ2
B l3X
γ3
B l4X
γ4
B 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 X
βG1
G X
βG2
G

(A.77)
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and
b :=

−AG5 + C3DB + C4 + C5Dγ1B + C6Dγ2B
C3DB + γ1C5D
γ1
B + γ2C6D
γ2
B
−C3DG − C4 − C5Dγ3G − C6Dγ4G + αGΛG
(
(1− τ)DGyG +GunlevG (DG)
)
−AB5 + αBΛB
(
(1− τ)DByB +GunlevB (DB)
)
−AG5 + Z (XB) +B4
XBZ
′ (XB)
−AB5 + dˆB
(
(sB + 1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯yB )XB
)
−Z (XG) +B4 + dˆG ((sG + 1)XG)

.
(A.78)
The solution to the unknowns is again given by
[
AG1 AG2 AG3 AG4 C1 C2 B1 B2
]T
= M−1b. (A.79)
1.5 Bankruptcy costs
For the calculation of bankruptcy costs, the ODEs are given by the following system:
For 0 ≤ X ≤ DG : bG (X) = (1− αGΛG)(1− τ)XyG +GG (X)− αGΛGGunlevG (X)bB (X) = (1− αBΛB)(1− τ)XyB +GB (X)− αBΛBBunlevB (X) . (A.80)
For DG < X ≤ DB :
rGbG (X) = µ˜GXb
′
G (X) +
1
2 σ˜
2
GX
2b′′G (X)
+λ˜G
(
(1− αBΛB)(1− τ)XyB +GB (X)− αBΛBGunlevB (X)− bG (X)
)
bB (X) = (1− αBΛB) (1− τ)XyB +GB (X)− αBΛBGunlevB (X) .
(A.81)
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For DB < X < XG : rGdG (X) = c+ µ˜GXb′G (X) + 12 σ˜2GX2b′′G (X) + λ˜G (bB (X)− bG (X))rBdB (X) = c+ µ˜BXd′B (X) + 12 σ˜2BX2b′′B (X) + λ˜B (bG (X)− bB (X)) . (A.82)
For XG ≤ X < XB : bG (X) = dˆG ((sG + 1)X)rdB (X) = c+ µ˜BXb′B (X) + 12 σ˜2BX2b′′B (X) + λ˜B (dˆG ((sG + 1)X)− bB (X)) .
(A.83)
For X ≥ XB :  bG (X) = bˆG ((sG + 1)X)bB (X) = bˆB ((sB + 1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯yB )X) . (A.84)
The boundary conditions are as follows:
lim
X↘DB
bG (X) = lim
X↗DB
bG (X) , (A.85)
lim
X↘DB
b′G (X) = lim
X↗DB
b′G (X) , (A.86)
lim
X↘DG
bG (X) = (1− αGΛB)(1− τ)DGyG +GG (DG)− αGΛGGunlevG (DG) , (A.87)
lim
X↘DB
bB (X) = (1− αGΛG)(1− τ)DByB +GB (DB)− αBGunlevB (DB) , (A.88)
lim
X↘XG
bB (X) = lim
X↗XG
bB (X) , (A.89)
lim
X↘XG
b′B (X) = lim
X↗XG
b′B (X) , (A.90)
lim
X↗XG
bG (X) = bˆG ((sG + 1)XG) , (A.91)
and
lim
X↗XB
bB (XB) = bˆB
(
(sB + 1− KB/ΛB
(1− τ)Xt¯yB
)XB
)
. (A.92)
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Eqs. (A.85) and (A.86) are the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions for bankruptcy
costs in good states at the default boundary in bad states. Similarly, Eqs. (A.89) and
(A.90) are the corresponding conditions for bankruptcy costs in bad states at the option
exercise boundary in good states. Eqs. (A.87) and (A.88) are the value-matching condi-
tions at the default thresholds. They incorporate the fact that upon default, the value of
the leveraged growth option switches to the value of the unleveraged growth option. Eqs.
(A.91) and (A.92) are the value-matching conditions at the option exercise boundaries.
To solve for the unknown parameters, we plug the functional form
bi (X) =

(1− αiΛi)(1− τ)Xyi − αiΛiGunlevi (X) +Gi(X) X ≤ Di, i = G,B
C1X
βB1 + C2X
βB2 + C5X
γ3 + C6X
γ4
+λ˜G
αBΛByB(1−τ)
rG−µ˜G+λ˜G X +
c
rG+λ˜G
DG < X ≤ DB, i = G
Ai1X
γ1 +Ai2X
γ2 +Ai3X
γ3 +Ai4X
γ4 + c
rpi
DB < X ≤ XG, i = G,B
B1X
βB1 +B2X
βB2 + Z (X) + λ˜B
c
rPi (rB+λ˜B)
+ c
rB+λ˜B
XG < X ≤ XB, i = B
bˆG ((sG + 1)X) X > XG, i = G
bˆB
(
(sB + 1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯yB )X
)
X > XB, i = B
(A.93)
into the system of boundary conditions (A.85)-(A.92). The solution to the unknowns is
given by [
AG1 AG2 AG3 AG4 C1 C2 B1 B2
]T
= M−1b, (A.94)
where
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M :=

Dγ1B D
γ2
B D
γ3
B D
γ4
B −D
βG1
B −D
βG2
B 0 0
γ1D
γ1
B γ2D
γ2
B γ3D
γ3
B γ4D
γ4
B −βG1 D
βG1
B −βG2 D
βG2
B 0 0
0 0 0 0 D
βG1
G D
βG2
G 0 0
l1D
γ1
B l2D
γ2
B l3D
γ3
B l4D
γ4
B 0 0 0 0
l1X
γ1
G l2X
γ2
G l3X
γ3
G l4X
γ4
G 0 0 −X
βB1
G −X
βB2
G
l1γ1X
γ1
G l2γ2X
γ2
G l3γ3X
γ3
G l4γ4X
γ4
G 0 0 −βB1 X
βB1
G −βB2 X
βB2
G
Xγ1G X
γ2
G X
γ3
G X
γ4
G 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 X
βB1
B X
βB2
B

,
(A.95)
b :=

−AG5 + C3DB + C4 + C5Dγ1B + C6Dγ2B
C3DB + γ1C5D
γ1
B + γ2C6D
γ2
B
−C3DG − C4 − C5Dγ3G − C6Dγ4G + (1− αGΛG)
(
(1− τ)DGyG − αGΛGGunlevG (DG)
)
+GG(DG)
−AB5 + (1− αBΛB)
(
(1− τ)DByB − αBΛBGunlevB (DB)
)
+GB(DB)
−AB5 + Z (XG) +B4
XGZ
′ (XG)
−AG5 + dˆG ((sG + 1)XG)
−Z (XB) +B4 + dˆB
(
(sB + 1− KB/ΛB(1−τ)Xt¯yB )XB
)

,
(A.96)
C5 =
l¯3
l3
(
A¯levG3 − αBΛBA¯unlevG3
)
, (A.97)
and
C6 =
l¯4
l4
(
A¯levG4 − αBΛBA¯unlevG4
)
. (A.98)
The case in which DG < DB, DˆG < DˆB, and XG > XB:
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This case can be solved analogously.
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2 Data and Variables
Our sample includes all U.S. manufacturing firms (SIC codes between 2000 and 3999) as
provided in the Compustat annual research file. We consider the following firm individual
variables: Ft are the net fixed assets (PPENT) at the beginning of the period t, and
Total Assets are the book values of the assets (AT). Asset Sale is equal to the cash
proceeds received from the sale of fixed assets (SPPE), and Investment is obtained from
the Compustat item capital expenditures (CAPX). Both variables are scaled by Ft. We
compute the firm individual sales growth as first difference of the Compustat item SALE.
We standardize the firm individual sales growth by subtracting the mean and scaling it
with its standard deviation. To compute the sample aggregate sales growth we compute
then for each year the value-weighted mean sales growth across all sample firms. Age is the
number of years a firm has been listed at the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ, i.e., the current
year minus the first year of a firm’s stock price entry in the merged CRSP/Compustat
file. Using Total Assets and Age, we construct the SA-index as measure of financial
constraints following Hadlock and Pierce (2010) as
− 0.737 ∗ Total Assets+ 0.043 ∗ (Total Assets)2 − 0.04 ∗Age. (B.1)
q is a proxy for growth opportunities and calculated as the sum of total debt and market
equity divided by the book value of total assets (cf., Hovakimian and Titman 2006).
Financial Slack corresponds to the sum of cash and short-term investments (CHE) scaled
by Ft. We define Total Debt as the sum of total liabilities (LT) and total preferred
stock (PSTK) excluding deferred taxes (TXDB) and convertible debt (DCVT) scaled by
Total Assets. As a proxy for Cash F low we use the sum of income before extraordinary
items, depreciation and amortization (IB + DP) scaled by Ft. Cov. Ratio is EBITDA
divided by interest expenses (XINT). The Altman (1968) Z-score is a widely used measure
of financial distress. It is computed for each firm as
Z = 1.2∗ACT − LCT
AT
+1.4∗RE
AT
+3.3∗NI +XINT + TXT
AT
+0.6∗ME
LT
+0.999∗SALE
AT
.
(B.2)
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A higher value >2.99 indicates that the firm is not financially distressed. We compute
the equity issuance costs for our sample firms according to the cost function estimated
in Hennessy and Whited (2007). In their paper, Hennessy and Whited (2007) provide
estimates for the equity issuance costs function for small, large and all firms in their
sample. At the end of each year, we sort firms according to their size (ME) into tercile
portfolios. We then compute the equity issuance costs for the firms in each portfolio for the
subsequent year according to the amount of equity that a firm issues in the corresponding
year (SSTK). For the firms in the lowest size portfolio, we use the estimation results of
Hennessy and Whited (2007) for small firms, for the highest size tercile the estimations
for large firms, and for the medium size tercile the estimation results that Hennessy and
Whited (2007) obtain for the full sample. We winsorize the estimated equity issuance
costs at the 90% level to control for outliers.17
The sample period is 1971 to 2010, and all variables are deflated to 1982 dollars using
the CPI. Only firms with at least 24 consecutive months of data remain in the sample.
Furthermore, we winsorize the sample with regard to the book-to-market ratio, market
equity, age, investment, asset sale, and stock returns at the 99% and 1% level. In addition,
we exclude firms that have a q below zero or above ten to address issues of investment
opportunity measurement in the data. We also require firms to hold at least 5 million
dollars in fixed assets to eliminate very small firms. The final sample contains of 3563
firms.
In Table B1, we report some basic sample characteristics. The table reports the mean,
the standard deviation (Std), the median, the 25 percent (Q25) and the 75 percent quan-
tiles (Q75). Panel A provides summary statistics for different sample variables of the full
sample. In Panel B and Panel C, the table reports the same summary statistics but for
bad and good states, respectively. We define an aggregate downturn of our firm economy
as years where the sample aggregate sales growth and the annual return across sample
firms are in the bottom 25% across all years. We choose this definition of a business cycle
downturn mainly because sales growth combined with market based downturn measures
are a direct measure of the propagation of positive and negative shocks from the aggre-
gate economy onto the corporate level (see also the downturn definitions in e.g., Opler and
17Using the SA-index instead of size as sorting variable does not change the quality of our results.
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Titman 1994, Gilson et al. 1990). All other years are defined as good state.
176
Data and Variables
Table B1: Compustat Sample Summary Statistics
The table provides summary statistics for different sample variables in Panel A. In Panel B and
Panel C, the table reports summary statistics for bad (Panel B) and good (Panel C) states. We define
an aggregate downturn of our firm economy as years in which the sample aggregate sales growth and the
average annual equity return across sample firms are, simultaneously, in the bottom 25% of all years. All
other years are considered as a good state. The table reports the mean, the standard deviation (Std), the
median, the 25 percent (Q25), and the 75 percent quantile (Q75). Total Assets (AT ) and Fixed Assets (F )
are in million dollars, measured at the beginning of each year. Investment is equal to capital expenditures.
Cash F low is the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization. Asset Sale
are the cash proceeds from sale of fixed capital. Fin. Slack is the sum of cash and short-term investments.
Investment, Cash F low, Asset Sale, and Fin. Slack are scaled by the book value of the beginning-of-
period net fixed assets. Total debt is (LT+PSTK-TXDB-DCVT) scaled by Total Assets. Market Equity
is computed as the CRSP monthly share price (PRC) multiplied with the number of outstanding shares
(SHROUT). The variable Cov. Ratio is computed by dividing EBITDA with the interest expenses. The
sample period is 1971 to 2010. The sample consists of 3563 U.S. manufacturing firms.
Panel A: Summary Statistics – Full Sample Period
Variable Mean Std Q25 Median Q75
TotalAssets (TA) 1096.7957 3902.4779 107.9349 248.368 775.2354
Fixedassets (F ) 341.71 1227.6213 25.3198 65.0605 226.4631
q 1.3736 1.5714 0.3208 0.8114 1.8194
Investment/F 0.2224 0.1267 0.1351 0.1943 0.2769
Asset Sales/F 0.0163 0.0335 0 0.0041 0.017
Cash flow/F 0.3401 0.8763 0.1883 0.3178 0.5115
Fin. Slack/F 0.7944 1.734 0.0777 0.2218 0.6741
Total debt/TA 0.4371 0.1816 0.3061 0.4366 0.5556
Market Equity 1073.251 3124.8059 67.8379 230.3514 774.345
Cov. ratio 50.3956 650.1915 3.8589 7.5978 16.5498
Panel B: Summary Statistics – Bad Business Cycle States
Variable Mean Std Q25 Median Q75
TotalAssets (TA) 956.4744 3274.8589 104.4335 243.0936 691.5205
Fixedassets (F ) 321.4881 1116.0169 25.5838 68.6458 223.8184
q 0.7426 1.3518 0.1049 0.2023 0.6972
Investment/F 0.2293 0.1299 0.1402 0.2025 0.2836
Asset Sales/F 0.0166 0.029 0 0.006 0.0196
Cash flow/F 0.3381 0.8569 0.2063 0.3028 0.4566
Fin. Slack/F 0.528 1.4339 0.072 0.1546 0.3511
Total debt/TA 0.4499 0.1652 0.3363 0.4563 0.5574
Market Equity 602.085 2514.0054 18.278 69.1531 341.5384
Cov. ratio 27.3812 178.9324 4.2015 7.5163 14.1713
Panel C: Summary Statistics – Good Business Cycle States
Variable Mean Std Q25 Median Q75
TotalAssets (TA) 1110.2081 3957.0518 108.067 249.1114 782.224
Fixedassets (F ) 343.6429 1237.764 25.2956 64.7399 226.5775
q 1.4339 1.5777 0.3726 0.8774 1.9019
Investment/F 0.2217 0.1264 0.1347 0.1936 0.2763
Asset Sales/F 0.0162 0.0339 0 0.0039 0.0167
Cash flow/F 0.3403 0.8782 0.1863 0.3197 0.5177
Fin. Slack/F 0.8199 1.7579 0.0782 0.2343 0.7094
Total debt/TA 0.4358 0.183 0.3028 0.4346 0.5555
MarketEquity 1118.2869 3173.4242 77.0098 248.7331 816.8768
Cov. ratio 52.6282 678.6751 3.8251 7.6041 16.7963
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